Journal of Asian Civilizations

Vol. 39, No. 2, December 2016

Journal of Asian Civilizations

(Founded by Late Prof. Dr. Ahmad Hassan Dani in 1978
as
Journal of Central Asia)

Editor
Ghani-ur-Rahman (PhD)

Vol. 39, No. 2
December 2016

Cover Photo:
Buddha, Standing with the Wheel of Law, from Gandhara (Taddei, M. 1966).

Rs. 400.00 in Pakistan
U.S. $ 40.00 outside Pakistan

ISSN 1993-4696

HEC recognized "X" category journal, since May 2015

Published by:
Taxila Institute of Asian Civilizations
Quaid-i-Azam University Islamabad, Pakistan.
Tele: +92-51-2601066, Fax: +92-51-9248127
E-mail: taxilainstitute@yahoo.com

Printed at: Sohail Altaf Printers, Rawalpindi – Pakistan
Ph: 051-5770388/ E-Mail: sohailaltaf1958@gmail.com

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Translation, Cultural Adaptation and Cross Language Validation of Domains of Language Use Patterns

Uzma Anjum
Qaisar Khan
Ajmal Gulzar

Abstract

The present study seeks to ascertain the reliability and validity of a modified questionnaire. It is endeavoring statically the configuration of existing language domains of an endangered minority language, Mankiyali. The process includes translation, cultural adaptation and cross language and cultural validation of questionnaire entitled Domain of Language Use with the sample of Mankiyali speakers. This language is spoken in the north of Pakistan. The age range of the studied sample has been 10 to 80 years. It has been translated and culturally modified following committee translation approach (Brislin, 1980; Schoua-Glusberg, 1992; Acquadro et al., 1996; Guillemin et al., 1993). Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was accomplished to investigate covert and novel configuration of this questionnaire. Results revealed that Domain of Language Use consisted of five factors (Dominant Languages Use Patterns Mankiyali in Family, Religious and Neighborhood, Mankiyali in Religious Domain, Hindko and Pashto in Neighborhood and Family Domain, Languages in Friendship Domain). The investigated scale provided assessment for existing domains of a lesser acknowledged language in order to grasp a better assessment and comprehension regarding language vitality of a minority language in multilingual contexts.

The focus of the study is a language spoken in a village Dana, which is situated at a remote hilltop. Dana is one of the small villages situated in



Figure 1 (Map of Union Council Bandi Shungli)
Source: Army Map Service (LU) Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army, Washington, D.C. Retrieved on 1 March, 2015: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/ams/india/ni-43-05.jpg

Bandi Shungli that in turn forms part of the union council of Tehsil Oghi situated to the north-west end of district Mansehra in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Paget 1907). In a preliminary survey conducted in September 2012, the total population of Dana was 411. The community residing in the village speaks a different language unintelligible to the people of surrounding communities living in Bandi Shungli who are predominantly Hindko, Gujari and Pashto speakers. More importantly, the language is not listed in the existing literature related to the study of linguistic landscape of Pakistan (Lewis et al. 2014). Some of its speakers call it Mankiyali.

The dominant languages of Bandi Shungli are Hindko, Gujari and Pashto. However, all the female above twenty-five are bilingual in Mankiyali and Hindko. In Sociolinguistic terms, Mankiyali language is a different language from the other languages spoken in the region. Core vocabulary items comparisons showed this difference. It shares higher lexical similarity with Bateri than any other language within the ""Dardic" group of Indo-Aryan languages. Mankiyali is not mutually intelligible with any other neighboring languages including Bateri as it does not show enough lexical similarity. language.

Conventionally, most of the people of village Dana are subsistence farmers. Most of the households keep cattle such as buffalo, goats, sheep, and cows. Households consume most of the milk production, share some quantity with neighbors and rest is sold in the market. The manure of the livestock is used to enrich their fields. Likewise, two harvests of the two crops are important occasions of the village. Wheat is harvested in the month of June and corn is harvested in the month of September. These events are very significant to the village life of Dana because for almost six months they consume the crops they produce themselves. The community as a whole participates in the harvest. Other neighboring communities bring drumbeaters and play songs to entertain the harvesters; however, this community does not follow this practice because of their association with religion as being prayers leaders in different villages and Imams of mosques. Another important event of community is grass reaping. The month of September is the time when the entire community goes to the village pastures for cutting fodder for the cattle. This annual grass reaping is done in order to store winter fodder for the livestock. Reaping grass is a very tough time for the whole village. It starts early in the morning and ends at sunset. Other than two crops, seasonal vegetables such as tomatoes, potatoes, turnips are also cultivated on the small scale for the consumption of the family.

Men of this community are also employed on lowly or moderately paid professions. Recently, some of the educated men have made their way to government jobs. There are nine teachers in the village teaching in different private and public schools. The village has labors, teachers, skilled workers, drivers and security personnel. Recently, few of them have gone to the Middle East for employment. Health problems of this community also showed the low quality of life and vigorous life style of

these people. A medical camp organized for the community confirmed that most of the health problems of the community are because of rigorous living conditions, malnourishment and the centuries-old tradition of endogamy.

Exploratory Factor Analysis has been used to classify distinctive variables of the scale and to study the alignment or relationship amongst the tested variables. This test determines and computed multidimensionality of a theoretical construct. It evaluates the construct validity of a measure (Thompson 2004). The findings of EFA investigated the existing language domains of people living in village Dana. Results of EFA indicated the structures of Domain of Language Use.

Prevailing Communicative domains of a particular are very crucial indicators of language vigor and loss (Brenzinger et al. 2003). This specific theoretical framework is associated with the multilingual settings and related to an appropriate language with regard to, 'who speaks what language to whom, when, where and even why?' (Fishman 1965). With a view to properly categorize different variables on the scale and to examine their association across variables, the study employs Exploratory Factor Analysis. It is best-suited to discover and calculate multidimensionality of a theoretical construct. Further, it also facilitates assessment of the construct validity of a scale (Thompson 2004). The current study aims to establish the reliability and validity of an expanded scale including cross language validation of language domains and use patterns along with adaptation and translation.

This comparative study has been based on Fishman's model (1971). Overall, the domains in which a language exists, its use in family and the attitudes of its native speakers are pivotal parameters to demonstrate the loss or vitality of a language (Brenzinger et al. 2003; Fishman 1991, Lewis & Simons 2010). The current study also investigates language domains and attitudes of native speakers. Fishman (1972) has proposed a framework of language choices and different language situations that primarily refers to who the speaker is, to whom and when he speaks and in what language. The said framework also has a scope for encompassing the use of different languages in multilingual settings. For instance, it has the capacity to describe tangible locations including home, religious sphere, educational domain, market, playground, street, community-specific events, government, neighborhood, legal sphere and

workplace (Tsunoda 2009: 65). Among the locations, Fishman (1991) finds family use crucial as it largely determines the nature and extent to which a language is transmitted over generations. Family is also significant to the maintenance and vitality of a language as its role is indispensable for the survival of a language (Rohani et al. 2005).

Language performs several roles and facilitates life functioning in human societies. Globally, the English language has emerged one of the leading languages due to its worldwide usage. It is also native to several communities and countries and has served a communication link between them. In imperialistic terms, it has been a major symbol of power and authority and has been exploited to control the rest of the world by its speakers in various domains. It is used in the administration, courts, instruction, media, and several categories of literature worldwide (Görlach 1991: 1). This operational multiplicity is also linked with language attitudes (Tsunoda 2009: 67). In comparison, minority languages, according to Tsunoda (2009: 65), mostly influence rites, mores, customs, communal life, native and local occasions, folk lore, family, domestic business, informal close group communications, worship and commonality.

The existing domains of English and local languages in India were examined in an online survey by Hohenthal (2003) including family, neighborhood, friendship, education, transactions, government and employment. The purpose of the survey was to investigate language behaviors of the participants by employing an attitude-gauging tool. The findings of the study were explicit in stating that English enjoyed dominance in power circles and was exploited to yield authority while other local languages were found to dominate more informal domains like communal life, native and local occasions.

In a similar study, Gal (1989: 316) investigated the functional domains of German and Hungarian in an Austrian village, Oberwart that was surrounded by villages with German speakers. It was revealed that Hungarian was associated and thus represented intimate functional domains related to regional accomplishments, customary life, communal harmony and agricultural life. Rubin (1968) has also offered a fascinating functional dissemination amongst Paraguayan Guarani and Spanish. It is the lively native language of South America and is a vigorous part of an unwavering bilingual setting.

Haugen (1953) has illustrated the association across religious bonds, separateness and language shift. Religion, however, has not been investigated in bilingual or multilingual setting (Spolsky 2003). Fishman et al. (1966) offer an outline of the influence of religious undercurrents on language loss and preservation in the background of migration. Stewart (1968: 541) also records religion as one of the domains for prevailing language usage. Ferguson (1982) on the other hand, concentrates on various orthographic traditions and escalated mushrooming of important religions. Ferguson (1959) refers to his former researches on religion and diglossia. The study also examines implications of diglossic usage configurations in religious sphere (Ferguson 1959) and language policy and planning (Ferguson 1968). Fasold (1987: 77-78) has also focused on the situation of a language mainly related to religious rites and ceremonies. Edwards (2009: 101) has examined mushrooming of Islam and growth of Arab Empire in the seventh and eighth centuries. Likewise, history presents how Christian evangelists became contributory to extend colonialism and neocolonialism. This has threatened indigenous cultures and languages all over the globe. These Christian missionaries have performed a foremost contribution in widespread usage and promotion of European languages, and chiefly English (Pennycook 2005). Another research related to church relationship and its impact on language practices, distinctiveness, and language distinction among Kwara'ae speaking research sample is in the Solomon Islands. In the islands, the growth and moderation of language has been examined in relation to several conflicting church ideologies of dissimilar sects and also their impact on language choice and modification. The findings reveal that church members identify and distinguish themselves separately through the choice of their language and through discourse configurations and nonverbal features of communication (Watson-Gegeo and Gegeo 1991).

Methods

Translation of the questionnaire is a vital procedure for such an indigenous context when there is no such instrument present in the particular field of study (Harkness &Schoua-Glusberg 1998). It has been translated and modified following committee translation approach (Brislin 1980; Schoua-Glusberg 1992; Acquadro et al. 1996; Guillemin et al. 1993). MCT also termed as team translation method. This translation method has two

stages. In the first stage, the questionnaire was translated. In the second stage, translator and another bilingual English language teacher not only inspected translation but also fixed the discrepancies in the selected translated items and thus final version was ready for the study (Acquadro et al. 1996). The aim of MCT is to acquire Urdu version of the English questionnaire that is conceptually corresponding in the targeted language and culture. The emphasis was on cross-cultural and conceptual equivalence rather than on linguistic and literal equivalence. A well-established technique to accomplish this goal is to use translations (Harkness &Schoua-Glusberg 1998). It was guaranteed that the translators are bilingual in both Urdu and English. The original list of questions was handed over to these bilingual experts.

Three hundred and three participants were included in the current investigation. These participants were native speakers of Mankiyali language. This survey included all the male and female population from 10-80 years of the village. As the age ranged from 10 to 80 years in this study, the mean age was 32 (M=32.33, SD=15.07). Purposive sampling was the sampling technique for this part of the study.

As the total number of population of Dana village was 411, whole population over 9 years was part of the study. The participants of the study fell into two groups: all the inhabitants of Dana village with both parents speaking it as mother tongue, and all those residents of the village of Dana with only fathers speaking it as their native language**.**

Results of EFA

Factor analysis is an important tool that can be used in development, refinement, and evaluation of tests, scales, and measures. Exploratory factor analysis is a very significant technique of checking dimensionality. In the current study, the technique was used for configuring and decreasing the number of items of the questionnaire. Principal axis extraction technique was used as it exactly improved Hampered features and specified multivariate normality (Briggs & MacCallum 2003). Kaiser-Meyers-Olkin (KMO) value was employed for assessing sampling sufficiency and Bartlett method was employed to discriminate unbiased factors that linked with their own factors only (Tabachnick & Fidell 2007). Content validity was confirmed through a discussion with two subject experts; one of them was an M Phil scholar and the other was a college

teacher. Cronbach's alpha test was undertaken to test internal consistency and to measure how narrowly linked a set of questionnaire items was as a collection. It is believed to be a degree of measured reliability. In addition to measuring internal consistency, evidence to the effect was provided to determine that the questionnaire in question had been unidimensional and additional analyses have been performed. After applying Cronbach's Alpha reliability test on these five subscales, EFA was complete. The total items tested were sixty-nine. It is exploring domain patterns of language use. The overall Internal consistency of the scale for the total score was adequate to make it a reliable tool (α =.84).

The sample size was more than four times bigger than the total number of items (Field 2010). It helped to uncover the underlying structure of a relatively large set of variables. Kaiser-Meyers-Olkin (KMO) and Bartlett's Test of Sphericity are also the measures of appropriateness of Exploratory Factor Analysis (Norris & Lecavalier, 2010). First of all Kaiser-Meyers-Olkin (KMO) was computed to analyze the sampling adequacy. Bartlett's test of Sphericity was employed to ensure the sampling adequacy (N = 303) and after this test EFA was applied. The result of KMO (.78) which confirmed the justification of reliable factors with Bartlett test of Sphericity $\chi 2$ (2346) =12219.623 significant at $p < .000$ indicated that the data is appropriate for running EFA, as correlations have been proved to be convincing enough for undertaking such tests.

Table (See Appendix- B)

Factor loadings of 69 items (N = 303)

This table specified that no binary loadings were more than .31 (Costello & Osborne 2011). Binary loading has been termed as a twofold response (double barrel). These kinds of items are confusing for the participants (Field, 2010). Most of the items remain in a satisfactory range other than eighteen items. Eighteen items (. 24, 25, 26, 27, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 56, 57, 62, 63, 68, and 69) revealed double loading items and were excluded from the scale. On both factors, there were factor loadings less than .30, still emerging on expected factors. Other items of questionnaire were on the satisfactory range and satisfying the standards of factor loading, all these items were retained in the final version of the

questionnaire. Moreover, loadings below 0.3 point to the inability of the participants to comprehend these items (Bowling 1997).

Originally, 13 factors were recommended with eigen values more than 1. The Scree Plot (see Cattell as cited in Kim and Muller 1987) suggested 5 factors solution with eigen values. This analysis revealed some double loading items, therefore; I excluded these items from the scale. Binary loading has been termed as a twofold response (double barrel). These kinds of items were confusing for the participants (Field 2010). Moreover, value 0.3 points to the inability of participants to comprehend these items (Bowling 1997). Other items of the questionnaire were in acceptable range and satisfying the standards of factor loading, all these items were retained in the final version of the questionnaire. Originally, 13 factors were recommended with eigen values more than 1. The Scree Plot (Cattell as cited in Kim and Muller 1987) suggested 5 factors solution with eigen values.

Exploratory Factor Analysis is used to classify different variables of the under discussion scale. Moreover, this statistical framework has been employed to study the configuration and association across variables. This procedure also calculated multi-dimensionality of the scale.

When a language is detected as developing, it will mostly display a positive attitude of the speakers. A language might have a positive attitude if a substantial number of speakers speaks it, if it performs multiple roles in different functional domains and it is used in education and has a standardized orthography to be used in power domains such as education. On the other hand, negative attitudes to a specific language happen when there are no agreeable and encouraging attitudes are seen for the function of the language (Tsunoda 2006: 59).



Fig, 1, Scree Plot

Domains of Language Use Patterns

This term has been defined as a phenomenon of using varied languages or varieties of the same language in various social contexts termed as language domains. According to Fasold (1984: 183), domain is a choice in a bilingual/ multilingual situation where the use of a specific language is more appropriate than that of other languages. It has items related to family, religion, friendship, neighborhood, education, government, transactions and employment domains. Most of the items have been taken from Hohenthal (2003). Some items were taken from Rehman (2011) and some other items were added after pilot testing and focus group discussions. It has 1-4 scoring. 1 is the lowest and 4 is the highest value. It has following subscales:

Dominant Languages Use Patterns (DLUP)
Majority languages generally overshadow indigenous and native language use of minority language in various language domains. The language situation in a multilingual society offers complex language choices to the speakers in different domains (MacPherson & Ghoso 2008). This subscale included items in the context of majority languages used by participants of the study. This part of the questionnaire included English, which is the official language of the country, Urdu is national language of the country, Pashto, is majority language of the province, and Hindko is regional majority language of this area. It has 15 items. It includes different functional domains such as family, religion, friendship, neighborhood, education, government, transactions and employment domains

Mankiyali in Family, Religious and Neighborhood (MFRN)
According to Fase, Jaspaert & Kroon (1992), language use patterns within a speech community determine the vitality and endangerment of a language. Informal domains (family, neighborhood and religion) are associated with community language within a bilingual or multilingual context (Tsunoda 2006: 59). The present study included Mankiyali in informal domains to investigate the pattern of use across family neighborhood and religion. In this subscale, items are measuring functional domains of Mankiyali in family, religious and neighborhood. It has 15 items.

Mankiyali in Religious Domain (MRD)
Religion has been identified as a very important source of indigenous and minority language exposure throughout the world (Pak 2003; Park & Sarkar 2007; Tse 2001). Religious places have been recognized an important domain and crucial factor of the minority language use and vitality (Hinton 1999). This subscale has been developed in the light of the experts' opinion, available literature (Horowitz 1975; Chong 1998; Joseph 2004; Tsunoda 2006) and results of focus groups. This subscale has four items. It also follows scoring mentioned in the previous subscale. All the items in this scale are focused on the use of Mankiyali language in preaching religion, loudspeaker announcements of the mosque, regular prayers and Friday prayer (Namaz-i-Jumma).

Hindko and Pashto in Neighborhood and family domain (HPNFD) and Languages in Friendship Domain (LFD)

These variables reflect multilingualism of a speech community. Peer influence is an essential variable of language shift. This is a language situation where more than one language is used. This context creates a contact situation (Fishman 1965: 76). However, balanced language use of two or more than two can be developed in a minority (Landry & Allard 1992). This subscale is based on language use of Hindko and Pashto in domains of neighborhood and family. The first subscale is measuring functional domains of Mankiyali in family, religious and neighborhood. It has 15 items and scoring is 1-4, as in other parts of the questionnaire. The second subscale is based on all the languages used across peers and acquaintances. It included Mankiyali, Pashto, and Hindko.

Discussion

Exploratory Factor Analysis has been used to categorize different variables of the scale and to study the configuration or association across variables. This measure discovers and calculated multidimensionality of a theoretical construct. It assesses the construct validity of a scale (Thompson 2004). The result of EFA explored new existing domains of people living in village Dana. Results of EFA indicated the structures Domain of Language Use. Moreover, these findings suggest that these items are appropriate for evaluation of language domains in Pakistani cultural and linguistic perspective. Moreover, during this translation method, certain items were found inappropriate for the Pakistani culture and society. Hence, these items were revised in harmony with Pakistani cultural framework. For this purpose method of (Brislin 1980; Schoua-Glusberg 1992; Acquadro et al. 1996; Guillemin et al. 1993) have been used.

Prevailing Communicative domains of a particular language are very crucial indicators of language vigor and loss (Brenzinger et al. 2003). There has not been any valid and reliable scale to existing language domains in the perspective of lesser acknowledged languages in Pakistan (O'leary et al. 1992; Rehman 2010). These results showed the relationships across variables (Field 2009: 167) as they represent language use patterns of various languages in the lives of Tarawara community living in Dana village. Dominant languages use patterns included English,

the official language of the country; Urdu, national language of the country; Pashto, majority language of the province and Hindko, regional majority language of this area. The results show the existing of Mankiyali domains have been shared with other languages. Pandharipande (2002: 213-234) defines this relationship in terms of a low functional load of minority languages as compared to the higher functional load of the dominant languages. This disparity resulted in the low prestige of minority languages of the country. Pakistani minority languages have been facing a looming jeopardy because of this higher functional load of the dominant language (Rahman 2005). According to Rehman and Baart (2005: 1-4), only 500 active speakers currently speak Kundal Shahi. The results of the initial survey also included a varying language behavior of the speech community. The study showed shrinking functional domains of the language. It has been used only in formal domains. In the same way, Weinreich (2010) examined language shift of Domaakí, a marginalized minority language spoken by 350 speakers in the Nager and Hunza Valleys, Northern areas of Pakistan. According to the results of this study, the marginalized community of Doms (‘musicians’) is gradually shifting from their mother tongue due to social pressures. These speakers have been speaking this language in only limited domains.

The external pressures of dying language are because of the choices in a bilingual and multilingual context. These pressures also generate the possibilities of language shift and maintenance of a minority language (Weinreich 1964). The results showed that although the Mankiyali language has been transmitted to the next generation but this language group has been reportedly in contact situation in all the existing domains and community, eventually in coming years, will discontinue this language in favor of Hindko language. Mankiyali appeared to negotiate a contesting position with Hindko language in all the domains of language use of Tarawara community living in Dana village. Mankiyali is still spoken and transferred to the next generation in these families. This trend was found consistent with existing literature (Antonini 2003; Anjum 2016).

In Pakistan, dominance of few languages in the domains of power created a persistent conflict between the various cultural and ethnic groups. Focus of language planning at the national level has been on only a few dominant languages. Urdu is the national language of the country

whereas English is the official language and dominant in the domains of power (Rahman 1999: 262). These policies have disastrous consequences on the fate of local and indigenous languages in Pakistan. English has been a dominant language in most of the post-colonial societies. Although it has never functioned in informal and intimate language domains of these countries; however, it has always been part of power discourse of these societies as it is used in the domains of administration, law education, media, and a few types of literature (Rahman 2006).

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APPENDIX A

QUESTIONNAIRE

This research is conducted under the supervision of Faculty of Higher Studies, NUML Islamabad. The present research is related to Mankiyali language. The data collection in this regard will be a part of an academic study only. Thank you very much for your cooperation.

Name……

Your age:…….

Gender: Male Female

Place of birth ……

Area where you Live:……

Nearest City……

Occupation…….

Highest Qualification (level of education)……..

List all the other languages you can communicate ……

Sect……

Do you live in village…..

Family System joint / Unitary

Monthly Income……

Number of Siblings……

Birth Order……

Marital Status……

Are you married within community or outside?.....

Married In Paternal tribe or maternal……..

Has your family always been living in this village……

Name of your father's village ……

Name of your mother's village……

Father's Language…….

Mother's Language……..

Spouse's Language……

For How Many Times You Go Out Of Village……

If yes, what places do you travel to?

…….

If you don't live in village Which city/ village do you live……..

Please tick the appropriate number from 1 to 4.(1. Never 2. Sometimes 3. Often 4. Always

		1	**2**	**3**	**4**
1.	My boss speaks Urdu so I speak Urdu to him.				
2.	I speak Urdu with my colleagues.				
3.	It is necessary to know Urdu for a government jobs.				
4.	My boss speaks Pashto so i speak Pashto to him.				
5.	I speak Urdu with my friends and acquaintances.				
6.	From grade, one Urdu language was language of instruction for me.				
7.	I speak Urdu with all my friends who speak other languages.				
8.	My boss speaks Hindko so I Hindko with him.				
9.	I speak Pashto with all my friends who speak other				

	languages.				
10.	At my office, I use Urdu to introduce my friends to others.				
11.	From grade, one Hindko language was language of instruction for me.				
12.	I speak Urdu to men of my family				
13.	I speak Pashto with strangers.				
14.	My boss speaks English so i speak English with him.				
15.	I send applications and official letters in English.				
16.	I speak Hindko to my family for discussing important issues of the family				
17.	I appeal and address God in Mankiyali.				
18.	I speak Mankiyali to women of my family				
19.	I speak Mankiyali with my family				
20.	Malvi Shahib uses Mankiyal for giving instruction while teaching Quran				
21.	To discuss important matters of the family I speak Urdu				
22.	My neighbours speak Mankiyali				
23.	When offering nimaz at home I offer dua in Mankiyali				
24.	I speak Mankiyali to children of my family				
25.	I speak Mankiyali with my family members				
26.	Preaching of molvi Shahib is in Mankiyali language.				
27.	In my village, Language of religious instruction is Mankiyali				
28.	The mosque loud speaker all announcements are				

	made in Mankiyali language				
29.	In my village after Jumah prayers dua is offered in Mankiyali				
30.	My neighbours speak Hindko.				
31.	I speak Pashto to women of my family				
32.	To discuss important matters of the family I speak Pashto				
33.	I use Mankiyal to introduce my friends to others				
34.	I speak Hindko with all my friends who speak other languages.				
35.	I speak Pashto with my friends and acquaintances.				
36.	I speak Hindko with all my friends who do not understand my language.				

Items		1	2	3	4	5
1.	My boss speaks Urdu that is why I speak Urdu with him.	**.789**				
2.	I speak Urdu with my colleagues.	**.773**				
3.	It is necessary to know Urdu for a government job.	**.772**				
4.	In school, I have been speaking Hindko with the children from my community.	**.731**		-.435		
5.	I speak Urdu with all the strangers I meet.	**.706**				
6.	My boss speaks Pashto, so I speak Pashto with him.	**.705**				
7.	I speak Urdu with my friends and acquaintances.	**.699**				
8.	From grade one, Urdu language was language of instruction for me.	**.691**				
9.	I send applications and official letters in Urdu.	**.686**	.463			
10.	In school, I have been speaking Mankiyali with the children from my tribe.	**.683**	.441			
11.	I speak Urdu with all my friends who speak other languages.	**.680**				
12.	My boss speaks Hindko, so I speak Hindko with him.	**.678**				
13.	I speak Pashto with all my friends who speak other languages.	**.669**				

14. I speak Hindko with my friends and acquaintances.	**.661**	.481		
15. I use Urdu to introduce my friends to others	**.660**			
16. From grade one, Hindko language was the language of instruction for me.	**.552**			
17. In my school, I have been speaking Urdu with the children from my community.	**.518**	-.507		
18. I speak Urdu to men of my family.	**.516**			
19. I speak Pashto with strangers.	**.488**			
20. My boss speaks English; that is why I speak English with him.	**.477**			
21. I speak Hindko to men of my family.	**.472**	-.452		
22. I use Pashto to introduce my friends to others	**.465**			-.427
23. I send applications and official letters in English.	**.436**			
24. I tell story to children in Urdu				
25. I speak Mankiyali to men of my family				
26. In school, I have been speaking Pashto with the children from my tribe.				
27. From grade one, Pashto language was the language of instruction for me.				
28. From grade one, Hindko language was the language of instruction for me		**-.657**	.437	
29. I speak Hindko at home		**-.643**	.499	
30. To discuss important matters of the family, I speak Hindko		**-.638**		
31. I speak Hindko to women of my family		**-.627**	.527	
32. I appeal and address my God in Mankiyali.		**.594**		
33. I speak Mankiyali to women of my family.		**.545**		
34. I speak Mankiyali with my family.		**.545**		
35. Molvi Shahib uses Mankiyali for giving instruction while teaching Quran.		**.536**		
36. To discuss important matters of the family I speak Urdu.		**-.498**		
37. My neighbours speak Mankiyali.		**.495**		
38. I speak Mankiyali at home.		**.480**		-.449
39. In my home; after namaz, I offer dua in Mankiyali		**.479**		-.422
40. I speak Urdu to women of my family.		**-.423**		-.343
41. I speak Urdu with my family members.				
42. To discuss important matters of the family, I speak to Man.				
43. I speak Hindko with strangers.				
44. I speak Urdu at home.				
45. I tell story to children in Mankiyali.				
46. I tell story to children in Pashto.				

47. Preaching of Molvi Shahib is in Mankiyali language.			**.698**		
48. I speak Pashto with my family members.	.454		**.614**		
49. In my village, Language of religious instruction is Mankiyali.			**.592**		
50. I speak Pashto to men of my family.	.449		**.537**		
51. My neighbors speak Pashto.	.451		**.506**		
52. In my village, language for preaching religion is Mankiyali.		.457	**.483**		
53. Through mosque loud speaker, all announcements are made in Mankiyali language.			**.440**		
54. In my village mosque, Dua is offered after every namaz in Mankiyali.			**.411**		.401
55. In my village. after Jumah prayers dua is offered in Mankiyali.			**.402**		
56. It is necessary to know English for government jobs.					
57. In my province, it is necessary to know Pashto for a government job.					
58. I speak Pashto at home.		-.491		**-.534**	
59. My neighbors speak Hindko.				**.471**	
60. I speak Pashto to the women of my family.				**-.457**	
61. To discuss important matters of the family, I speak Pashto.				**-.446**	
62. I tell story to children in Hindko.					
63. I speak Mankiyali with all my friends who speak other languages.					
64. I use Mankiyali to introduce my friends to others.					**-.550**
65. I speak Hindko with all my friends who speak other languages.					**.524**
66. I speak Pashto with my friends and acquaintances.					**.481**
67. I speak Hindko with all my friends who do not understand my language.					**.462**
68. I speak Mankiyali with my friends and acquaintances.					
69. I use Hindko to introduce my friends to others.					

Eigen Values	12.462	8.427	5.680	3.825	3.231
% of Variance	18.061	12.213	8.232	5.544	4.683
Cumulative Variance	18.061	30.274	38.506	44.051	48.734

-2-

Etymology of Zhunbil and Identity of the Rulers of Kabul and Zabul in Seventh -Ninth Centuries C.E.

Gulman S. Afridi

Abstract

This paper deals with the political and religious situation to the south of Hindukush following the occupation of Sistan by Arab Muslims during the caliphate of 'Usman, the third Caliph of Islam. The origin of the popular cult of god Zhun and identity of its followers, being obscure, will be highlighted in the light of Iranian religious history and Pashto phonology of the name Zhun. Similarly, effort will be made to determine the correct form of the long debated title of Zabul rulers in Seventh-Ninth centuries in the light of Iranian priestly traditions and sound system of Pashto language. Moreover, Afghans' presence to the south of Hindukush during the period, though totally overlooked by scholars, will be established. Regarding the identity of the rulers of Kabul and Zabul from seventh to ninth centuries, there is a difference of opinion but the dominant view considers them Turks whose origin is obscure. Among the historical accounts of the period, Tabari's (d.923) account could highlight the identity of these rulers but it is considered confused and, therefore, greatly reconstructed. An effort is made here to reevaluate his account, without the assumptions introduced from time to time. As a result, a new interpretation of Tabari's account is offered, which not only highlights a new origin and identity of the rulers of Kabul and Zabul, but also throws new light on the history of the region in Seventh-Ninth centuries C.E.

Introduction

Arab Muslims appeared in Sistan in 32/652-53 towards the last stage of overwhelming Iran and after the death of Yazdagird III, the last Sassanid king in 31/651. A year later, the Arab forces advanced against Zabulistan and surrounded the shrine of Zhūn, the 'Mecca' of its followers, in Zamindawar in 33/653-54. Xuanzang, the famous Chinese Buddhist pilgrim, had visited Zabul a decade earlier in 644, who described, in Da Tang Xiu Jee, the shrine of *Suna* or *Zhuna* in some detail, but he neither mentioned its origin, nor the identity of its followers. At that time,

according to Xuanzang, the ruler of Kapisa-Kabul-Gandhara was a Buddhist and of Kshatria class, while the king of Zabulistan was the follower of the cult of Zhun and successor of a long line of kings. The new Arab Governor of Sistan, 'Abd al-Rahman bin Samurah launched an offensive against these rulers and reduced both kingdoms during 664-65. He was, however, relieved from the governorship in 666 which led to the loss of these kingdoms as quickly as they had been captured. The new rulers of Zabul, called by the title of Rutbil or Ratbil in the Arab literature, became famous for their tenacious resistance to the Arab advance towards the east and northwards to Kabul. Closely associated with them were the rulers of Shahiya dynasty of Kabul, founded by Kabul Shah or Barhategin in 666. Both the rulers and their dynasties, which survived for about two centuries, were considered by the Arabs as Turkish, though the opinion of modern scholars greatly differs with regard to their origin and identity. Regarding the title of Rutbil, it has been maintained that it should be read as Zunbil/Zhunbil, the first part representing the name of god Zhun. Etymology of the second part has, however, not been satisfactorily explained so far, which has recently led some eminent scholars to disagree with the emended vocalization.

Historical accounts of the period generally overlook the internal relations between the rulers to the south of Hindukush. Tabari's (I : 2706) account throws some light on their political relations but his account is believed to be confused. Scholars have reconstructed a great part of it but the restoration has led to loss of some valuable information. The origin of Zhun and etymology of Zhunbil could be explained in the light of Iranian religious history and phonology of Pashto, the language of Afghans, but scholars mostly consider Zhun to have Indian origin and therefore, look for its explanation in Indian religious world. The purpose of this brief essay is to explore the origin and followers of the cult of Zhun and present a new etymology of Zhunbil which will not only confirm the Zhunbil title of Zabul rulers but make most of what Tabari said understandable. It will also present a detailed reconsideration of Tabari's report and the emerging picture will lead to a new identity of the rulers of Kabul and Zabul, which diverge from the widely accepted conclusions of the period.

1. Origin and Followers of the Cult of Žun

Before the advent of Islam in Afghanistan, people followed different religions, some widely known like Zoroastrianism, Hinduism, and Buddhism, while others not so well known but were locally very popular and zealously followed. One such indigenous religion, with a large following in Zabulistan during 7–9 centuries, was the cult of god *Žun.* Xuanzang, the Chinese Buddhist pilgrim*,* described the god as *Suna* or *Žuna,* based on the worship of an idol, whose shrine was set on top of Mount Zhunagir[1], located in Zamindawar. According to Balladhuri (d. 892) 'Abd al-Rahman bin Samurah raided Zamindawar and surrounded the shrine of Žūn set on a hill called Zur. He cut one arm of the statue that was embodied in gold to show to its followers that the god was incapable of doing good or harm (Murgotten 1924: 144). The cult of Zhun survived in Zabulistan for over two centuries after the arrival of Islam but its origins and followers are obscure. Modern scholars have not been able to add much to what was already known from Chinese and Arab sources. Marquart (cited in Bosworth 1968: 35) considered the cult to be neither Buddhist nor Zoroastrian, and suggested that it might have links with the shrine of the Hindu Sun-God Āditya at Multan. As this view still prevails, scholars mostly look for the origin of the cult in Indian religious traditions. *Zruvān 'time', on the other hand, must have become *Žun* as in Pashto the stressed

The name Žun can, however, be explained in the light of Iranian religious traditions and Pashto phonology. The expression of Pashto *ğo,* earlier *žo,* 'by god', according to Morgensteirne (1982: 516-518), is derived from Avestan**zruwā*, 'time' and is compared to the name of god *Žun*. He adds that the consonant cluster of ancient 'zr'in Pashto had regularly changed to ž'ğ and ancient u/awā changed into 'o', as in Pašto (feminine) from ancient **Parsuwā*. The stressed Iranic '*a'* normally becomes 'o' but before a nasal it becomes '*u'*, like ancient **Parsuwā* became Pašto but *Parsuwān* became *Paštūn (*Afghan). Similarly, ancient **zruwā* became *žo* but **Zruvān* must have become *Žun*. The names *Žulad* (of Guzgan, the king of gar) (Sims-Williams, 2007: 6-8) is derived from *Zruvādata,'*given by *Zruvā'* and Žunlad from *Zruvāndata,'*given by *Zruvān',* (the king of Rob, modern Rui in second half of seventh century).

[1] Zhunagir most likely reflect Zhunaghar, the 'Zhuna mountain' in Pashto. Kuwayama (2ooo, p.59) has restored it as Zhunahira.

Two names of the god are thus attested; *žo* <**zruwā* and Žun < *Zruvān ; the first survived in the name *Žulad* and the Pashto expression *'ğo'* or *žo*, 'by god', while Žun is attested in the name of Žunlad and *suna or* Žuna of Xwanzang. Such names must have been common to the south of Hindukush, though these are not attested. The change of *–data,'*given' into *-lad* appears to be Pashto as evident from Pashto change of ancient *dita* and *dāta* into *lid* and *lod* respectively (Morgensteirne 2003: 42). This change occurs regularly in Bactrian too but no examples of '*zr'* becoming '*ž'* are found in Bactrian. The Ž sound of Žun and Žunbil or Žobil has most probably changed to 'Z' under the influence of Arabic and Indo-Aryan languages which resulted in Zun. Kuwayama (2000: 59) reads "Žun or Žuna, a restored name from Chinese "Sui history and Xuanzang" which confirms Pashto sound of 'zr' into' ž' in the name of the god.

Like the Pashto Žun, the Sassanid Zurvān, the god of time, is also believed to have been derived from ancient *Zrvan or *Zruvan, 'time'. Žun, however, is clearly not derived from Zurvān as the ancient cluster *zur-* could not have changed to 'Ž' in Pashto. The Sogdian *Zrv*, though represented Indian god Brahma in the Buddhist texts, is identified with Sassanid Zurvān (Levinsky 1996: 422). Žun, Zurvān and, Zrv are presumably derived from the same source but their worship and priesthood developed differently over a long period of separation. The cult of Zhun appears to have acquired Hindu characteristics which must be the result of a long stay of the god in Indian environments. The influence of Žun and Zurvān is evident from theophoric names like Žunlad and Žulad in North Afghanistan and *Zurvāndukht*,' daughter of Zurvān' and *Zurvāndad*,' given by Zurvān 'in Iran (Boyce 1979: 119-122,). It appears that the followers regarded the 'god of time' a powerful divinity, for such names are obviously given to children who are born in answer to prayer. Xuanzang confirmed the influence of Žun when he wrote:

> He is severe or good, causing misfortune or exercising violence. Those who invoke him with faith obtain their wishes; those who despise him reaped misfortune. Therefore people, both far off and near show for him deep reverence; high and low alike are filled with religious awe of him (Beal 1884, vol.2: 283).

Regarding origin of Žuna, Xuanzang had only mentioned that it was initially brought to Kapisa, later Begram[2] from "far" and later moved to Zabul. There is no consensus as to who brought it and when. By identifying Žun with Sassanian Zurvān, the cult of Žun *or*Zruvān* can be viewed in a much wider context of Iranian history and religious developments. Žun, Like Zurvān, most likely represented the 'god of time', a herecy in Zoroastianism, which originated in response to the religious reforms introduced during second half of Achaemenid Empire. Setting of Žun shrine on mountain tops near Kapisa and later, Zhunagir in Zamindawar conform to Iranian tradition of worship in high places. **Zruvān* was most probably personified in human form at an early time. The later evidence shows that the cult was well organized with priests, probably Magis, who claimed magical and curative powers (Boeworth 2oo8: 244). Žo and Žun are clearly Pashto derivations from ancient *Zruvā* and *Zruvān* which shows that its followers were mostly Afghans who, presumably, brought it to the south of Hindukush during their migrations from the north, long before the coming of Hepthalites and Turks. Since *Zruvān* was a heresy in Zoroastrianism, its Afghans followers were, most probably, initially Zoroastrians. Mention of Žun and its devotees disappeared with the end of Žunbil dynasty of Zabulistan in 870. Its followers, according to Ibn Athir, accepted Islam (Qasmi 1989, vol.11: 87-88; Abdullah 1997, vol 12: 568), which is in line with Afghan tradition of their mass conversion to Islam.

2. Presence of Afghans to the South of Hindukush

Historical and linguistics evidence suggests the presence of Afghans in Zabulistan long before the seventh century but scholars have generally overlooked their presence. "Their original home", according to Morgensteirne (1940: 143), "extended from Arachosia and the Helmand to the Suleman Mountains and to Ghazni and Kabul". Xuanzang had mentioned that the language and writing of the people of Zabul differ from those of other countries. Since Xuanzang was well familiar with Bactrian, Indian and Turkish languages, it is most likely that the language spoken in Ghazni was Pashto (Cunningham 1876, .3, 41; G. Scarcia, 1967: 41). The deep influence of Indian languages on the vocabulary and phonetics of Pashto points to an early arrival of Afghans and contact with Indians. The

[2] Begram is situated at the confluence of Ghurband and Panjshir Rivers of eastern Afghanistan, near Charikar.

earliest recorded name of Afghans in the form of *Avagāna* was, till recently, by the Indian astronomer Varaha-Mihira of the mid 6th Century in his Brhat Samhita (XI: 61and XVI: 38) where he speaks of the *Avagāna* (Afghans) alongside the well known Pahlavis and White Huns or Hephthalites. The recent discovery of a letter in the Bactrian Archives "contains the earliest datable reference to the Afghan people" in the form of *Avagāna* in the fifth century. The reference is in connection with a dispute over horses with the "men of Rob", now Rui, north of Hindukush (Sims-Williams 2008: 94).

Linguistic evidence reveals traces of Pašto language to the south of Hindukush much earlier than the Afghan name. Morgenstierne (1940: 143) maintained that the oldest loan words in Pashto date back to Greek occupation of Bactria and Kabul. The title of Saka king of Ujjain in the first century, *Čaṣṭana,* is believed to be the exact equivalent of Pashto word *'caṡtan'* 'master, lord'[3] (Morgensteirne (1973, 89). *Paštānə* (plural of *Pashtun*), a Middle Pashto form, was borrowed in some "Indian border dialects of an archaic type in the form of **Paṣṭāna*" which became modern Indo-Aryan *Paṭhān* (Morgensteirne1940: 143-144). Early Afghan settlement in south-east Afghanistan is also well reflected in the development of ancient hydronyms and toponyms, as stated by Morgensteirne (2003). The change of the names of rivers *Xvastra* to Xvash (p.96), *Heithumant* to Helmand (p.35), *Hušaapā* to Žob (river) (p.29), *Krumu* to Kurma 'the river Kurram (ancient female gender retained) (p.39)' and place-names like *Maštān* to Matūn (p.53), *Vaharkana* to Urgūn (p.89), *Xvastu* to Khost and *Gomati* to Gomal (p.27) show development of Pashto sound changes. Some of these sound changes occur in Bactrian and other languages too but Pashto, being the language of the people living in the area, has most probably developed these changes. In view of the geographic horizon of Pashto names in Zabulistan and etymology of the god Zhun, it can be said that the Iranian dialect that was spoken in Zabul was most likely middle form of Pashto.

[3]Morgensteirne thought that the Pashto *caštan* may have been derived from **čars(t)ana* and the Pashto '*rs* 'must have reached or approached the stage şt by the beginning of common era

3. Etymology of the Title of Zhunbīl/Zunbīl

The rulers of Zabulistan were known by the title of Žunbīl, called Rutbīl in the Arab sources, from seventh to ninth centuries. Kingdom of Zabulistan bordered on Kabulistanin in the northeast and in the south and west it included areas of al-Rukhkhaj, the modern Kandahar region, Zamindawar and area upto Bost on the confluence of Arghandab and Helmand rivers. Sulaiman Mountains formed the eastern border. Ghazni was the winter capital of the kingdom while Zamindawar was the summer capital and religious and pilgrimage center devoted to Žun or Zun. Žunbīl is first mentioned in connection with his re-capture of Zabulistan from Arab Muslims in 667. The Zhubils effectively resisted Arab raids into Zabul and also Kabul from the south. The exact form of the title is still subject to a great deal of controversy. Markuart (cited in Bosworth 1968: 34-35) suggested that the correct form of the title was Zunbīl or Žunbiīl, a theophoric name, the first element representing god Zun/Žun. Majority of scholars agreed with the suggested form of the name as a valid alternative to Rubīl, but the suffix *–bīl* has not been satisfactorily explained so far. Frye (1975: 77) agrees with the vocalization of Žunbīl and states that quite a few scholars have suggested that the title represent something like "the leader for (or servant of) the god Zun". According to Harmatta (1996: 367-372), the name was registered in the Tang sources in two forms, "Shih-yü and Shih-k'ü," but both spellings represent variants of the same name, Zivil or Zibil, which confirms Žobil < Zruvāpati. He considers Rutbil and Zunbil as misreading of the title. Kuwayama (2000:64) citing same Chinese sources, consider the restored form as possibly "Zābul". In the edition of *Tarikh-i-Sistan*, the editor reports that the manuscript gives the name *Znbyl*, which support the reading Zunbil (Bosworth 1968,n.7: 37) But, lately, some eminent scholars (Rehman 1979 :180**;** Sims-Williams 2002: 235; Inaba 2005 : 2) began to agree with Bombaci's (1970 as cited in Sims-Williams 2002: 235) tentative suggestion that the title of Rutbil is correct and should be understood as a corrupt form of the Turkish title Iltabir, Ilteber or Hilibēr.

According to Jiu Tangshu (Vol.194), the Tung Yabghu Kaghan had given the title Iltabir to all the rulers of the Western Regions (Inaba 2005 : 7) but it is strange that none of these titles, except that of Zabul rulers, had been corrrupted to Rutbīl by Arabs. The Turkish title, according to Kuwayama (2000: 54) was given by the Chinese king to the

ruler of Zabul in 720 but Arabs seems to have called all the rulers of Zabul from 667 onwards as Rutbīl. Carrying a lower title of Iltabir/Rutbīl, denoting a governor or high military commander, (Bosworth 2008: 244; Rehman 1979: 180) for so long, when the rulers of Zabul had effectively ruled for over 2oo years, makes no sense. Moreover, these rulers were in frequent contact with the Arabs of Sistan, who must have been well aware of the correct title of the rulers. The view that Rutbil may be a scribal error appears to be correct as in Arabic script the difference of Zunbīl and Rutbīl is very small. When two dotes are put over the second letter, the word can be read Rutbīl but if the dots are put slightly away from each other, رتبيل ‘ زنبيل the word becomes Zunbīl. It is very likely that the name was Žunbīl or Zunbil but has been misread as Rutbīl. Žunbīl could not be explained so far by scholars probably because of overlooking the presence of Pashto language to the south of Hindukush, and the belief, since Marquart's time, that the cult of Žun was not Zororoastrian. Marquart seemed to have correctly identified the first element as Zun or Žun but his assertion that the cult was not Iranian but Indian led many scholars to look for its explanation in Indian religions. It was seen above that Žun was a middle Pashto form of ancient Iranian *Zruvān, 'the god of time'. When the first part is accepted as Pashto, an East Iranian language, one is justified in Iranian meaning for the second part too. Etymology of Žunbīl can be explained in the light of Zoroastrian priestly traditions and Pashto phonology.

Major changes were introduced in the Zoroastrian religion and worship by Achaemenid king Artaxerxes II (404-359 B.C.E) who revived old gods like Mithra and Anahita and introduced cult statues in temples (Boyce 1979:62). *Zruvān, as a god of time, most likely originated, like Sassanian *Zruvān*ism, as a response to the religious changes introduced during this period. The heresy appears to have equated Ahura Mazda, the supreme god in Gathas, and Angra Mainyu, the demon, as twin brothers created by *Zruvān. Zurvānites believed that Zurvān (or *Zruvān) 'time' "did not merely provide the framework for cosmic events but was actually in control of them, hence a sentient being" (Boyce 1979: 68). In view of later evidence of Žun, *Zruvān was most probably worshiped in human form from an earlier time, which must have led to the development of its own priesthood and rituals.

Introduction of cult images in shrines was an innovation in Zoroastrian worship, which necessitated coining of new names to describe such temples. Most Iranian languages suggest that the term used for the image shrine was derived from Proto-Iranian **bagina*, 'place of gods' and its high priest from **baginapati,* which changed to *bagnapet* in Parthian and *vaghnpat* in Sogdian, 'chief (priest) of the image shrine' (Boyce 1979: 85-88, 98).The new practice is believed to have led, as a reaction, to introduction of temple fires, itself an innovation in Zoroasrian worship. Divine images and sacred fire were often housed in the same temple or temple complex and the community mostly worshipped both of them (Boyce and Grenet, *1991*, n.71: 66). Moreover, in Parthian period, presence of more than one divinities or both Greek and Parthian divine images, are reported to have been worshipped in the same temple or **bagina*. Such temples may have been called **bagina,* 'place of gods' because they housed more than one divine images. A shrine dedicated to Mithra is attested in Armenia which was called after the cult as *mehean* in Armenian, 'place of Mithra' (Boyce 1979: 88-89) but the designation of its chief priest is not mentioned. The Sassanians, according to most likely accounts, were hereditary guardians or high priests of a great temple of Anahita at the city of Istakhr which once contained idols (Boyce 1979:101-106). No information, however, is available about the designation of the high priest. The cult of Žun, as known from later evidence, had one central temple in Zamindawar, which housed the cult statue of Žun and was known as the shrine of Žun earlier*<u>*Zruvān.*</u>

Like the early Sassanians, the family of the king or chief (when not in power) of Žun followers provided hereditary high priests of the temple, known as Žunbil, a Middle Pashto form of**Zruvānpati*, the suffix *–pati* or *–bil* denoting 'chief, master or lord'. It appears that normally a prince of the family performed such functions but at times the religious and temporal functions were combined in the king, as evident from Žunbīls'rule of Zabulistan from seventh to ninth centuries. The followers presumably formed a distinct political and religious group who visited the shrine of Žun called 'Mecca' (probably so named after contact with Muslims) on an auspicious time of the year. Xuanzang reported that "princes, nobles and people of this as well of foreign countries assemble every year at a season of rejoicing which is not fixed and offer gold and silver and precious objects of rare value… (Beal 1884, vol.2: 283). The

cult of Žun had only one shrine in Zabulistan and its followers worshiped it once a year during the annual pilgrimage. In view of the large number of people visiting it, the shrine must have had elaborate priestly organization. **Zruvānpati* must have, from the beginning, presided over the priestly proceedings during the annual pilgrimage. In addition, the chief priest acted as the overall religious leader of the cult in the kingdom. *Zruvā (n) pati literally meant 'chief of *Zruvān' but since *Zruvān or Žun was the name of the god's only shrine, the title most likely denoted 'the chief (priest) of Žun (shrine)' or 'chief for/chief (priest) of god Žun'. A somewhat similar title is found in the early Sassanid period when king Hormazd (r. 272-3) gave the title of 'Ohrmazd Mobed', 'the chief priest of god Ohrmazd', to Kerdir, the most influential religious figure of Sassanid Iran.

The first element of Žunbil was seen to have been derived from **Zruvān* and the suffix *–bil* of *Žunbil* is most likely Middle Pashto form of suffix*–pati*. In Middle Persian**,** the suffix *-pati* had changed to *–bed* as evident from**magupati > mobed,* Avestan **aēθrapaiti > erbed or herbed* and so on. In Middle Pashto, the sound of intervocalic *'p'* had changed to '*b'* as in Persian but't' had changed to '*l'* which was a characteristic feature of Pashto sound change. A few examples of the change of ancient *–p-* to *'b'* and *-t-*to '*l',* according to Morgensteirne (2003) are: *āpāh > obə*, 'water'(p.7); *Hušaapā* > Žob (river) (p.29), *hapərəsi > obəx̌ta* 'juniper' (p.7); *upā- čita > bejal*, *bojal* (*t* also changed to *l*), 'mound, pedestal' (p.13); *hapaθni > bən,* 'co-wife' (p.14); *upantai** > *bānde,* 'on, upon, above'(p.14) and many more. A few examples of the change of intervocalic '*t'* to 'l' in Pashto are: *satəm > sal,* 'hundred' (p.74) ; **čitaka > cəlai* 'cairn or pillar of mud or stones (p.17) ; *pitar > plār,* 'father' (p. 62); *čaθwar > cal'or,* 'four', (p.17) ; *paθana > plən*' wide, broad' (p.62); *Haētumant* > Helmand, 'River Helmand of Afghanistan'(p.35); Armenian *margarit > maryarəla /maryaləra* 'pearl' (p.51); Sanskrit *kuncita > kunjəla, '*sesame', (p.39) ; **sančita > sanj'ala,* 'wild olive', (p.74); and more. These examples clearly shows that ancient *–pati had resulted in* '*-bil* in Middle Pashto. However, the suffix of Žunbīl has a lengthened *ī* whereas *–pati* would probably have changed to *–bil.* The long ī may be due to dialect variation in Pashto or the *-bil* transformed to *bīl* in the Arabic writing (Scarcia 1967: 1). Thus the ancient**Zruvā (n) pati* had changed to *Žobīl* or *Žunbīl* which represented the chief priest of

the shrine of *Zruvān or *Žun*. It follows that the cult had, unlike Sassanian Zurvan, elaborate priesthood and rituals right from the beginning. The etymology of Žunbīl gets further support from Ibn al-Athir (d.1233) report, related to ninth century, saying that Žunbīl resided on the sacred mountain (of Žun) called Mecca, the ruler there, the Zunbil was (divine) and was carried on a golden throne by twelve men (cited in Bosworth 1968 : 35; Qasmi 1989, vol.11 : 87-8; Abdullah 1997,vol 12 : 568). Žunbil had residence on the sacred mountain of Žun and was divine, perhaps, not because he was the ruler, but he was also the chief priest of the popular cult of Žun. The religious title, retained by the Zabul rulers for over 200 years, certainly helped in motivating the mainly Afghan followers of Žun to follow the lead of their leaders for so long. It may be pertinent to mention that Afghans have, on many occasions in their history, converted a political conflict into a religious war, led by a religious leader, to sustain a long struggle against a powerful enemy.

4. Coming of Arab Muslims to Southern Afghanistan

The king of Zabul in 643 was, according to Xuanzang, the successor of a long line of kings and follower of the cult of Zhun. The same king or probably his successor was ruling in Zabul during Mu'awiya's Caliphate (661-680). Xuanzang did not call the dynasty Indian or Turkish which could thus be considered of indigenous. In the Kapisi section, Xuanzang called the king of Kapisi-Kabul-Gandhara in 629 as a follower of Buddhism and of Kshatria caste. Kuwayama, basing on Chinese sources, calls the king of Kapisa-Kabul-Gandhara in 658 as Ghar-ilchi of the Khingalide dynasty (called Nezakides by some scholars) and the same king was probably confirmed by Tang China as the king of Kapisi in 661 (Kuwayama 2000: 42, 59).

Great events occurred in Iranian Empire when Xuanzang was travelling in India and Afghanistan. The Iranian Empire collapsed as a result of the determined attacks of the Arab Muslims during the Caliphate of ʿOmar (13/634-- 23/644), the Second Caliph of Islam. Xuanzang was probably unaware of these events as he did not mention them. The wave of Muslim expansion continued under the third Caliph, ʿOṯmān (24-35/644-56). The last king of Sassanid dynasty, Yazdegerd III was killed in 651 by a common miller with whom he was hiding. In32/652-53, ʿAbd-al-Raḥmān b. Samura was sent who re-conquered Sistan and annexed Bost. He then

advanced to Zamindawar and surrounded the shrine of Žun from where Arabs collected a large booty (Murgotten 1924: 144). Thereafter, the history of Kabul and Zabul is intimately linked with the history of the governors of Sistan.

The second tenure of Ibn Samura as Governor of Sistan (663-66) (Bosworth, 1968: 22; Rehman 1979: 57-58) had profound effects on the political situation of the region. Soon after arrival in Siestan, Ibn Samura launched an offensive against Kabul through Marv[4] and reduced the town after some hard fighting in 44/664-665(Rehman 1979: 57). Probably leaving some force in Kabul, Ibn Samura returned to southern Afghanistan where he captured Khwash, Bust, and Khushahak. Rukhkaj, the classical Arachosia, was reduced after hard fighting. He then advanced against Zabul "who had broken the treaty", its people attacked him but they were defeated (Murgotten, 1924: 146-147). The king of Kapisa had, in the meantime, reasserted his authority, Kabul was, therefore, attacked and recaptured again after a long siege (Rehman 1979: 58)[5]. The Khingle king, before being executed, accepted Islam and was probably allowed to rule under Muslim patronage. Ibn Samura was relieved from command in 666 which prompted Kabulshah or Barhategin to capture Kabul by killing the king and ousting the Muslims in the same year (Ibid. : 47). Zhunbil recovered Zabul, Rukhkhaj and Bust but withdrew on arrival of reinforcements from Basra under Rabi b Ziad (Murgotten, 1924: 147-48) in, according to Rehman, (1979: 64) 667-68. The new rulers of Kabul and Zabul were considered as Turks but not belonging to the Western Turks. The origin and identity of the rulers and their dynasties are subject to a great deal of controversy among the modern scholars. Barhategin established Shahiya dynasty of Kabul while Zhunbil revived the old dynasty of Zabulistan. The new dynasties effectively checked Arab advance towards Indus valley for two centuries, though the Arab rule had been 'firmly established in Seistan, Badhghis, Gozgan, Tokharistan and Transoxania and even in Sind by the beginning of the eighth century' (Harmatta 1996 : 373).

[4] The direction appears to be correct as Ibn Samura could not have attacked Kabul from the south through Zabulistan which was not yet conquered.

[5]Rehman refers to *Tarjuma I Futūhāt* which says that the siege lasted one year.

5. Identity of the New Rulers of Kabul and Zabul

The events of Mu'awiya's rule to the couth of Hindukush are covered by Islamic authors, Balladhuri, Tabari and al-Beruni and the Korean pilgrim Hyecho, the later two only briefly referred to the change of dynasty at Kabul. Balladhuri's (d. c. 892) account, though well connected, overlooks the internal political relations of the rulers. He mentioned capture of Kabul by Ibn Samura in 664-665, its recovery by Kabul Shah in 666 and occupation of Zabul and area upto Bust by Zhunbil (Murgotten 1924: 146-147). Al-Beruni(cited in Kuwayama 2000: 58-59) , briefly referred in *Ta'rikh al-Hind* to Barhategin and his conquest of Kabul:

> The Hindus had kings residing in Kabul, Turks who were said to be of Tibetan origin. The first of them, Barhatakin, came into the country and entered a cave in Kabul ... Some days after he had entered the cave, he began to creep out of it in the presence of the people …Now people honored him as a being of miraculous origin, who had been destined to be king, and in fact he brought those countries under his sway and ruled them under the title of Ashahiya of Kabul. The rule remained among his descendants for generations, the number of which is said to be about sixty.

Al-Beruni's report clearly indicates obscure origins of Barhategin and also the fact that, before usurping power in Kabul, he was neither a ruler of Kabul as mentioned by Kuwayama (2000: 61-65) nor of Gandhara as claimed by Rehman (1979: 63). He calls him a Turk but of Tibatan origin. Huei-ch'ao presumably referred to the same dynastic change saying that the father of Wusun Tegin Shah, the ruling Turkish king of Kabul in 726, surrendered to the king of Kapisa along with his followers. On gaining strength, he killed the Kapisa king and made himself lord of the country. Huei-ch'ao also referred to the fraternal relations between the kings of Kabul and Zabulistan_(Harmatta 1996: 367-368). Tabari reported some important information about the internal relations of the rulers of Kabul and Zabul and how they gained power but the report is considered "confused" and, therefore, greatly reconstructed by scholars. Correct interpretation of this report is crucial to the understanding of the identity of Kabul shah or Barhategin and Zhunbil. Salient aspects of Tabari's famous passage (I : 2706) as translated by G. Rex Smith (1994: 75-76), are given in Parts A to E below:

A. "At that (Caliph Mu'awiya) time the ruler (Shah) fled from his brother who was called Zunbil, to an area called Āmul and (he and his followers) paid allegiance to Salm b. Ziad, at the time the Governor of Sistan".

B. The Governor "was pleased with this (development), made a pact with (the ruler and his followers) and allowed them to settle in this area".

C. According to Calph Mu'awiya "the area between Āmul and Zaranj was where there were difficulties and trouble".

D. "After Mu'awiya's death when there was civil war, the ruler rebelled and conquered Āmul".

E. "Zunbil was afraid of the ruler, so he took refuge from him at a particular place…But he did not take kindly to this, when people ignored him and he began to covet Zaranj. So he attacked (the town) and besieged (its inhabitants) until reinforcements arrived from Al-Basra.

Tabari's passage relates to political events which happened to the south of Hindukush during Mu'awiya's Caliphate (661-680). Scholars have restored a great part of it but the multiple replacements appear to have distorted the information contained in the passage. The distortion mainly occurred when scholars assumed that the event (Part-A) happened after Kabulshah or Barhategin gained power at Kabul, thus limiting the occurrence of the event to Kabul and the period to after 666. Tabari had, actually, not mentioned Kabulshah or Kabul (Part-A) but the same was assumed. Kuwayama (1999: 62-63), like others, then wondered as to how Kabulshah could run away from Zhunbil, his brother, at Kabul when Balladhuri had clearly said that Kabulshah captured Kabul in 666. Scholars like Marquart (cited in Kawayama 1999: 63) and Rehman (1979: 66) naturally assumed that instead of Kabul Shah, his brother Zhunbil, must have fled to Āmul after 666. Since there was no place by the name of Āmul to the south of Hindukush, Zabul was substituted for Āmul where Zhunbil subsequently ruled. Occupation of Zabul and area up to Bust by Zhunbil in 667, reported both by Tabari (E) and Balladhuri, and his subsequent rule of Zabulistan was assumed to have been done as the governor of Kabul Shah (Ibid. p.64). The event of fleeing of 'Shah' or Zhunbil was assumed to have occurred during Salm b. Ziad's Governorship (681-83) (Ibid. 67; Inaba 2002: 1-2).

Tabari's original report, apart from some chronological confusion and mistaken names, explains well the internal political situation of the region, and, at the same time, confirms the accounts of Balladhuri, al-Beruni and Huichao. Moreover, the origin and identity of the rulers of Kabul and Zabul can only be explained through Tabari's report. It is evident from reports of Balladhuri and Tabari (Part E) that Zhunbil had, after expulsion of Muslims from Kabul by Barhategin, independently occupied Zabul, Rukhkhaj and area up to Bust in 667. Zhunbil is always associated with Zabul whether it was its liberation from Muslims or its rule. Balladhuri shows him as a ruler who negotiated with 'Ubaid Allah b. Abi Bakrah, the Governor of Sistan in 51(671-72) the terms of "peace for his own country and the land of Kabul" (Murgotten 1924: 148). No evidence exists to show Zhunbil in Kabul or as a subordinate of Kabul Shah. Tabari's statement (Part-A) that the 'Shah' fled from Zhunbil is correct but the event, evidently, happened at different place and earlier time. The passage becomes meaningful when we assume that Tabari's 'Shah' was actually the king of Zabulistan and his brother Zhunbil was with him at Zabul. This statement gets further confirmed by the etymology of Zhunbil, who as chief priest of Zhun, naturally belonged to Zabul. Zhunbil, a prince and high religious leader must have had great influence and power. Due to some reason, he dethroned the king who, according to Tabari, fled to a place called Āmul (Part A). Āmul could not be Zabul because the king was already there. Āmul could not be Sistan either because the 'Shah' later conquered Āmul (D), whereas it is known that Sistan was never captured from the Muslims during or after Mu'awiya's time. Moreover, Part C clearly suggests that Āmul could be at the other end of Muslims difficulties. It follows that the only other place where the 'Shah' could flee from Zabul was Kabul. Tabari, therefore, meant Kabul from Āmol as also suggested by the translator of Tabari's volume (Smith 1994, n. 338: 75-76).

Part A of the report further mentions that the 'Shah' fled during Mu'awiya's caliphate to Āmul where he paid allegiance to Salm b. Ziad, the governor of Sistan. This statement is obviously contradictory as Salam was appointed governor after the death of Mu'awiya. Most scholars (Rehman 1979: 66; Inaba 2005: 2) consider Mu'awiya to be mistaken and assign the occurrence of the event to the period when Salam was Governor of Siestan (681-83). It, however, seems that Salm is mistaken because the

'Shah' paid allegiance to the Governor of Sistan at Kabul, which, as we know, was not under Muslims occupation during his governorship. The Shah must have escaped to Kabul before the Muslims were ousted from Kabul in 666. Moreover, the Shah must have been dethroned by Zhunbil before Zabul was occupied by Ibn Samura in 665. It, therefore, follows that Zhunbil dethroned the Zabul's 'Shah' sometime in 664-65 when Zabul was still independent, though seriously threatened. The name of Salam b. Ziad must, therefore, be replaced with 'Abdar Rehman Ibn Samura who gave asylum to the fugitive Shah during Mu'awiya's rule and allowed him and his followers to settle" somewhere in Kabul region (Part-B). The account further says (Part-C) that the ruler rebelled after Mu'awiya's death and conquered Āmul_(Kabul). The timings of this statement are generally considered correct but are obviously not so according to our interpretation of Tabari's account. The statement implies that Kabul was under Arab occupation when Mu'awiya in 680 and that the 'Shah' recaptured it after his death. The historical situation of the time does not support such a statement. It is well known that Kabul was recaptured from the Muslims in 666 and it remained under Kabulshahs for a long time thereafter. Part C, therefore, refers to the occupation of Kabul in 666 during Mu'awiya's Caliphate. Tabari confirms accounts of Balladhuri, al Beruni and Huei-ch'ao_regarding change of Kabul dynasty when he says that the 'Shah' rebelled and conquered Kabul. All the three reports refer to the same person, though differently attested, who captured Kabul in 666.

Tabari's account also confirms the proposed etymology of Zhunbil to the extent that he belonged to Zabul; that the title already existed before 666, which could not have been Rutbil; and the first element of the title certainly reflected the name of the god Zhun. Moreover, this interpretation supports the generally agreed view that Tabari's Shah was actually Kabul Shah or Barhategin and Zhunbil was his brother. But it also highlights a subtle difference which has important bearing on the identity of these rulers. The Shah was initially ruler of Zabul who, after being dethroned by Zhunbil, fled to Kabul in 664 where he miraculously usurped power in 666 and thus became Kabul Shah. Part-E apparently looks confusing but fits well in our interpretation. It possibly relates to the time when the dethroned 'Shah', of Zabul had usurped power at Kabul while Zhunbil was still hiding somewhere in Zabul or on the Indian frontier. A year or so

after the fall of Kabul, Zhunbil regained control of area upto Bust until reinforcements arrived under Ar-Rabi, the new governor of Sistan (Murgotten 1924: 47-48,). The same is reported by Tabari who says (Part-D) that Zhunbil besieged Zarang until reinforcement arrived from Al-Basra. Both reports imply that Zhunbil did so independently of Kabul Shah or the 'Shah'.

Based on above analysis and interpretation of Tabari's account, the political movements in the region during, and immediately after, the second tenure of 'Abdar Raman b. Samura as Governor of Sistan are explained as follows: The king of Khingle or Nizuk dynasty was ruling Kabul while Zabulistan had a king who was a follower of Zhun. Zhunbil, besides being a prince, was the high priest of the popular cult of Zhun. Ibn Samura, after reaching Sistan, launched an attack against Kabul from the direction of Merv in 664 and captured it. Knowing well Ibn Samura's earlier attack of the temple of Zhun in 653-54, Zhunbil probably realized a serious threat not only to the kingdom of Zabul but also to its religion. He dethroned the king, his brother, in 664-65, probably for being too conciliatory towards Muslims, and assumed political leadership of Zabul under the religious title of Zhunbil. He thus gave religious orientation to the struggle against the Muslims which appeared to him to be a long one. The Shah'' of Zabul, along with his followers, fled to Kabul and paid allegiance to Ibn Samura and the titular king of Kabul. The fugitive 'Shah' and his followers were allowed to settle somewhere away from Kabul, probably near Gandhara. The defeat of the king of Kapisa and his conversion to Islam must have greatly demoralized the mainly Indian population of the kingdom. Moreover, the consecutive defeats and occupation of Kabul region must have disorganized and scattered his forces. The fugitive 'Shah' built up his strength slowly and waited for the right moment. The departure of Ibn Samura, one of the successful Muslim commanders, and the eventual withdrawal of Muslim forces from Kabul for being too far away from their base at Sistan, gave him the chance. The fugitive Shah or Barhategin emerged from his hide out as a savior, mobilized the people against the last king of Khingle dynasty of Kapisa before he could reorganize his forces, and killed him. Thus Tabri's 'Shah' or al-Beruni's Barhategin or Baladhuri's Kabulshah, all one and the same person, established Shahiya dynasty of Kabul in 666.

Zhunbil, soon after, came out of his hideout, collected his forces and, according to both Baladhuri and Tabari, captured Zabulistan and area up to Bust and probably threatened Zaranj when Rabi bin Ziad arrived with reinforcements in 667-68 who forced him to withdraw. Zabul had most probably changed hands thrice around the mid sixties of seventh century; once when Zhunbil assumed political control of Zabul by expelling his brother probably in 664-65; the second time when Ibn Samura captured Zabul in 665 from Zhunbil; and finally when Zhunbil recaptured Zabul in 667 after withdrawal of Muslims. The first mention of Zhunbil is assigned to the time of 667 but Tabari mentioned him in connection with the dethroning of the king of Zabul in 664. The title of Zhunbil, as chief priest of Zhun, therefore, existed since long and was not given by Turkshah after 666 as claimed by Rehman**.** The title was retained by the rulers of Zabul till the end of the dynasty in 870 which indicate that the religious orientation given to the war with Arab Muslims by the first historical Zhunbil had helped in sustaining the war for so long.

The fugitive Shah's rise to power in Kabul in 666, within about two years of losing his kingdom of Zabul, certainly made him look like someone, in al-Beruni's words, of "miraculous origin and destined to be a king." Zhunbil was the brother of the 'Shah' before 666; he was brother of Barhategin or Kabul Shah after 666; it follows that Tabari's 'Shah' was actually Kabul Shah or Barhategin. The fraternal relations between the rulers of Kabul and Zabul are also confirmed by Hueich'ao. Alberuni's assertion of sixty generation long rule of Shahya dynasty, though exaggerated, fits better is case of the fugitive shah, who had been successor to a long line kings in Zabul before establishing the Shahiya Dynasty of Kabul. Thus the new ruler of Kabul initially belonged to the indigenous dynasty ruling in Zabul and, like Zhunbil, was the follower of the cult of Zhun, an offshoot of Zoroastrism. By identifying Tabari's 'Shah' with Kabul Shah and Barhategin, it has become possible to bring out the later two from the shadows of perpetual obscurity where history had placed them**.**

6. Ethnicity of the Rulers of Kabul and Zabul

The Muslim geographers mostly regarded the rulers of Zabul and Kabul and their followers and even the people on the Indian border as Turkish. But a large number of scholars disagree. Regarding the name Turk, Wink (1990: 116) says: "the Arabs appear to have applied this term to all their opponents on the eastern Iranian and Indian frontier". He says elsewhere that Turkshahs "like the Zunbils of Zabul were not Turks" (1992: 767). Gibb writes that "the Arabic records are misleading by their use of the word Turk for all the non-Persian peoples of the east" (1923:10). Bosworth states that "the Arab sources ignorantly describe the Zunbil's followers as Turks" (1968: 33-34). The ambiguity of the word Turk is evident from al-Beruni who called Barhategin a Turk but of Tibetan origin. Hueich'ao, the Korean pilgrim, described the first Turk Shah as T'uChueh but "not in the same line as Northern Turks" (Kuwayama 2002: 262). Similarly, Ou- kong, during his visit in middle of 8th century, connected Turkshahs to the famous Kanishka of Kushan dynasty (Wink 1992: 767). YU Taishan (2011:15) states that in the "Rājataraṅgiṇī (I, 170) there is a reference to the fact that the Turkic ruler in Gandhāra claimed his ancestor was Kanishka".

The rulers of Zabul and Kabul had been given Turkish titles by the Chinese kings probably because of the high prestige of such titles at that time. Moreover, by showing connection of the rulers with Turks, the titles meant to impress the Arab Muslims with the strength and links of these rulers. The successor of Barhategin is known as Khurasan Tegin Shah, whose name or title not only shows that he was linked to the Turks but also indicate his exaggerated claim of being the ruler of a vast area to the south and north of Hindukush. Since the Turks had mostly been subdued by the time the next Turk Shah ascended the throne in 739, he called himself Fromo Kesaro, a Bactrian form, meaning Ceaser of Rome. The name implied "an anti-Arab programme and propaganda" indicating links with Byzantine Empire (Harmatta 1996: 372). Zhunbils, though believed to have been given Turkish titles, were always known to Arabs by their native titles of Zhunbil, though erroneously recorded as Rutbil. The Chinese also called the rulers of Zabul by names which are restored by Harmatta as Zibil, Zobil and Kuwayama as Zābul indicating no connection with Turkish names. Barhategin and Žunbil were both, at different times, rulers of Zabul and also followers of Zhun, though Kabul Shah or his son

may have accepted Buddhism after becoming rulers of Kabul. They and the dynasties they established in Kabul and Zabul were therefore, neither Turkish nor Hypthalite but of indigenous origin with roots in distant Iranian past.

Linguistic evidence indicates that majority of the followers of the cult of Zhun were Afghans and the dialect that was spoken in Zabul was most probably Pashto. Zhunbil and Barhategin or Kabulshah were both followers of Zhun and might have been Afghans. The long and resolute resistance of the Zunbils to the Arab attacks was probably mainly by the "ancestors of the Afghans or Pathans, who supplied troops to fight against Islamic expansion" (Fry 1975: 92). However, in view of the popularity of the cult of Žun in the region, it is possible that many other people must have become followers of the cult during its long stay south of Hindukush. Some scholars are of the view that the rulers of Kabul and Zabul were Khalaj Turks (Rehman 1979: 42-43; Inaba 2005: 15-16). In view of the roots of these rulers in Iranian past, they cannot be Khalaj Turks unless Khalaj were Afghans as believed by some scholars. Reference to the Kushan lineage of Kabulshahs by Ou-kong and al-Beruni may actually connect the kings of Kabul and Zabul from seventh to ninth centuries to the Kushana dynasty. It is worth noting that Sakas and Afghans presumably moved south through Herat to Sistan and Arachosia in the second century B.C.E. (Morgensteirne 1979: 22-23). Kushanas closely followed them who established their dynasty in the beginning in first century CE with capital at Peshawar. It appears that Huvishka had extended the Kushan rule to East Afghanistan. Many Kushan soldiers and people might have followed and settled and ultimately amalgamated with Afghans and become followers of the god Zhun. After the disintegration of Kushana dynasty, the Zabul rulers probably continued to rule independently or at times under the patronage of Iran.

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-3-

The Dilazāks: A Forgotten Afghān Tribe

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Abstract

The Dilazāks the very first Afghān tribe to enter the Peshāwar Valley held a dominant position in their new home for a long time and were the most powerful of all the Afghāns. This is why, when the Yūsufzai/Mandanr much depressed, poverty, stricken and fatigued requested them for a piece of land where they could reside in peace, the Dilazāks, showing great generosity, assigned the Doāba to them and gave them even more lands afterwards. But the Yūsufzais gradually secured their position and in the end drove their benefactors out of the Peshāwar valley. The other section of the Dilazāks was driven out likewise by the Ghoriakhel. The Dilazāks then lost their power scattered by Mughal forces shortly afterwards. They have now almost been forgotten.

The Dilazāks grossly mistaken by some early writers for ancestors of the Sikhs of the Panjāb, or Rājpūts (See Raverty 1976: 35n) were undoubtedly an Afghān tribe. Zahīr ad-Dīn Bābur (1987: 376) who knew them well, just as he knew many other Afghān tribes and also records their names for the first time, calls them Dilazāk Afghāns, as do some other Afghān writers. When Khān Kaju stopped his men from attacking the fugitive Dilazāks at the Indus crossing, he loudly shouted, "stop comrades, let their ladies get across, after all they are Afghāns like us." (Khwāju 1977:206). The Dilazāks consider themselves Karlārnis (Kararāni or Karrāni) and, according to the genealogical tables given by the Makhzān-i- Afghāni (1978:801), Karlārni was the fourth son of Qais 'Abd ar- Rashīd, the so-called progenitor of the Afghān race.

What does the name Dilazāk mean, we do not know, just as we do not know the meaning of Ghurghasht, Betani, Sarbanri – names of the other three sons of Qais, or of Kharshbūn and Sharkhbūn, the sons of Sarbarni. But there is no doubt that these are all non- Muslim names.

When Yūsufzai and Mandanrs (Khashi) were expelled from Afghānistān after the mass slaughter of their chiefs and notables in about

AD 1480 or 1485 by Mirzā Ulugh Beg, the king of Kābul, the Dilazāks were very powerful and possessed half of Bajauṛ, Tīrah, a great part of Nangrahār (Nagarahāra), the entire plain of Peshāwar except for Hashtnagar and the adjoining territories to the north, which were under the control of Sulṭān, Awais, of Swāt, whose governor named Mīr Handā (or Hindā) b. Arzu (or Azru), a brave and celebrated chief, of the tribe of Dodāl, ruled over Sher Khānai,Bāz Dara, Barmol, Sangāo, Hisār Bālol, fort Baigham, and Hashtnagar then inhabited by Shalmānis, from the provincial capital called "fort of Hashtnagar" (Mu'azzam Shah 1977:118) (present Bālā Hiṣār), the ruins of which can still be seen from a distance near Charsada on the right bank of the Jindai.

Where did the Dilazāks come from is nowhere recorded. In bygone times, it seems, they had been forced by the forward pressure of other tribes to remove into Nangrahār. Of the Afghān tribes, the Dilazāks, according to the Akhūnd (1960: 110) were the first to appear in Nangrahār. When did it precisely happen the Akhūnd has nothing to say. But careful analysis of the details he has given regarding the Budīni, it is possible to work out an approximate date.

Akhūnd Darweza (1960: 107) tells us that he had heard from the most elderly and the most pious of the age that the country of Nangrahār in ancient times, was in the possession of a non- Muslim people called "Budni" who had several tribes, and that they missed no opportunity in creating troubles for the Muslims or hurting them. Raverty (1976: 51) maintains that the tribe which predominated over the Nangrahāris, as the Akhūnd styles the Tājik inhabitants of that part, called Budni, appears to have been a clan of those Turkish tribes which, before the Afghāns pushed as for north as the southern face of the Spin Ghar range, ruled it from very early times. But we know it from Herodotus that they were not Turks. Herodotus (1973: 278, 306, 309, 310, 315) writes this name as "Budīni" and it appears to be the correct form in view of the following facts:

1. Some people in Balūchistān still call themselves Budīni. They are undoubtedly remnants of a tribe of the same name.
2. Between Bannu and D.I.Khan there is a tomb in the Pezu Gap on top of a hill, ascribed to Shaikh Budīn, a highly venerated saint in the surrounding districts.
3. A section of the tribe seems to have migrated to lower Sind. The

place they selected for their residence came to be known as Badīn (Budīn) which has now grown into a sizeable city.

4. The southernmost branch of the Kābul River flowing at a short distance from Peshawar city is called Budni, corrupted from Budīni. Dani (1969: 9) incorrectly translate this name as "old". To suit Dani's translation the name should be Budhi, which it is not.

Herodotus (1973: 278) located the Budīnis somewhere between the Black Sea and the Caspian. "Once acrss the Tanais", he writes, one has left Scythia behind, and come first to the Sauromatae, who occupy a stretch of country which runs northward fifteen days' journey from northern tip of the Sea of Azor, and is entirely bare of trees, wild or cultivated. The next region beyond the Sauromatae belongs to the Budini, and is plentifully supplied with timber of all sorts."

Herodotus does not specifically call the Budīni Scythian but they were ostensibly closely related to them and supported the Scythians against the Achaemenian emperor Darius 1 when he sent a powerful army to crush them.

When did the Budīni reach the Nangrahār is not known for certain. But their expulsion from Nangrahār was known to Akhūnd Darwezā (1960: 607-09). The Budīnis (Budni), he remarks, were overthrown in a single action and expelled from Nangrahār and Tīrah by Sulṭān Bahrām, whose brother Fakhal (Pakhal) ruled over Swāt , Bajauṛ , Kashmīr and other territories in that direction. He took up his residence at Pāpīn in Nangrahār and died at Koṭ in that same territory. The descendants of Sulṭān Bahrām held possession until the time that Amīr Tīmūr, the Gurgān, subdued the parts around, after which they were for some time vassals of him and his descendants (Akhūnd: 113). In course of time, however, even the chieftainship passed out of the hands of the family. It is probable that Sulṭān Qirān son of Sulṭān Bahrām, or his Sulṭān Khwāja held the throne of Pāpīn at the time of Tīmūrs invasion (AD 1398-99) Sulṭān Bahrām who expelled the Budīnis from Nangrahār, might therefore have held the royal office in about the middle of the fourteenth century. This probably was the time (about AD 1340-1350) or even a little before it when the Budīnis were expelled and the Dilazāks moved into Tīrah and Nangrahār. It seems the Dilazāks did not stay long there and pushed on towards the Peshāwar plains. The exact date is not known, however, AD

1400 or a little earlier may be a plausible guess. Khwaja (1977: 100) says that on reaching Peshāwar the Dilazāks found that Hashtnagar was already in the possession on the Shalmānisā dihqān Tājīk tribe khan who originally lived in Shalmān and Kaṛmān and hence came to be known as Shalmāni.

In Peshāwar the Dilazāks grew rich and powerful and also expanded to Bajauṛ on the one hand and to territories across the Indus in Hazārah. They also appear to have pushed the already weakened Budīnis across the Indus. Raverty (1976:381n) believes that the Khaṭars and Gakhaṛs are probably some of the Budni (Budīni) tribes who crossed the Indus into the Sind-Sāgar Doāba.

After the massacre of their chiefs, the main portion of the Khashis (Yūsufzai and Mandanrs), much broken, fatigued and powerless as they were at that particular time, decided to contact the Dilazāk of Peshāwar for refuge. For this purpose they invited the Dilazāk chief to meet at a place known as Safed Sang (east of Tahtarah) and held conference and solicited land from their country. But, in the meantime, on very slight provocation, a fight ensued between them in which a number of the Yūsufzai and Mandanrs are said to have fallen. As a result the Yūsufzais and their allies went back and took up their quarters in the hills about Tahtarah and Dhākah. But subsequently finding no way out of the dilemma they made up matters with the Dilazāks who treated them with great generosity and consideration and assigned them the entire Doābah district (in which the town of Shabqadar stands prominently at present).

Malik Aḥmad, the Khashi chief, expressed his gratitude, but, at the same time, pointed out that the Doābah was but a small district and that numbers of his people remained behind, who intended to rejoin their kinsfolk as soon as they should find a safe haven, and then they would not all find room to dwell in and obtain a livelihood. On this the Dilazāk once again showed extraordinary generosity and gave the Khashi a vast territory extending from Dānish-Kol and Anbār to Bajauṛ without consulting the Bajauṛ section of their own tribe. This negligence became a source of great trouble for the Bajauṛ section did not like it and refused to surrender any lands to the Khashis as we shall see below. In any case it was much more than the Khashis expected. Malik Aḥmad was much delighted over the gains, while the jubilant Khashis went back to make preparations to bring their families to their new home. They got even more excited when they

were told that they could snatch Hashtnagar from the Shalmānis any time it suited them.

On the way to their new home some of the Khashi families went straight to the Doābah, others who had a lot of cattle preferred Danish Kol and `Anbar, and still others took up their residence at Lāshoṛahh in Bajauṛ. This they did by virtue of the permission given them by the Dilazāks of Peshāwar. When Malik Haibu (correctly Haibat Khan), son of Jattah, chief of the `Umar Khel Dilazāks who possessed the Jandūl valley came to be known about it, he collected his men to roll the Khashis back with a powerful push. He was a physically strong and renowned chief and commanded one thousand Dilazāks families.

Wearing iron coat and helmet, he advanced to Lāshoṛahh at the head of a powerful army and took up his position above the village of Laka Tiga, signifying in Pushto an upright monolith, on the bank of the Lāshoṛahh River.

Yūsufzai and Mandanr lashkar under the command of Mīr Jamāl Amānzai gathered at Ṭop and Makhranai villages at a distance of about one mile from the Dilazāk camp, to the south of the Lāshoṛah River. The Yūsufzais were now joined by a portion of the Khalīl tribe, which had, sometime previously, quarrelled with the other tribes of their sept, Ghoria Khel, had left Tarnak and Qalāt in the northern parts of Qandahār territory, and had reached those parts, and taken up their abode, in the Lāshoṛah Darah (Khwāju 1977:104). The confederates mustered their fighting men in the plane near Lāshoṛah where at this time, says Khwāju, the 'Arab' castle called Shahr or Khār stands. Meanwhile the Yūsufzais of the Doābah came to know about these developments and rushed to the help of their brethren In Bajauṛ.

The Tarkalanrīs (a tribe of the Khashi sept) and Mohmands (a tribe of the Ghoria Khel sept) at the time were dwelling in Lamghān and in the neighbourhood of Kābul to the south respectively. Hearing of the feud they, with the intention of finding a comfortable niche in Bajauṛ for themselves, and they determined to fish in the troubled waters, set out accordingly at the heads of bodies of their respective tribes, and entered Bajauṛ pretending to bring about and reconcile the disputants by show of force. On their arrival they advised Malik Haibū to agree to the decision of the Peshāwar Jirgah of his tribe. But duped into believing that they would remain neutral, he refused to give up Lāshoṛah, much less Jandūl, and

attacked the confederates. When the actual fight began the Tarklānris and Mohmands, much to his surprise, joined forces with the Yūsufzais and made him their special target. A desperate fight began in which the ‘Umar Khel suffered defeat and Malik Haibū and his brother lost their lives. Khwāju (1977:107) says that a Kakāzai Tarkalānri named Pāindah was the first who smote Haibū with his sword and another of the same clan, Burhān by name, smote him on the neck with his, and the Malik`s head rolled upon the ground. Mīr Jamāl Mandanr of the Amānzai clan, dismounted from his horse and stripped Haibū’s body of his armour, a valuable suit, and carried it off as well as his sword. These trophies remained in the family of Mīr Jamāl for many generations.

The defeated ‘Umr Khel retired to Jandūl but soon realized they they could not remain there for long after this affair and, family by family, they began to set out in order to reach the lower country (the Peshāwar valley). But the Yūsufzais and Khalīls would not permit them to proceed by the Lāshoṛah route, and at last they had to come down into the Darah of Mihr, in the south eastern part of Bajauṛ, through tracts where there was no way out, and they settled in ‘Anbar and Dānish Kol.

The Tarklānris and Mohmands went back to their seats after winning the battle and so did the Yūsufzais of the Doābah. Soon after this the Yūsufzais opened hostilities with the Shalmānis of Hashtnagar and dispossessed them of the whole territory from Hashtnagar to Mālākand. Now they began to look upon Swāt with greedy eyes and seriously thought of snatching it from the hands of Sulṭān, Awais, the ruler of Swāt. Meanwhile an unforeseen and dangerous situation arose in the Michni area. The river Kābul marked the dividing line; the Dilazāks being on the right bank and Yūsufzais (including Mandanrs) on the left bank. Michni was the main crossing point. Minor incidents of theft and cattle lifting were common in the border areas. Khwāju (1977:121) however, holding the Dilazāks of Peshāwar responsible for such mishaps, says that whenever the matter was brought to the notice of Muḥammad Khān, the Dilazāk chief, who himself lived across the river (i.e. right bank) below the Michni crossing, he just shrugged it off saying that he was not personally in favour of doing any harm to the Yūsufzais and that the Yūsufzais should, on their own, remain alert against such incidents. But this answer did not satisfy the Yūsufzai Chief Malik Aḥmad, who, besides setting up night patrol under Shaikh Mali, also told some of his own men

to cross the river at night and steal some Dilazāk cattle, hoping that such an action would deter the Dilazāks from doing any mischief in future. The Yūsufzai burglars, surprisingly, did more than what they were told and made off with the favourite horse of the Dilazāk chief. This horse, we are further told, Shaikh Mali used in his night patrols.

Instead of frightening the Dilazāks off, this incidence provoked them to take revenge. One night a brave Dilazāk, named Juhaṛ b. Kīmal, and some other horsemen and footmen, knowing that Michni crossing was very well secured by the Yūsufzais, crossed the river upstream above Tangi and Barbar at a point where the shrine of a certain ‘Ali then existed, with a view to carry out a night attack, and hid themselves –some near the Tangi crossing and some in the olive forests near the Yūsufzai village waiting for the cattle to come, which they wanted to steal and take to the other side of the river.

Shaikh Mali was on his usual patrol when he came know about it. Sensing the danger, he sent for help from the neighbouring villages. By the time of breakfast all the people joined him and marched to Pechūni, while the Dilazāks, descended to the same point and engaged them. A dreadful battle ensued and lasted till evening when both the sides agreed to disengage and bury the dead. It was decided that one of the parties would go home leaving the other to bury their dead and the other party would come next day and bury their own dead. The Dilazāk’s opted for staying in the battle field for the night. In the morning they picked up the bodies of their dead fighters and buried them in a level ground at the foot, but a little to the north, of the hill called “Top of the Gibaris of Karohi,” and went back home. After this the Yūsufzais came and buried their dead at a distance of about five to six yards from the Dilazāk graveyard. In the gap left between these two graveyards passed the road to Kaṛapah (Black water), which bifurcated near the Yūsufzai cementry – one branch going to Bajauṛ and the other to the Gibaris. To the west of it was the burial ground of the Dilazāks and to the east that of the Yūsufzais. White pebbles, we are told, were plentifully available. In order to decorate the burials some people put them on the graves. Therefore the place came to be known as “Spin Khāk” or White Soil.

Realizing that the threat from across the river was greater than what they had imagined, the Dilazāks now made prepartions on a larger scale and assembled a huge number of their troops in the Barbar gorge

opposite Michni, with a view to nipping the evil in the bud with a powerful push. The sheer number of the Dilazāk fighters dispelled the spirit of confidence in the Yūsufzai camp. The only way out of this dilemma, Malik Aḥmad wisely thought, went through the typical Pushtūn tradition, of Nanawatal, literally "the entering in". By this tradition a Pushtūn is expected, ever at the sacrifice of his own life and property, if necessary, to shelter and protect anyone who in extremity may flee to his threshold and seek an asylum under his roof, admit his fault and ask for forgiveness.

Malik Aḥmad himself took the initiative, crossed the river in the company of a few others and went straight to the house of Malik Muḥammad Khān, the Dilazāk chief. When he reached there it was mid-day. When Muḥammad Khān's wife came to know about it, she enquired from Aḥmad as to who he was and what the purpose of his visit was. Answering these questions Malik Aḥmad disclosed his identity and also the purpose of his visit. Muḥammad Khān's wife, Khwāju (p.126) remarks, was a brave and wise lady. She instantly understood the urgency of the matter and dispatched one of her trustworthy servants to Muḥammad Khān, her husband, with the confidential news regarding Malik Aḥmad's arrival in Nanawatal. She also instructed the messanger to quickly report back to her regarding the prevalent mood of the army in general regarding this incidence.

The messenger brought back the news that, in spite of Muḥammad Khān's exhortations, the army was furious and wanted to kill Malik Aḥmad, and that they were rushing to the house of Muḥammad Khān to get hold of him. But before the army reached their destination, that sagacious lady took a wise precautionary step and hid Aḥmad behind cotton stacks in the godown and spread the news that he has made good his escape and fled from the scene. At this the army was greatly disappointed. But after a while good sense prevailed and some of the grey beards pointed out that the thought of killing Aḥmad, when he had come to admit his fault and ask for forgiveness, was a violation of the Pushtūn tradition and that it had put the entire Dilazāk nation to shame.

When sentiments cooled down Muḥammad Khān's wife said to him that if he could guarantee the security of Malik Aḥmad she could still produce in his presence Malik Aḥmad out of the godown. Everyone in the Dilazāk camp appreciated the sagacity of the lady for saving their honour.

Aḥmad was then brought before the army which had not yet dispersed where he made a short speech in which he admitted his fault and promised that he would see to it that it did not occur again. He was then given full honour and respect. A fully caparisoned horse was presented to him and he was sent back home honourably amidst the sound of drums. It goes to the credit of the young Khashi chief that, putting his own life at risk, he succeeded in averting a potential danger.

The present distribution of tribes is partly the result of the actions or inactions of the successive Tīmurīd rulers of Kābul. Tīmūr, who died in 807H/1404 was succeeded, in the government of Kābul, by Mīrzā Pīr Muḥammad who in turn died in 809H/1406. His successor, Siwraghtimish, died in 830H/1426. The throne of Kābul then passed on into the hands of Amīr Shaikh Ali, the Mughal. The next ruler of Kābul Mirzā Abū Sa'eed died in 873H/1468 and was succeeded by his son Mirzā Ulugh Beg, the notorious persecutor of the Khashis, who died in 907H/1501. Towards the end of this year Muḥammad Muqīm b. Amīr Zunnūn became the ruler of Kabul. He was deposed by Zahīr ad-Dīn Bābur in 910H/ 1504. In contrast to some of his immediate predecessors Bābur quickly brought Kābul, Lamghān, Jalālābād, Nangrahār, Peshāwar, Doābah, Hashtnagar and all other tracts up to the banks of the Indus, under his influence if not effective control. The Yūsufzais too outwardly at least accepted his over lordship (Khwāju 1977: 149).

In the first month of 925H/January AD 1519, when Bābur Bādshāh moved against Bajauṛ, and overthrew the Gibarī Sulṭān, the Gagiānis were then settled in the Doābah, but the Tarklānris were still dwelling in Lamghān, the Afrīdis had only recently settled on the Bārah river, and the Muḥammadzais, and part of the Utmānkhel, tribe were still dwelling in Nangrahār. The Gagiānis at this time had relations with the Bādshāh, brought him into Hashtnagar district, ostensibly to make a raid on the Dilazāks, but it was suspected against the Yūsufzais and Mandanrs. They had lately however agreed to give him the daughter of the Malik, Shāh Manṣūr, the cousin of malik Aḥmad, in marriage and had propitiated him.
The raid on the Dilazāks of the Samah was of little effect and soon came to an abrupt end, except for the story of Shāh Boṛae, which gives a lively touch to this otherwise tragic scene in which unprovoked killing of unweary people and spoliation of property emerge as significant features. Shāh Boṛae, as the story goes, was a man – like woman among the

Dilazāks. She was fond of horse riding and archery and in normal life shunned the company of women. One night she and Rustam, her cousin, were routinely scheduled for keeping watch and ward in the village. Between themselves they decided that she would perform the duty in the first half and Rustam in the second half of the night. When she went to bed after performing her duty and was fast asleep, sexual lust tempted Rustam to kiss her, but he kissed so hard that his teeth left her cheek bleeding. She at once jumped out of the bed and tried to find her sword. But this and her other weapons had been carefully hidden by Rustam beforehand, for, he knew the moment she got up she would kill him. While she was searching for her weapons, Rustam found sufficient time to make good his escape. With the bleeding cheek, she thought, she would be put to shame by the village folk and therefore decided to marry the same person who had committed this outrage. When Bābur's troops invaded Kalpāni, a Dilazāk village and home of Shāh Boṛae, Rustam was laid down with fever, and was unable to fly. He exhorted Shāh Boṛae to flee and save her life but she decided to defend her husband valiantly. The enemy took her for a man and, having faced tough resistance, finally overpowered her. As the news regarding this brave woman reached Bābur, he issued instructions not to kill her. But by this time, she had already been killed during the fight. Filled with remorse Bābur reproached his soldiers for this unbecoming action (Khwāju 1977: 182-86).

When Bābur raided Kalpāni, the home of the 'Umr Khel Dilazāks, it consisted of two large villages, facing each other, separated by a stream of the same name. A wooden bridge connected them. The 'Umr Khels were a brave people. In order perhaps to strengthening his position, Bābur had summoned Malik Sar Abdāl, chief of the Akozais, and Mīr Fateh Khān, chief of the Ilyāszai, along with their Lashkars, into his presence. Both acted in accordance with his command and presented themselves. The Gagiāni chief Malik Ḥamzah and his Lashkar was already with him. In view of the overwhelming number of the enemy troops, the 'Umr Khel cautiously dispatched their women and cattle to the Karamār mountain and decided to secure the left bank of the Kalpāni. For a while the Mughals could make no progress, for, every time they tried to wade through the stream they were halted by the deadly rain of arrows let loose upon them by the Dilazāks. When Bābur sternly urged his commanders to get across, they in turn, Khwāju (1977: 181-82) says replied: "The Dilazāks are

excellent marksmen, archers and brave and don't budge an inch from their position". With their superior numerical strength the Mughals at last won the battle. As the night was fast approaching, Bābur decided to stay there for the night. Malik Sar Abdāl, who was young and superior in wisdom to others and was therefore looked upon by the king with favour, also encamped with the other Afghāns, at a distance from the royal camp. In the morning the two sections of the Yūsufzais – the Akozai and the Ilyāszai – somehow locked horns in a brawl and raised unprecedented hue and cry which alarmed the king who, suspecting that there was something foul and that the whole affair was a drama staged by the tribes to corner him, immediately jumped upon the back of his horse and was ready to flee when the Akozai chief approached him and convinced him that there was nothing to be worried about. Sar Abdāl then advanced to disengage the parties but was himself hit by a stray arrow and died. The king retreated, Khwāju says (p. 189) without realizing his ambition. Malik Ḥamzah, however, fulfilled all the formalities of a feast and entertained the king properly.

The above statement is based upon Khwāju, but, Raverty (1976: 223), who doesn't indicate his source of information gives a somewhat different account and says that the brawl took place between two divisions of the Gagiāni tribe, and that the person who was killed by a stray arrow was one of the greatest of the Gagiāni chiefs. This however doesn't appear to be the case, for, the great Gagiāni chief is known to have entertained the king while he was on his way back to Kābul, subsequent to this event. Bābur himself has nothing to say and the story appears to be fig of Khwāju's own imagination.

The Battle of Nīma Waṛae

The unprovoked aggression against the Dilazāks of Kalpāni left them severely bleeding but they were still powerful and decided to avenge the wrong done to them. They were fully convinced that none but the Gagiānis were responsible for it. The matter was discussed in a Dilazāk Jirgah (council of elders) and it was decided to apprize Malik Aḥmad, who was in Swāt at that time, of the situation and take him into confidence. Malik Aḥmad's reply was positive but he told the Dilazāk leaders that the final decision should be kept pending till after sometime they meet again in Buner. Malik Aḥmad and Shaikh Mali then went to the Akozais in the

Samah to offer condolence to Malik Mahmūd b. Yaḥyā, ‘Alā ad-Dīnzai, over the death of Malik Sar Abdāl. They also took the opportunity to reprimand the Akozais for taking part in the action against the Dilazāks of Kalpāni. On reaching Buner Mailk Aḥmad met the ‘Umr Khail Dilazāks in a jirgah and, to the great satisfaction of the latter, remarked: “your enemy is our enemy. I renounce the “Nang” (sense of honour demanding reprisal) of the Khashi; go and take revenge on the Gagiānis.”

This neutral position of Aḥmad encouraged the Dilazāks to go ahead with the plan. They collected a huge Lashkar and crossed the Landae at the ferry called Surgh Waṛae reached Peshāwar where they received additional reinforcements from their brethren. The Gagiānis, who had already removed their assets to the neighbouring mountains, and were encamped at Nīmah Waṛe in the Doābah to face the enemy but suffered defeat. Thinking that molesting the women and children of the vanquished enemy would not be appreciated by Malik Aḥmad, the Dilazāk fighters avoided committing any outrage, and went back home (Khwāju 1977: 195)

The Battle of Kātlang

The families of the slain Yūsufzai chiefs who had joined hands with Gagiānis without the permission of their chief, Malik Aḥmad, and also those of the Gagiānis now flocked to him crying for revenge. Moved by the Khashi Nang or by the Dilazāk menace of lifting Yūsufzai cattle near NagarKot, Malik Aḥmad, in consultation with other chiefs, decided to take on the Dilazāks – his erstwhile benefactors. Khwāju’s statement (p. 199) that the immediate cause was the lifting of the Chādar (garment used by Yūsufzai ladies as a veil) by a naughty Dilazāk youth from a bush where it had been spread out for drying, appears to have been concocted merely to harp on the Pakhtūn predilection for purdah (veil).

Malik Aḥmad knew the military strength of the Dilazāks and had therefore to make preparations on an unprecented scale. He therefore tried to appease even those sections of the Gagiāni tribe which had sided with Ulugh Beg against the Yūsufzais when they were in Kābul. Shaikh Mali and some other chiefs were tasked to go to Kābul and convince the Gagiānis (actually Mūsāzais) that the Yūsufzais were ready to offer a full pardon to them for their past offences in case they agreed to send their Lashkar to help Malik Aḥmad in that hour of need. To this the Mūsāzais

agreed whole- heartedly. The Mūsāzais, Utman Khels and Muḥammadzais got ready to send their contingents but the Tarklānris refused to join this confederacy (Khwāju 1977: 201).

When Shaikh Mali was in Kābul, Malik Aḥmad himself visited Swāt, Bajauṛ, Samah and Hashtnaghar to collect local Lashkars. The Dilazāks of Kalpāni were not sitting idle too. When they came to know that Shaikh Mali had proceeded to Kābul with the intention of bringing more troops in the filed they also sent messages to their people in Peshāwar, Hazārah, Mānakrāe, Akori, Turbela, Pehūr, Sher Darah and Panjtār with the request to help.

The Dilazāks gathered at Shāhbāzgaṛha and then moved towards Kātlang. The two armies came face to face at the village called Gadar situated on the bank of a stream of the same name. From the confederating army the Popalzai cavalry comprising two hundred horses was the first to move. Meanwhile Shaikh Mali also reached the battle field and strengthened the position of Malik Aḥmad. The upshot was that the Dilazāks were completely over thrown and fled to Hazārah. The precise date of this very important battle is not recorded by Khwāju. Caroe (1958: 189) places it in AD 1525. Khān Kaju, the successor of Malik Aḥmad, took part in this battle as a young man and, later, married a daughter of the Dilazāk chief Bhāi Khān. This marriage, which ostensibly seems to be a political alliance alone, for, it held back the Dilazāks, or at least the family of Bhāi Khan from carrying out retaliatory raids on the territory of their son- in- law, has been painted by Pakhtūn writers in highly romantic terms. Khān Kaju was one of the delegation, as the story goes, which went to the house of Bhāi Khān to carry out negotiations with a view to avoiding an armed conflict, and by chance caught a glimpse of Bhāi Khān's daughter and fell in love with her. On coming back he proposed marriage but his purposal was turned down. Subsequently the Dilazāks were defeated in the battle of Kātlang and fled to Hazārah, but they had to cross the river Indus. While they were still busy in making preparation to get across, they were over taken by the Yūsufzai troops led by Khān Kaju. As they were being pressed hard, Bhāi Khān implored the young general to stop his men, otherwise they would all, including his love, jump into the river and perish. Khān Kaju stopped his men. Bhāi Khān safely crosswd the river and later on accepted Khān Kaju's proposal.

The Battle of Shāhpurae

The battle of Kātlang resulted in a complete evacuation of the country north of the Landae River which the Yūsufzais and their allies took under their control and distributed it amongst themselves. The Dilazāks were however still powerful in the lands to the south of the same river in the lands around Peshāwar. They were very loyal to Humāyūn, son and successor of Zahīr ad- Dīn Bābur. This became a cause of their expulsion from Peshāwar. It was probably during the time of Humāyūn (AD 1530-1556), that the Ghoriā Khels, as the Khalīls, Dāudzais, Chamkani and Mohmands were then collectively known, applied to the Dilazāks of Peshāwar for lands, but, having paid so dearly for providing the Yūsufzais with lands, and being amply instructed by this example, they refused to accede to their request. At this period, Mirzā Kāmrān held the fief of Kābul and its dependences. On the death of his father, Bābur, in 1973 H/ AD 1531, Humāyūn confirmed his brother Mirzā Kāmrān in his fief as a feudatory. The cultured and good-natured Humāyūn who never suspected the loyalty of his brother, went as far as adding Panjāb to Kāmrān's fief. But Kāmrān's ambition was boundless and his unfaithfulness to his brother proverbial and the object of his life was to work him ill and supplant him.

The Dilazāks had always been good and faithful subjects of Bābur as shown by his own words (Tuzuk 1987:367): "a trusty man of the Dilazāk Afghāns" was sent to the ruler of Bajauṛ, and they were also good subjects of his son Humāyūn. This fact was sufficient to awaken Kāmrān's hostility to them. To him the Ghoria Khels appealed, and he agreed to aid them with his force. This event must have taken place soon after Humāyūn's succession to the throne of Delhi, and at a time when he was much occupied in other far more momentous matters in Hindūstān to be able to help the Dilazāks by restraining Kāmrān. Had it not been for Kāmrān's support, it is very probable that the Dilazāks would have successfully resisted the encroachment of the Ghoria Khel; as it was only after much severe fighting that the Dilazāks were finally over thrown at the village Sulṭān Purae, of which the ruins can still be seen near Pabbi on the road connecting this town with Chamkani.

The time chosen seems to have been when Humāyūn was fully occupied at home, and when the whole empire, even including Kāmrān's

fief, was disordered and bounds of authority utterly relaxed. It was at such a time that the Khalīls plotted with kāmrān to despoil the Dilazāks of their lands; and he naturally desired to have his own men in control of Peshāwar.

In 1542-43 Humāyūn lost his kingdom to the Sūris and fled to Iran seeking help from the Ṣafavids. In 1545, he recovered Kābul from the control of Kāmrān who took refuge with the Ghoria Khel. In AD 1550 Kāmrān suffered defeat near Shutar Grām, but with the help of his friends, the Ghoria Khel, he made a night attack upon Humāyūn's camp in 1551. In the following year he was captured and blinded. As the Sūris never crossed the Indus into the Peshāwar valley, the expulsion of the Dilazāks of Peshāwar could have taken place any time between 1530 and 1545.

Having suffered defeat the Dilazāks crossed the river Indus and settled in Hazārah from where they carried out intermittent raids across the river into the lands then occupied by their enemies. This caused a lot of turbulence and unrest in the area surrounding Attock – the seat of the Mughal district administration. When the Mughal emperor Jahāngīr set out for Kabūl and reached Attock in Muḥarram 1016 H/AD 1607-08, where he encamped upon a piece of level ground near the village of which the name is variously written as Amrohi (Quddusi 1968: 199) and Āhroi (Qadari 1969: ii 750) also Amardi (Elliot 976: vi, 311) he came to know about the depredations of the Khaṭar and Dilazāk tribesmen. In order to put an end to this menace, he made Zafar Khān , son of the late Zain Khān, the Kokal – Tāsh , governor of Attock and its district before proceeding to Kābul , and gave him direction to have the Dilazāks and Khaṭars removed near to Lahore and to have their removal affected before his return from Kābul. The command was duty carried out. Hence forth, the Dilazāks reduced to penury, ceased to exist as a tribal force and scattered in different parts of India in search of livelihood.

The Yūsufzais and Ghoria Khel were more thorough in their treatment of the Dilazāk problem than the Mughals and cleared the Peshāwar valley of them completely only so that one Dilazāk village has survived. In Hazārah however there are more than twenty Dilazāk villages with Sarāe Ṣāliḥ as the chief town in the tract of land known as the Dilazāk pati.

The above narration is based upon information gleaned from the original sources (i.e. Khwāju and Akhūnd Dawezā). But placing no trust in

the accuracy of these accounts, Sir Olaf Caroe (1992: 191) remarks, "I suggest that the chroniclers' account of the Khakhay and Ghoriah wars against the Dilazāks is only a traditional and half – mythical version of tribal disagreements". He further goes on to tell us that "It is far more likely that the Khataks are the people whom in this context the chronicles like to call Dilazāk", but we know for certain that Sir Olaf Caroe (writing in 1958) was far removed in terms of time from the scenes of these battles and that his speculation doesn't carry enough weight to question the validity of these nearly contemporary sources.

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-4-
Chuhṛeṯṛināmāh- As Feminine Voice in South Asian Literature*

Naila Pervaiz

Abstract

Women have been marginalized in the human society in almost all parts of the world. Owing to this, the sufis in South Asia kept on underscoring the marginalized position of women particularly in their poetry. More often than not, the Sufis brought in the female argument in their poetic works as it was a common norm during olden times. Waris Shah, famous for his Hir, is a well-known classical sufi poet of eighteenth century Punjab, yet very few would have heard about one of his other creations namely Chuhṛeṯṛināmāh. He has represented the doubly-marginalized community of the society in the Chuhṛeṯṛināmāh. Speaking in the feminine voice, he highlights the concerns and miseries of an oppressed section of premodern Punjabi society i.e., Chuhṛi. Chuhṛi is one of the village menials proper who sweeps the house and village. She is the sweeper as well as scavenger of the Punjabi society. Waris Shah also brings to light some of the key concepts of Sufism in this poetic composition but the present study does not deal with it as it primarily focuses on the female voice presented by the poet. The concept of chuhṛi/chuhṛeṯṛi has been mentioned time and again by various Sufi poets like Shah Husain, Bullhe Shah, etc. In premodern Punjab, generally speaking, the status of women was quite low. Furthermore, the chuhṛi, being poor and at the lowest rung of the society, was more vulnerable than that of other women. The reason of selecting chuhṛi as a female voice was that the chuhṛa community was at the lowest ebb of the Muslim community during premodern times. She was the one who faced the abuses of society and was supposed to be thankful to those who allowed her to enter in their house for cleaning purposes. The chuhṛi has been faced with social, religious, economic oppression since long. Waris Shah has mentioned a woman's capacity to merge herself to her

*The paper has been presented in the "International Conference on South Asian Literary Traditions (ICSALT) on 10-11 April, 2015 at Gurmani Centre for Language and Literature, LUMS.

beloved/master/God as, unlike men, she loves through her soul and not physically. Sufis have adopted this particular phenomenon in order to present more loyal and submissive attitude towards God. One of the reasons of presenting oneself in the female position could be the feminine virtues of compassion, nurturing and devotion. The chuhṛi also employs a strategy to attain self-empowerment by attaching herself with the spiritual lineage (such as with the renowned twelfth-century Sufi Sheikh Abdul Qadir Jilani; d. 1166) because her own status is blood-based which she cannot change.

Women Marginalization

> She is defined and differentiated with reference to man and not he with reference to her: she is incidental, inessential as opposed to the essential. He is the subject, he is the Absolute—she is the other (Beauvoir1974: xix).

Women have been marginalized in the human society in almost all parts of the world. Although they have played a crucial role as the guardians of cultural norms and contributed a lot in the economic aspect of life among others, they did not enjoy the powers enjoyed by the male members of the society. Humanity, in stereotypical term, comprises of male gender and man defines woman as a relative being and does not regard her as an independent being (Beauvoir 1974: 8). The role of women was mainly defined by the demands of patriarchal setup of the medieval times. They were expected to be modest and suppressed. According to Ghazali, women were trained to be submissive and not to contest the authority of the male members of the family (Malamud1996: 89-117).Male domination was an observable fact of medieval times, both in the east and the west. The society was feudalistic in nature because of its mode of production which was primitive. Therefore, women were treated as mere possessions.

Man has deprived woman of education, of financial independence, of social mobility because he is afraid of her. Although both men and women have complementary qualities and need each other to make their life whole, there has been no independence for women in almost all the religions and regions of the world. The biological division of both sexes is somewhat natural and not an event in human history. In the west, St. Augustine (d. 430 A.D) declared that ‘woman is a creature neither decisive

nor constant'. (Beauvoir1974: 22). It was only later in the eighteenth century that some really democratic men began to view the issue impartially. Diderot (French Philosopher and writer during eighteenth century) and John Stuart Mill (English philosopher, economist, social and political reformer of nineteenth century), among others, strove to show that, like man, woman was also a human being. She never enjoyed an equal legal status as compared to man. As far as her role in the productivity of the society was concerned, she played a vital role when she entered into the circle of productive labor. She was a real threat for men who saw her as a competitor because she was used to work for lower wages. Women in a feudal society played a supporting role in order to justify her position in the society. She supported the male members in order to rationalize their status because the women themselves were subordinate to the male members of the family.

Someone once described woman as a 'womb' (Beauvoir 1976: xv). Discussing woman is not an easy thing as we are not supposed to merely understand what woman is. Our focus is more on the variety of roles she plays in the society. Woman, in all ages, has suffered from savagery that clings to man. During premodern times, man's attitude towards woman could be expressed through these lines of Malik Muhammad Jayasi (d.1542) an Indian poet who wrote in the Avadhi dialect of Hindi, 'Women and the territory are the hand-maids of the sword. They belong to him who conquers them by sword.' (Yasin n.d.: 131-32).

The aim of this paper is to highlight the "doubly-marginalized" position of women in eighteenth century Punjab, specifically of low caste women because of their birth ascribed ranks.We can take the example of Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, the architect of Indian Constitution, who had changed his religion from Hinduism to Buddhism but the fact remained that he was unable to change his caste, which remained a 'mahar'. Owing to this, the sufis in South Asia kept on underscoring the marginalized position of women particularly in their poetry. Poetry has remained significant throughout the ages not only for the pleasure purpose but also because it deals with the history, traditions, social, political and economic hardships, laws of certain people and places, etc. It gives a person a voice. It helps us transmit ideas and express feelings. In their poetic compositions, the Sufis have used symbols which are not artificially constructed signs to express something which cannot be expressed otherwise. They have used symbols

to depict and elaborate upon the social realities of their times. John Baldock has beautifully highlighted the significance of symbols used by the Sufi poets. He opines that outer reality of a symbolic object has an underlying meaning. (Baldock 2004: 75).

The sufi culture and practices are very much connected with the social beliefs and cultural traditions of the land and its people. In the South Asian society the relationship of wife with her husband is of great submission, dedication and surrender. She is always supposed to surrender her will in front of her husband and to dedicate her life thoroughly to his wishes. The Punjabi sufi poets adopted this very theme from the Indian wives and wrote in the female persona. This theme depicted them as 'bride of God'.

Sufi Symbolism

Sophia Kim opines that Sufis focus on the spiritual side of Islam and for this reason they interpret it through symbolism (Kim 2009). All Sufi poetry is symbolic in nature. Symbols are evocative and add to the attraction of the sense desired to be conveyed by the Sufis (Singh 1940: 11). It can only be expressed by clues and allusions. The Sufi language is veiled and most of the time allegorical. Moral precepts, social and at times political realities are also depicted through Sufi poetry. The technique of poetry used by the Punjabi Sufi poets is rarely ever conceived of as something apart from its content. Those poets have very little idea of flowery language, images and rhythms (Syed 1968: 19). The main concern of their poetry is their meaning. More often than not, the Sufis assume themselves as women firstly, because of latter's marginalized status in society and secondly, because presenting themselves in the feminine place has been a common norm in the classical Punjabi Sufi poetry. Shah Husain throughout his poetry and Bullhe Shah, occasionally, have written in female voice in order to show the self-marginalized status of women in the society.

South Asian social set up is essentially patriarchal where men are given primary value socially and culturally. Sufis in South Asia intentionally acquire the female persona in their poetic compositions by deliberately abandoning their maleness and its prerogatives. This adoption of female voice in their poetry implies the transgression of gender based limitations of the society. Such behavior of the sufis was against the

established norms of the society and the institutionalized Sufism itself (Karamustafa 1994). This use of adoption of female persona in the poetry of South Asian sufis was a metaphorical practice and was an idea of the 'bride of God' (Anjum 2015). This kind of gender reversal i.e. male sufis writing in female voice was a common practice of South Asian sufi poetry (Abbas 2002; Petievich 2007).

Waris Shah

Waris Shah, famous for his *Hir*, is a well-known classical sufi poet of eighteenth century Punjab. He has acquired an unmatched position in the Punjabi literature. Historians are not certain about the personal life of Waris Shah, so very little is known about his life. We can get some information about his life through his poetry, according to which, Waris Shah was born in a village of Jandiala Sher Khan of District Sheikhupura in the year 1720 A.D. (Akhtar 2007: 165). According to some his father's name was Saiyid Gulsher Shah (Kunjahi n.d.: 41; Shahid 2014: 5) but in the *qissa* he has mentioned the name of his father as Qutb Shah and not Gulsher Shah (Singh 2001: 7). Consistent with the evidence of *qissa*, he was born in a Saiyid (Kunjahi n.d.: 33-34) family who studied with Maulvi Ghulam Murtaza in the city of Qasur. As it was customary in those days, Waris Shah received his early education at home or in a *madrassah* in his hometown. Later on, he went to Qasur which was popular for higher education for the young Punjabis. In his search for learning and knowledge, Waris Shah traveled through the Punjab. Later, he moved to Malka Hans in the capacity of *Pesh-Imam* (Muslim prayer leader) of the village mosque. According to the evidence of qissa, his most famous *Hir* has been composed in that village mosque of Malka Hans in the year 1766-67. He belonged to the Chishtī *Silsilah* as he has mentioned in his qissa clearly that he was a great admirer of Baba Farid and was extremely impressed with his simplicity, endurance and closeness with God. Waris Shah had praised his mentor in his qissa as well.

Shakr Ganj Masūd Mawdūd wāngauṇ au nafs tē hirṣ nū mār rēha

Emulating Shakar Ganj Mas'ud Maudud, he is trying to win over his self and greed (Aziz 2008: 345).

Waris Shah as Sufi Poet

Famous Punjabi poet of twentieth century Mian Muhammad Bakhsh paid great tribute to Waris Shah in his poetic work *'Saif ul Muluk'* in these words,

Waris Shah sukhan dā waris nandē kon onhaṇ nū
Harf ohdē tē ūngal dharnī nāheṇ qadr asānū

Waris Shah is the master of language, who can dare to evaluate him. We cannot question his words (Bakhsh n.d.: 488)

Waris Shah, a celebrated Punjabi sufi poet, had vast knowledge and great sense of observation. He has highlighted the sentiments of common masses through his poetry which clearly depicts thecolors of medieval society. His poetry contains territoriality and universality at the same time (Waqar 2007: 51). He was highly influenced by the society; his poetry also contains mystic/ sufic elements in it. Waris Shah brought to light various key concepts of Sufism in this poetic composition along with the existing social disparities. For instance, he talks about the concept of self-marginalization, surrendering egotism,self-abnegation, impermanence of life andpresenting himself as female and God/Beloved as male, which was common among the South Asian Sufi poetry. The so-called competition which was creating a worldly avarice and greed among the people was a matter of great concern for people like Waris Shah. He, like other Sufis, knew the impermanence of this world and charms of life which were nothing more than mere illusions. In this composition, he told about the utmost simplicity of the Sufis. He was living in a society where people were trying to make their presence felt by getting maximum material sources and in achieving their goals they did not hesitate to deceive others (Akbar 1985: 221-33). They were doing so because they were not aware of the impermanence of this worldly life.

Rehnā rehnā ākhan sārē ethay kisē nā rehnā
Ghāfil karde merī merī sir tē maut nā jānan

They all talk about their long lasting stay but no one here to live eternal life.

They are forgetful while they just talk about their material life. They are not aware of their death which is most near to them.

According to Sufism, a spiritual mentor acquires significant position for the Ultimate Union. Moreover, the key concept of the Unity of

Being has also been highlighted by the poet. The Sufi philosophy of *Waḥdat al-Wujūd* (the 'Unity of Being' or Pantheistic Monism), according to Sufis, is the highest stage when Sufi achieves the Union with God which can be achieved only through total submission.The Prophet Muhammad defined submission as "to bear witness that there is no god but God." (Chittick 2011: 5). *Chishti* and *Qadiri* Sufi poets were the promoters of the Sufi philosophy of *Waḥdat al-Wujūd* (Jalalpuri 2010: 162). Resultantly, almost all of them, including Baba Farid (d. 1266), Shah Husain (d. 1599), Sultan Bahu (d. 1691), Bullhe Shah, Ali Haider Multani (d. 1785), Khwaja Ghulam Farid (d. 1901) and Mian Muhammad Bakhsh (d. 1907) presented this philosophy in their poetic works as this concept became the consistent part of the Punjabi sufi poetry of medieval times. Shah Husain highlighted this very concept in these words,

Andr tūṇ, bāhar tūṇ, rom rom vich tūṇ
Tūṇ hi tāna, tūṇ hi bāna, sub kujh mera tūṇ
Kahey Husain faqeer sāeṇ dā, mai nāheṇ, subh tūṇ
You are within and outside, You are everywhere
You are the essence of everything, You are everything to me
Husayn, the devotee of the Lord, says, You are everything and I am nothing.

Bullhe Shah (d. 1757) was the true representative of the same concept. Mian Muhammad Bakhsh said about his poetry:

Listening to the Bullhe Shah's kafi shatters inner infidelity.
And he (Bullhe Shah) himself swam in through the river of Oneness.
Here swimming in the river of Oneness means seeking union with the Divine (Ahmed 2010: 9).

Gurcharan Singh, very appropriately, commented about Waris Shah that 'he leads in totality' and that 'his Punjabism results from his characteristic realism' (Singh 2001: 23). The reason behind saying so about him is that Waris Shah was a realist when he highlighted the status of low-born woman in the premodern Punjabi society.

***Chuhṛeṯrināmāh*: An Introduction**

Waris Shah is the author of famous tragic *qissa* of *Hir Raṇjha*. He has elaborated the political, social, religious conditions of the Punjab during eighteenth century which were deteriorating and devastating. He has also

highlighted the outlook of the common people by using language of the rural folks. However, very few would have heard about one of his other creation namely *Chūhṛeṯṛināmāh*. Speaking in the feminine voice, he highlights the plight of an oppressed section of premodern Punjabi society i.e.*chūhṛi*. Waris Shah was a rebel against the social ideas of orthodox religion, based on formalities. In this poetic composition he hasrepresented the "doubly-marginalized" community of the society. The reason of putting himself in such a commoditized and self-marginalized position is the status of *chūhṛi* i.e. the lowest among the village servants (Elliot 1985: 62).

The Social Status of *Chūhṛa* in Punjabi Society: A Socio-historical Context

The word *'chūhṛa'* is a corruption of *'chūṛa'* that means beautiful (Sharma 1995: 110). He was available throughout the Punjab except in the hills (Ibbetson 1916: 293).The *chūhṛi* or *bhangan* is one of the village menials proper who sweeps the house and village. She is the sweepress and scavenger of the Punjabi society and performs certain duties. In return she receives a customary undecided share of the produce. She collects the cow dung, pats it into cake and stacks it, works up the manure, helps with the cattle and takes them from village to village. Death news to the friends is also sent through her so she works as village messenger as well. She also makes the *chaj* or winnowing pan and the *sirki* or grass thatch which is used to cover the carts. Moreover, when an animal died, the Hindus beat the drum to let them know to come and carry off that dead animal with them. They took the dead animal, ate its flesh and received five rupees and a shroud as fee (Ibbetson 1911: 209).

It appears that in many parts of the Punjab the Muslim *chūhṛas* continue to be called with this name as they eat carrion or remove night-soil (Ibbetson, 1916, 295). They worked as tillers of land and were also needed for threshing of crops. Their women accompanied them during the harvesting season. They were also associated with some type of criminal disposition and probably because of that they were employed as *jallād* (professional executioners) (Jahal 2000: 409).

The lower castes were not allowed to study because if the upper castes would let them study, they would get respectable jobs and none would be left to do the menial work (Madhopuri 2010). The *chūhṛi*, along

with other low-born women, was dishonored during her working hours by the upper class. However, she could not resist because firstly she was afraid of her lower status in the society and secondly, she expected to get some financial help from the culprit. It implies the worth of a woman of lower class in the Punjabi society where she was not safe and could not get any justice as well.

kehṛī aeṇ tu sāg toṛdī
munḏa tera te muhāndra merā
You did not come here to pluck the mustard leaves
Your son resembles me (Babra 2008: 88).

In premodern Punjab, generally speaking, the status of women was quite low. Furthermore, the *chūhṛi*, being poor and being at the lowest rung of the society,was more vulnerable than that of other women. Her caste and the baggage it carried, was the primary reason for selecting the *chūhṛi* as she was the one who faced the abuses of society and was supposed to be thankful to those who allowed her to enter in their house for cleaning purposes. The *chūhṛi* has been subjected to several social and economic oppressions since long. This concept alludes to the social norms of the society where importance of the people is determined by their social status.

The Sufi Norm of Self-Abnegation

As discussed above, the Punjabi society was stratified into high and low class structure. Some of them were very proud of their high social order and looked down upon the lower stratum of society. There was no equality among the social status of the people (Srinivas 1969: 2-47). The poor were dependent on the upper class which on one hand made the formers' lives more miserable and on the other, made higher classes more arrogant. When selfishness had become a common norm, people started considering it quite a normal phenomenon (Wikeley 1915: 25-47). Waris Shah, along with other Sufi poets, rejected this discrimination on the basis of social status and spoke for their equality. The Sufis themselves lead the life of self-abnegation and humility as they are devoid of all types of arrogance or pride. Their message is beyond all the religious and ethnic boundaries. They live their life as a pure manifestation of selflessness. They teach people to consider all humans on equal basis. Highlighting the

impermanence and mortality of life Waris Shah said:

Kahāṇ gae bādshah zamin dē lashkar sanē sipāhaṇ
where have been the kings along with their soldiers

The concept of *chūhṛi/chūhṛeṯṛi* has been mentioned before Waris Shah by various Sufi poets like Shah Husain and Bullhe Shah in their poetry. Sufis express this phenomenon very aptly in their poetry as they are the custodians of selflessness (Duggal 1996: 282). Madho Lal Husain, popularly known as Shah Husain (1538-1599), wrotemostly in feminine voice. He has presented this concept in these words:

Chūhṛi haṇ darbār dī
Dhyān dī chajlī, gyān dā jhaṛū, kām karodh nit jhāṛdī
Qāzī jānē, hākim jānē, fārigh khatī wagār dī
Mal jānē, ar mehtā jānē, ṯehel karāṇ sarkār dī
Kahē Husain faqir namāna, talab terē didār dī

I am a sweepress of the court
Basket of meditation, broom of knowledge, I sweep away the lust and greed
The qāzī knows, the chief knows, I am liberated from the duty
The chief sweeper knows, and the village headman knows, I served the Master
Husayn, the devotee of the Lord, says, I yearn to access your vision

Shah Husain, here, is assuming himself as a low-born *chūhṛi* who has no self-esteem as she is dependent on the upper classes of the society. She is subservient to the ruling class and cannot afford to express herself in front of them. Moreover, the reason of selecting the female gender is that a woman is naturally possessed with kindness, generosity, politeness and motherhood.

Bullhe Shah (d.1757), who is a contemporary of Waris Shah, occupies almost a central position in the known history of Punjabi poetry (Syed 2003: 21). He has highlighted the same theme and presented the low status of *chūhṛi* in his *kafi*. Like Shah Husain, he has also expressed the status of the chūhṛi. She is expressing her marginalized position as she has been economically deprived and as if born to face such economic oppressions in the society.

Representation of "Doubly-Marginalized" *Chūhṛi*

Her caste and the baggage it carried was the primary reason for selecting the *chūhṛi* as a theme by Waris Shah. He has mentioned a woman's capacity to merge herself with her beloved/master/God as, unlike men, she loves through her soul and not physically.One of the other reasons of presenting oneself in the female position can be the feminine virtues of compassion, nurturing and devotion. Waris Shah was born when *jagirdari* set up was at its peak and where the status of a woman was no more than that of a *kami* (serving castes). Under the *jagirdari* system even the degrading proverbs were also related to the lower or serving castes, for instance, *'tu bandā aeṇ key nāī'* (are you a man or a barber) (Ejaz 2009: 277). During that period society was still divided into castes and this division was believed to be natural as well. Owing to this, Sufis adopted this particular phenomenon in order to present more loyal and submissive attitude towards God.

The poet has highlighted the marginalized status of women during his time as well. He has presented her economic and socialdependence over men. She is supposed to be obedient to her husband as her wellbeing in society is based on her level of obedience to her husband. A woman without husband is worthless because she is a nonentity without marriage.

Waris nār suhāgan hoī jehṛī mannē amar khasam dā
Alfoṇ bay nā ākhē othē khāwand koloṇ ḏardī
Waris, a real married woman is one who is obedient to her husband
She never utters a word as she is afraid of him

Spiritual Progression

In premodern Punjab, people used to change their castes with their improving economic condition in order to make their status acceptable in the socially stratified society (Mitchell 1981: 194). There is a common saying in Punjabi which aptly highlights this very fact:

Pehloṇ sī asāṇ julāhē, pher ban gae darzī
Holī holī ho gae syed, aggoṇ rab dī marzī
Initially we were weavers, then we became tailors
Gradually we became Saiyid, God knows what will happen next (Babra 2008: 56).

Since a *chūhṛi* cannot change her birth-ascribed rank, she tries to neutralize this shortcoming by associating herself with her spiritual mentor. In order to make her status reverent in the eyes of socially-stratified society, the *chūhṛi* attaches herself to the spiritual lineage of the renowned twelfth-century Sufi Sheikh Abdul Qadir Jilani (d. 1166) which, in turn, leads to her empowerment and liberation. She, by surrendering herself to her spiritual master attempts to improve her social status. The poet gives us the bottom line: to be the servant of God we need a spiritual mentor (Ghaffaar 2005).

As *chūhṛi* has devoted herself entirely to the spiritual progression, her Oneness with the spiritual leader gives her the required status uplift. She is no more afraid of the upper castes as she is an independent being. Owing to her spiritual transcendence, the world is afraid of her and not vice versa. Waris Shah, as a disciple and devotee has expressed his spiritual relationship with his murshid (spiritual guide or mentor) through gendered imagery and language. It also implies the need of a spiritual mentor in Sufism which was always supported by all the sufis.

Pīr pīrāṇ sir hazrat mīrāṇ mai chūhṛī hāṇ jis dī
Waris aggey mai sāṇ dardī hun khalqat methoṇ dardī
I am the sweepress of Hazrat Mirāṇ, the mentor of the mentors
Waris, before, I was afraid of people but now they are afraid of me
(because of my spiritual status)

Obedience is a key feature of disciples as disobedience can cause great harm to them. It is only through submissiveness that a novice moves from spiritual powerlessness to spiritual maturity, progression and authority. Submission to sheikh is the *sine qua non* for progression on the Sufi path. Obviously, obedience, submission and reliance on *murshid* are the key spiritual values. The spiritual director is believed to be of great reverence because he claims his direct contact with God (Sharda 1974: 44-45).

Concluding Remarks

To conclude, the classical Punjabi Sufis aptly present the dilemma of various marginalized sections of the society in their poetry. The Sufis not only defy the birth-ascribed and blood-based discrimination but also discard the gender based prejudices. Waris Shah has brought to light a debatable issue of the position of low born women in a patriarchal set up.

Mysticism is considered to be the core of all the religions of the world and does not treat people on the basis of their social and economic status. Waris Shah hasalso highlighted the same theme while dealing with one of the most oppressed sections of the society in an appropriate manner. Notably, submission, deference and obedience are means to acquire spiritual power and authority.

Most of the premodern Punjabi Sufi poets address themselves in the female gender. There are various reasons for this including identifying themselves with the marginalized gender of the society; they gave voice to the *yin* of the poets from where most of the poetry emanates and also because many self-reproaching *faqirs* address themselves in the feminine gender. The poets, all men, in order to recognize both their biological and metaphoric genders presented themselves as female. Probably they were trying to condemn the gender based identities of the society in favor of genderlessness because they considered it a divider of human kind.

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-5-

Another interesting relief from Swat Valley, Varia Collection- Swat Museum

Abdul Ghafoor Lone

Abstract

This paper is related with one of stone relief included in my PhD dissertation. The main research focuses on the study of "Varia Collection", a rare stone collections in Swat Museum. There are different episodes of the life of Lord Buddha depicted in these narrative reliefs. Tucci, president of the Italian Institute for the Middle and Far-East (Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, IsMEO), launched a precise survey in 1955-56 and selected different sites to excavate.[*] This collection also comprises Buddhist stone sculptures and narrative reliefs which were collected by Italian mission in Swat Valley, during 1956-2003. "Varia Collection" has been collected from different locations and sites in Swat Valley besides few stone sculptures which were purchased in Peshawar and Dir. "Varia Collection" covers a wider area in the sense that it came from every nook and corner in Swat Valley. First Sermon is an important event in the historic life of Buddha and its illustration in Buddhist art. This paper highlights the rare depiction of the First Sermon of Buddh in standing pose, probably preparation of first sermon, that is not only rare but also novel in the history of Buddhist art in Pakistan.

The Swat Valley, in the north western mountainous regions of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa,[†] Pakistan, is well known to ancient and contemporaneous

[*]. Since then Italian Archaeological Mission is working in Swat Valley, modern techniques, stratigraphy in excavations, were being employed for the first time, in Swat valley, and this marked a turning point in the history of Gandharan studies. Italian Mission in Swat properly registered and managed inventory lists of Varia Collection. This collection remained in reserve rooms about half of a century, except the few stone panels displayed in Swat Museum or published in East and West(1958). These narrative reliefs are reflecting diversity of subject, in form of the life stories of Buddha and Jataks.

[†]. North Western Frontier Province (NWFP) was lacking its name since British rule in 1860. In early 2010, the process of renaming proceeded and the Pakistani Senate confirmed the name change to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in the 18th amendment to theConstitution of Pakistan with a unanimous 90 votes on 15 April 2010.

historians as neighboring part of the Gandhara province of the Achaemenid Empire from 6th century B.C.E. to the invasion of Alexander the Great in 327 B.C.E.(Vidale & Olivieri 2016: vii). In later Sanskrit literature the areas of Swat is called Uddiyana (Tucci 1940). Ancient Swat Valley remained a junction of cultural, social and economic activities (Rahman 2011: 22). Uddiyana, from the word of Sanskrit, called "the royal garden". It is after the name of the river Swat that entire valley has gotten the toponym "Swat" (Olivieri 1996: 60). First exploration of the Swat region took placed in 1926 and 1933 by Sir Aurel Stein (Stein 1930: 10). In 1938, on the behalf of Archaeological Survey of India, Barger Evert and Philip Wright carried out the archaeological exploration on a smaller scale and conducted limited archaeological excavations in Swat (Barger & Wright 1930: 1). Tucci distinguished the prevailing environment and situation of Swat in past. He emphasized that the conditions prevailing in Swat were very favorable to the junction of ideas, situated as it was on great access point which brought the West into contact with the East, with Central Asia and India and where met, not to resist but to approach one another, the most active religions of those times (Tucci 1958: 279). Swat played a strategic role, as a contact area between Central Asia and Iran on one side and the Indo Pakistani subcontinent on the other (Vidale et al. 2016).

Brief History of Varia Collection

Since 1956, Italian Archaeological Mission carried out comprehensive field activities, including field survey and excavations in Swat. Varia Collection is, one of the exceptional collections in Swat Museum.[‡] During the course of time some of antiquities of "Varia Collection" were collected included the few purchased by the Italian Mission.[§] Varia Collection comprises of the antiquities of different materials, such as stone, stucco, terra cotta, bronze etc. Because of various origins and provenances it was named "Varia Collection".[**] After the establishment of Archaeological museum Swat, in 1959, these antiquities were shifted to Archaeological

[‡] . Collections in Swat Museum i.e. Wali-e-Swat Collection, Malakand Collection, Pehawar Collection,

[§] . Registered antiquities of Varia Collection are 1604, included 1152 stone sculptures.

[**] . Vaia means, A collection or miscellany, Latin, neuter plural of varius=various

Museum Swat.[††] Antiquities collected by Italian Mission in Pakistan were subsequently, shared out to Swat Museum, Federal Department of Archaeology and Museums.[‡‡]

In 1966, Maurizio Taddei published a rare and interesting stone relief **(Fig.1).**[§§]That stone panel was reported from a private collection. Said relief is depicting the rare style of Buddha in standing pose with his right hand resting on the dharmacakra. Presentation of Buddha in standing pose with the Wheel of Law is very rare in this region. Panel is partially damaged. In the panel face of Buddha is missing. From right. Buddha is standing with flexed body in relax mode. Buddha is fully clad in his monastic robe with deep neck. Bold folds forms grooves of monastic robe. His drapery is freely dropping over both shoulders. His left hand is securing the hem of his monastic robe. His right hand is resting on the wheel of Law. A lotus flower is encircled in the centre of the Wheel of Law. Bold petals of lotus are dominant. On the left of panel two monks are leaning on right knees with clasped hands in adoration. Both monks are wearing monastic robes. Right shoulders of monks are exposed. In the background the features of two standing figures are badly mutiluted and damaged. On the extrem left, base of a column is surviving. Taddei referred its influence from Syrian representation of Nemesis.

There is another narrative relief, identified by author, depicted with same episode. This rare relief is part of Varia collection, presently in, National Museum of Oriental Art "G.Tucci" Rome. This remarkable relief was collected by Italian Mission in Pakistan, from Barikot Swat. Narrative relife is measuring 13x20.5 cm and it is made of black schist **(Fig.2).** From right, a corinthian pilaster, with a flute on shaft, is depicted. Haloed Buddha is standing on the left side of pilaster. A tri-rattna, with three lotuses, engraved in a row, adorned on the top of pilaster. Buddha is fully clad in his monastic robe. He is holding the hem of his drapery with his left hand and his right hand is resting on the wheel of law towards column,. It is an exceptional depiction of First Sermon, where Buddha is

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[††]. Tahira Tanweer, then the Deputy Director Archieves credited the initial concept of the establishment of the Swat Museum to the Late Mian Gul Jahan zeb ruler of Swat, then the Wali-e-Swat, to keep his private collection and material collected by I.A.M after three seasons of excavations in Butkara and Udegram (Tahira Tanweer 2011:43).

[‡‡]. 71 antiquities of Varia Collection, including 62 stone sculptures were shifted to Italy, under the then agreement between Government of Pakistan and Italy.

[§§]. Taddei Maurizio,1966, An interesting relief from Swat Valley, East and West, Rome, Vol.16, Nos.1-2, pp.84-88

standing and holding the Wheel of Law. Wheel of law is illustrated behind the column and half of it is visible on right side. On the left of column remaining scene is badly damaged. However it looks that a monk is leaning forward, holding seat, to be offered to Buddha. This relief is depicted with the identical subject, preparation of First sermon and novelty of the style of standing Buddha, holding wheel of Law.[***] Physical condition of the relief is damaged; left corner is broken and missing. Facial features of figures are badly worn out.

Maurizio Taddei pin pointed an interesting and unforeseen depiction of standing Buddha setting the Wheel of Law in motion. *dharmacakrapravartaka* Buddha have been assimilated**,** in an friendly environment. The wheel alone can symbolize Nemesis as well as Buddha. On the other hand, the tradition of showing Buddha sitting down with his hand resting on the cakra is usual in Gandhara.[†††] To find close iconographic resemblances between these two panels is astonishing. These panels representing a novel style of holding the wheel of law by Lord Buddha. It is rare style ever reported in Buddhist art in Pakistan. Such influence is connected with the Oriental cults in the Roman Empire, Syria and central Asia. Amalgamation of invaders in the region caused materialization of such depiction of First Sermon. Here, most probably the scene is illustrating the preparation of First Sermon. The far from causal resemblances that tie them to some Syrian representation from the Roman age cannot be explained by a generally assumed classical taste as if we were just dealing with a fashion that led men to clothe local deities in Western attire. Every iconographical detail adopted is a sign of fluctuation or profound change in religious culture. Buddhist art in Pakistan gave a western form to its religious concepts and imported representations carry with them at least a part of their original meaning. It is therefore necessary to define precisely the prototypes of certain Buddhist representations not limiting ourselves to general references outside of space and time to types like Apollo, Athena, Herakles etc. reference that even when correct are to be considered indirect and therefore devoid of any value in regard to a historical religious evaluation.

[***]. Inventory No.V-461. Presently lying at, National Museum of Oriental Art "G.Tucci" Rome, Italy.

[†††]. Taddei M.& D.Faccenna, Sculptures from the Sacred Area of Butkara I (Ismeo rep Mem.II), 2, Roma, 1962, p.20, pl.LIVa

Figures

Fig.1. Buddha, Standing with the Wheel of Law, from Gandhara. Published by Maurizio Taddei (1966).

Fig.2. Buddha Standing with the Wheel of Law, from Barikot Swat, Varia Collection (V-461). (coursty of National Museum of Oriental Art "G.Tucci" Rome)

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-6-

Some Unpublished Buddhist Sculptures in the S.R.O. Collection of Directorate of Archaeology and Museums, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan

Tahir Saeed
Zarawar Khan

Abstract
The Sub-Regional Office (S.R.O) of the Department of Archaeology and Museums, Govt. of Pakistan was established at Peshawar in 1972 whereas the main purpose was the preservation and conservation of cultural heritage of the N.W.F. Province (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa). Before its devolution in 2011 and since its inception the S.R.O had acquired 2768 antiquities through various sources which are mostly consisting of stone and stucco sculptures, coins of various ruling dynasties, metallic objects, and ceramics etc. However, this collection of antiquities has recently been shifted to the Directorate of Archaeology & Museums, Govt. of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa after the 18th constitutional amendment of 2011. Such an important collection has been concealed and did not receive any scholarly and scientific study and approach. The present paper thus treats with the identification of some of the Buddhist sculptures and narrative relief panels in order to bring them into the fold of academic research and to share them with scholars and researchers.

The Sub-Regional Office (hereafter S.R.O) Peshawar, of the Department of Archaeology and Museums, Government of Pakistan (henceforth DOAM, Govt. of Pakistan), which was established in 1972 at Peshawar in the antiquities store of the former Archaeological Survey of India, Frontier Circle (see Khan Z. 2015: 21-22) has rendered valuable services towards the cultural heritage of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province of Pakistan. It was due to the existence of this office that conservation and restoration works were regularly carried out at the Buddhist site of Takht-i-Bhai, Jamal Garhi, Ranigat and Nimogram etc. while illegal trade in antiquities was eliminated to a great extent. Besides conservation, the officers stationed there have carried out explorations in different parts of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province and brought to light hundreds of ancient

sites which were previously not enlisted in the archaeological record. Similarly excavations were conducted at several Buddhist establishments, particularly in the Swat Valley which resulted in the discovery of Buddhist sculptures and other valuable antiquities (see Ashraf Khan 1996a: 94 and 1996b: 104).

As for as the archaeological artifacts of the S.R.O. Peshawar are concerned, the collection which consists of 2768 antiquities is mainly composed of Buddhist sculptures and narrative relief panels which have come through various sources of acquisition and can be divided into three major categories i-e, inherited antiquities from the collection of the former Archaeological Survey of India, the artifacts discovered during the course of excavation and, the confiscated material.

The inherited antiquities which were collected by the officers of the former Archaeological Survey of India, Frontier Circle from different Buddhist sites in Gandhara mostly consists of stone and stucco sculptures and terracotta objects but their exact provenance are yet to be determined. These antiquities bears abbreviated capital letters "WU" along with Roman digits and are believed to have accessioned for the first time by Mr. Muhammad Wali Ullah Khan, the then Sub-Overseer, between 1931 and 1938 whereas the excavated antiquities of the S.R.O. are those discovered by the Japanese Archaeological Mission to Pakistan at different Buddhist sites of Gandharan such as Thareli, Mekhasanda and Zar Dheri etc. While the confiscated material are seized from different individuals, treasure hunters and antique dealers at different check post, railway stations and the Peshawar airport by Government agencies.

The Buddhist sculptures and other valuable antiquities of the S.R.O. Peshawar, which also consist of some unique specimens, are very much difficult to arrange due to various reasons. One of the issues is related to the accession records of the antiquities which do not contain enough information regarding the complete acquisition history of the collection. To distinguish the confiscated antiquities from those coming from archaeological context is another time wasting and tiring job since there are various abbreviated Roman letters marked on them such as, SRP, TH, TR, TB, SB, MN, the meaning of which is not known to the custodians of the collection. While to determine the genuine and fake nature of the artifacts is another important issue and requires a meticulous study because some of the sculptures declared as fake are mostly genuine or vice versa.

The S.R.O. collection remained out of the focus of scholars and art historian for a long time but in the year 2011, it was shifted to the Directorate of Archaeology & Museums, Govt. of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa after the 18th constitutional amendment where it is labeled as the S.R.O. collection of the DoAM since these antiquities are not yet handed over to the museums of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. However, these are accessible on proper permission to research scholars and students etc.The present study is initiated for understanding various aspects of the S.R.O. Buddhist collection in order to bring them into the fold of academic research.Although the sculptures are so many to be incorporated in a single research paper, the following specimens are presented here in order to share them with those interested in this hitherto ignored collection of Buddhist antiquities.

Jātaka Stories

Fig.1
Dīpaṃkara *jātaka*
Accession no. SRO-334 & SRP-683
38 x 23 cm
Received from the Custom Department, Peshawar

A slightly curvilinear panel depicts from left to right, a woman stepping out from a doorway and carries bunches of lotus flowers in both the hands. She is dressed in Indian *dhoti* fastened with a girdle below the level of navel and a skin tied shirt, chignon, necklace and ear pendants. In front of the doorway Megha is shown in two characters. In the first place he is shown standing and throws flowers with the right hand to Dīpaṃkara Buddha and carries a water pot in the left hand. He is bedecked with short *dhoti* and *uttarīya* over the left shoulder while the long hair tied with a ribbon.

In the second character, Megha prostrates in order to spread the long hair at the feet of Dīpaṃkara Buddha who stands with the raised right hand in *abhayamudrā* and wears the monastic robe, *uṣṇīṣa* and halo. In the middle of Buddha and Megha, the head of a man is visible observing the event. Dīpaṃkara Buddha is accompanied by two monks of whom the one is shaven headed and wears monastic robe whereas the other one is

half broken and missing. Another panel illustrating the same scene was found in Nawagai, Swat valley and currently preserved in the Victoria and Albert Museum, London (see Ackerman 1975: Pl. XXVI.a)

Fig. 2
Dīpaṃkara *jātaka*
Accession no. SRO-370 & SRP-685
16.5x19 cm
Received from the Superb Police, Peshawar

It is a broken and damaged panel and shows four standing and one prostrated human figures. From left to right a woman stands and carries probably lotus flowers in the right hand and a pitcher in the left. She wears a long tunic fastened by a girdle and anklets. A male figure to her left wears a girt animal skin and transparent *uttarīya* and holds something in the right hand and a water pot in the left. The third figure is dressed in the same costume as wore by the preceding figure. The prostrated Megha is placing his long hair before the feat of a half broken figure, probably Dīpaṃkara Buddha who is shown wearing ankle length robe. The panel is broke above depriving all the figures from the heads while a plain fillet is provided beneath the feet of the human figures.

Fig.3
Dīpaṃkara *jātaka*
Accession no. SRO-1048 & old no 1179
52x21
From unknown source

It is a rectangular panel in comparatively good state of preservation and shows from left to right couple standing in front of a doorway. The female figure (Prakriti) carries a lotus flower in the right hand and pitcher in the left while the male figure (Megha) is turning to her and asks for lotus flowers. In the next scene Megha throws flowers to Dīpaṃkara Buddha with his right hand and then frustrate on the ground. Buddha stands in *abhaya*mudrā, facing to Megha while a broken figure is visible at the background. Behind the Buddha stands Vajarapāṇī and shaven headed monk. The costume wore by Prakriti is composed of a sleeved shirt,

trousers, girdle, hair dress and thick anklets. Megha wears a short dhoti and *uttarīya* while Buddha is dressed in monastic robe. Vajrapani is provided with a sleeved short tonic whereas the monk is shown wearing a long robe. The panel can be compared with the one found at Aziz Dhri Buddhist site, Swabi district of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (see Nasim Khan 2008: fig.55 & 2010: 104, Cat.no. 116).

Fig. 4
Portion Dīpaṃkara *jātaka*
Accession no. SRO-556
21x13cm
From unknown source

Fragment of a panel shows twicely the figure of Megha. He stands frontally and carries a waterpot in the left hand and wears girt animal skin as a lower garment and twisted string across the belly. He is also shown prostrated on the ground with bent knees and right hand touches the fillet of the panel.

Images of the Buddha
Fig.5
Standing Buddha
Accession no. SRO-165
153 x 57cm
From unknown source

It a standing image of Buddha probably in *abhaya* pose with portion of halo, right arm and both the feet cut off and missing. His hair are combed and bound by a ribbon at the skull, forming *uṣṇīṣa* eyes fully open, *urṇa* at the forehead and lips closed. Right ear is broken and missing and left is preserved. His dress is composed of *antravāsaka, saṃghati,* and *uttarāsāṅgha.* A socket hole is visible at the broken arm while the left hand secures the hem of the robe. The image is to some extend comparable with the Buddha figures in Peshawar and Taxila Museums (see Ingolt 1957: Pls. 210, 214, Ashraf Khan et.al 2005: Pl. 58).

Fig.6
Standing Buddha
Accession no. SRO-166 & SRD-536
132 x 57cm
Received from the Superintendent of Police, Crime Branch, Peshawar on 7.3.1974

This is a headless statue of Buddha standing on a square pedestal with both hands are broken and missing. The garment is same as worn by the figure in fig no.5. On the pedestal only two standing figure survive at the left portion.

Fig.7
Standing Buddha
Accession no. SRO-167
121x 35cm
From unknown source
Statue of a standing Buddha with both the arms and feet are broken and missing. Portion of halo survive behind the head. The curly hair are bound by ribbon and forming the *uṣṇīṣa*, ears elongated, eyes half closed, ears elongated, *urṇa* at the forehead and the lips closed. The figure is dressed in the usual monastic robe and covering the body to ankle level.

Fig.8
Standing Buddha
Accession no. SRO-374 & old no. 153
40 x 16 cm
From unknown provenance

It is also a headless statue of Buddha standing on a low pedestal of saw tooth decoration. Both the hands are broken at the elbow level while signs of slight damages are visible near the left foot. The drapery is the same as worn by the figures of figs.5 to 7, however, the lower hem of the *uttarāsāṅgha* is visible to the left.

Fig. 9
Seated Buddha
Accession no. SRO-2667 & SRP-842
Received from Khanmai Police, district Charsadda (presently on loan to the Islamabad Museum)
19 x 25 cm

Buddha is sitting cross legged on a low seat which is decorated with denticulate designs at the front and wavy lines above representing grass. He wears a robe with a neck line and wavy folds and covers both the shoulders. The right hand was probably raised in *abhayamudra* but cut off at the elbow level and missing and left hand holds the hem of the robe. The figure has wide open eyes, *urṇa* mark at the forehead, mustaches and closed lips and combed hair with grooved lines bound by a ribbon. The aureole behind the head is marked by an incised line. The figure, particularly the pedestal has close similarity with a sculpture discovered from the Buddhist site of Thareli (see Mizuno & Higuchi 1978: Pl.92/3)

Fig.10
Seated Buddha
Accession no. SRO-1036 & old no. 19
42 x 24.5cm
Probably received from the
Kabuli Police station, Peshawar

Buddha is shown seated in *padmāsana* pose on open lotus with upturned petals and inverted sepals in *dharmachkramudrā*. The sole of the feet are visible and right shoulder is bare. Both the hands are chipped and damaged and right arm is partially broken and missing. The halo around the head is plain and broken at the right side. The *uṣṇīṣa* depicts grooved lines, ear elongated, eyes half open. Right portion of head as well as nose and lips are partly damaged and right shoulder, belly and legs are covered by the robe. A similar statue in comparatively good state of preservation is long ago found at the site of Amluk in the Swat valley (see Barger & Wright 1941: Pl. IV. 2).

Fig.11
Seated Buddha
Accession no. SRO-2668 & SRD-566
44 x 26 cm
Supposedly from Takht-i-Bhai Buddhist site.
Confiscated from Muhammad Bahadur and other and handed over to the S.R.O. Peshawar by the Superintendent of Police, district Mardan, on 7.4. 1974

Buddha is depicted in the same style, costume and gesture as fig.no. 10. However, the pedestal is plain and covered by a cloth. Right knee of the figure and portion of the pedestal are broken and missing. Similarly portion of the halo at the left side is also broken.

Conclusion

The S.R.O. collection of Buddhist sculptures which remained out of focus for nearly 45 years represents a treasure house of unpublished material and if properly investigated, will solve many hypotheses related to the Buddhist art of Gandhara. The selected sculptures included in the present study are merely the beginning of the research to be carried out on this hitherto ignored collection. Though the time frame and attribution of site and a complete acquisition history of the collection is under process yet the valuable artifacts in this collection need to be properly displayed in various museums for the easy access and study purposes for interested scholars and researchers.

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Figures

Pl.1: Dīpaṃkara *jātaka*

Pl.2: Dīpaṃkara *jātaka*

Pl.3: Dīpaṃkara *jātaka*

Pl.4: Dīpaṃkara *jātaka*

Pl.5: Standing Buddha

Pl.6: Standing Buddha



Pl.7: Standing Buddha

Pl.8: Standing Buddha

Pl.9: Seated Buddha in *abhayamudra*

Pl.10: Seated Buddha in *dharmachakramudra*

Pl.11: Seated Buddha in *dharmachakramudra*

-7-

Reproducing History and Family Identity through Material Culture
The Case Study of Faqir Khana, a Private Museum

Saadia Abid
M. Azam Chaudhary

Abstract
This article establishes history not in its singular but plural form as 'histories' whereby varied accounts of history are considered as partial truths, with each account if not equally then significantly important for a better understanding of history. It does so by presenting an ethnographic case of Faqir Khana museum. Various sources of data collection include, in-depth interviews of the family members, narrative surrounding artifacts as well as archival material available and a book published on the life of Maharaja Ranjit Singh by one of the members of the family. The museum has been established by the descendants of the three Faqir brothers who served in distinguished positions in Maharaja Ranjit Singh's court, a prominent Sikh leader of Punjab. The article also depicts museum as semaphore that links the tangible material culture with the intangible, for instance, past. In this particular study it is observed that this linking helps construct not just specific account of history but also familial identity as the custodians and preservers of indigenous cultural history.

Introduction
This article may be called ethnography of Faqir Khana Museum which is closely related to the political history of the Punjab during Maharaja Ranjit Singh (1799-18470). This may, on the other hand, also be called the study of Faqir Family particularly the three Faqir brothers who served in prominent position within Maharaja Ranjit Singh's court. Besides the study of some of the artifacts in the Museum and the data about its establishment this research mainly relied on interviews of the descendants of Faqir brothers. One aim of the article is to show how artifacts of the Museum and oral history woven together construct a particular history, an image of the uniqueness and importance of Faqir Family. Such histories, as was noted by Soekefeld (1997: 61):

"[M]ay not be totally satisfactory to a reader or listener who expects "true" or at least consistent accounts about the past. They are as much *stories* as *histories* in that they sometimes blur the limits between myth and a factual kind of history and in that they are now and then prone to twisting of historical facts".

The aim here is not to discredit the value of such history it is rather to highlight its significance. We tend to agree with White (1986: 64) and Ardner (1989: 22) that history is not entirely an objective matter. The narratives of Faqir Family and presentation of artifacts in Faqir Khana Museum may not always stick to the facts. As it was observed by Soekefeld:

"[F]or the (hi) story-teller it is often less important that he is telling a "true" and consistent story than that he is … able to relate himself to a past. History is not told in its own right but in relation to a present. The past becomes a resource of present identity. … It is interesting mainly as one's *own* history (Soekefeld1997: 62)."

This has also been called analysis of 'indigenous understanding of history' or 'actor-oriented' approach towards understanding history. This is sometimes even called "post-modern" perspective which makes anthropologist heedful of the many voices of those individuals and groups who, up to now, were not considered important enough to be allowed to speak (Stellrecht 1997: xviii). In this particular case, an imagined history of Ranjit Singh is created in a specific manner. Starting with an overview of Ranjit Singh's rule, the article briefly introduces "the three Faqir brothers" and concludes with specific ways in which material culture therein the museum reproduces a 'particular' history and identity.

According to Pomian, museum is a 'semaphore' in which 'visible objects are attributed value through their relationship to an invisible realm of signification – "nation" or the "past", for example – for which they are taken metonymically to stand" (Pomian in Brooks 2013:203). Since the beginning human beings share a symbiotic relationship with their material environment. In the process of drafting and crafting the environment the materials do not remain simply materials but acquire cultural meanings, thereby, value and significance. From the very same process humans also derive, generate and construct their identities. It is not only through the production of material culture that identity is constructed, rather in its acquisition, storage, collection, exhibition and varied usage that human

identity is produced, reproduced, constructed and reconstructed. Museums are repositories of material culture and bearers of identity. The varying types of museums help construct and communicate specific identities, for instance, national identities and ethnic identity. Museums with holy sacraments may endorse religious identity.

Within Pakistani context, Faqir Khan Museum presents a unique and interesting case for anthropological exploration and inquiry. It is one of the largest registered private Museum as claimed by the owners. The collection of artifacts conserved and rendered open to public exhibition performs specific purpose; firstly, it reproduces a particular historical era of Punjab as a "glorious" period with several parameters developed to explain and justify this "glory"; and secondly, it informs and endorses the key role played by the Faqir Family especially the three Faqir brothers affiliated with the court of Maharaja Ranjit Singh. It also then constructs identity in specific ways through the possession, conservation and exhibition of artifacts. Semiotic dimension of the objects at Faqir Khana can only be understood through its historical context.

The article is divided into two sections: the first section informs and establishes this historical context as imagined, narrated, recorded, and written by the Faqir family while the second illustrates the semiotic connotations of the artifacts and the museum itself.

The Epic Meeting of Faqir Family with Maharaja Ranjit Singh

Faqir Syed Azizud Din, the eldest of the three Faqir brothers, was the first to enter the Maharaja's court. It is believed that when Rajit Singh captured Lahore in 1799, he suffered from severe eye ailment. At that time Lala Hakim Rai was well reputed hakim of the area and Sada Kuwar, mother-in-law of Mahraja Ranjit Singh had firm faith in his abilities as a physician. On her recommendation, Mahraja called on Lala Hakim Rai, who for reasons unknown sent his pupil Faqir Sayyed Azizud Din. The latter prescribed treatment for Maharaja that cured his ailment. The young hakim's skill impressed the Maharaja to an extent that he appointed him as his regular physician (Munawwar 1973: 29, 30). Naushani on the contrary argues that the Maharaja called for Faqir Sayyed Azizud Din to cure his eye not only due to the latter being student of Lala Hakim Rai but also due to the fact that he was son of Faqir Sayyed Ghulam Mohiuddin who had already gained fame in Lahore as a competent physician and a saint (Naushani 1972: 98).

There is another version with respect to Faqir brother's entry into the Maharaja's court. According to Faqir Sayyed Waheedud Din, when Maharaja Ranjit Singh suffered from eye infection he called Faqir Ghulam Mohiuddin for treatment, the latter took his son Faqir Sayyed Azizud Din along with him. Maharaja Ranjit Singh was so impressed by the young physician's wisdom and wit that he offered him a seat in his court (Din 1965: 39)

Faqir Sayyed Waheedud Din, a member of the family has written a biography of Ranjit Singh in which he gives yet another interesting reason of coming into contact of the Faqirs and Ranjit Singh. The author informs that Maharaja Ranjit Singh upon conquering Lahore on July 7, 1799, was cautioned by a 'holy voice' to obey four commandments as a ruler for the sake of prosperous rule which he abided by throughout his lifetime. These include:

1. "To say his prayers every morning without fail.
2. Never to hold court sitting on the throne of the Mughal emperors.
3. To treat his subjects equally, without distinction of caste or creed.
4. To respect and befriend Fakir Syed Ghulam Mohiuddin of Lahore, a godly man who had been appointed spiritual guardian of the new state and whose sons would serve it truly and well" (Din 1965: 17).

The Three Faqir Brothers

The family sources introduce the three Faqir brothers as learned and eminent scholars having Sufi disposition. Holding important seats in the Mahraja's court, the three brothers ensured better representation of Muslims in the court and played significant contribution to the uplift of Punjab and the city of Lahore in Particular. The eldest of the brothers, Faqir Sayyed Azizud Din was born in 1777. He received his early education from his father, Faqir Sayyed Ghulam Mohiuddin and learnt medicine from Lala Hakim Rai, later he went to Khairpur and studied subjects other than medicine from Hakim Mohammad Yar. Moreover, he also learnt pharmacy from Doctor Martin (Bokhari 1993: 21). He was a scholar of Arabic and Persian languages. An important dimension of his personality was that he was a great poet and the uniqueness of his poetry lied in its simplicity (Latif 1997: 449). Initially he was appointed as the royal physician. As the Maharaja recognized his expertise over diplomatic matters, oratorical skills, and command over Punjabi, Urdu, Persian and

English, he appointed Faqir Sayyed Azizud Din as his foreign minister. He was also sent on military expeditions. In words of Din, "so great was Ranjit Singh's confidence in his all-round ability and fidelity that he entrusted several difficult and delicate military assignments to him (Din 1965:42).

Next to Faqir Sayyed Azizud Din was Faqir Sayyed Imamud Din. He held important administrative and military positions within the Maharaja's dominion. He was the guardian of the fort of Gobingarh at Amritsar, which was important not only from defense viewpoint but also because Ranjit had twenty five cannons,other ammunition items and most of the treasure of Lahore placed there (Bokhari 1993: 112). Moreover, Faqir Sayyed Imamud Din also served as governor of the country surrounding Gobindgarh Fort. He was in charge of the Government treasures, the magazine, arsenals and royal stables within the country (Din 1965:45).

Born in 1779, Faqir Sayyed Nurud Din was the youngest of Faqir brothers. He received religious education at an early age from his father. He too studied medicine; their ancestral profession (Bokhari 1993: 80). Like his eldest brother, he learnt *hikmat* (traditional medicine) from his father Faqir Sayyed Ghulam Mohiuddin and western medicine from Doctor Martin. He was also a great Persian poet (Munawwar 1993: 26). At Maharaja's court he had multitude duties to perform. He was "physician royal, apothecary-general, almoner, director of the royal palaces and gardens, one of the three custodians of the keys of royal treasury, commandant of the arsenal at the fort, a judge extra ordinary, keeper of the Maharaja's judicial conscience and what not (Din 1965: 43). To depict his influence on Maharja, Waheedud Din states, "Nurud Din wielded a good deal of personal influence with him. Not seldom this influence was called to their aid even by the member of the royal family" (Din 1965:43).

Faqir Khana Museum Established

Faqir Sayyed Jalalud Din, the grandson of Faqir Sayyed Nurud Din, was the first in the family who rendered the collection to public eye, it must have been around 1901. In a Trust Deed executed in March 1927 he clearly willed that the artifacts at Faqir Khana should remain open to general public. Thus, Ram informs that people who were interested in antiques and rarities would come to see "the hidden treasure of art, paintings, carvings, manuscripts, old china carpets and innumerable other

sundry curious", (Ram 1932: 1). He continues that:

"[A] visit to the well furnished rooms of Faqir Sayyed Jalalud Din is far more instructive and inspiring than reading so many uninteresting and dry books on the subject and although through Faqir Sahib's proverbial courtesy, affability and generosity, one finds no difficulty to his house rooms, yet it is regrettable that such a highly prized and valuable treasure which has such an educational value is kept hidden from the public eye" (Ram 1932: 4).

Faqir Sayyed Jalalud Din was succeeded by his son Faqir Sayyed Mugheesud Din in 1937. It was he who laid the foundations of Faqir Khana as a standard, regular and registered private museum. "The museum is given its present shape by Faqir Sayyed Mugheesud Din who collected these pieces and arranged them along with the treasures inherited by his ancestors in a sequence to bring before the public" (Munir 1987: 94).

According to my key informants the Museum was established with following key objectives:

- Ensuring the uplift of country's name for when people will come to visit the museum and see a panorama of remarkable articles and novelties, especially the foreign visitors, the "credit" will not only go to the Faqir family but also to the country as a whole.
- Ensuring prestige of the family collection, name and honour. The museum will enable the visitors to gain knowledge about the Faqir family, about their eventful history; their service to their land; their patronization of art and crafts and their connoisseurship especially of their ancestors, the three great Faqir brothers who served Maharaja Ranjit Singh.

The very act of maintenance and conservancy of possessions of their ancestors as a great treasure is attention grabbing. It is an imposing source of revealing the pride Faqir family holds with regard to its past. This "sense of pride" derived through the museum is revealed in the following verses cited by one of the key informants, the curator of the museum, when asked for reason behind establishment of the museum.

Hota hai fakhar jin ko maazi pe Moeen apnay. Rakhtay hain tareekh k har baab ko wo zinda (those who are proud of their past keep its each and every aspect alive).

Faqir Sayyed Nurud Din created a trust of all his movable and immovable property, including the holy relics and all the items present at Faqir Khana along with those which have been donated to Lahore Museum, in 1847 that is five years before his death. His grandson, Faqir Sayyed Jalalaud Din in his trust deed declared the building of Faqir Khana as trust property as well. The Faqir Khana Museum is being run by direct descendants of Faqir Sayyed Nuruddin with a member being appointed as the trustee of the museum as well as Astana-i-Alia (a building close to Faqir Khana Museum where holy relics are preserved) with each generation.

The Nomenclature of Faqir

Faqir is originally an Arabic word derived from the root 'fuqr' bearing two meanings. On one hand, it means poverty or mendicancy while on the other it is used for saints in the sense of accepting whatever is bestowed by God with resignation, humility and content. It is absence of desire for worldly wealth, wishes and material possession. From a religious point of view the word faqir then connotes a humble person, one who is satisfied with what God gives him in the way of his material needs and strives only for the acquirement of spiritual richness. There are two versions regarding the assumption of the title Faqir by the family. According to the first version, Faqir Sayyed Ghulam Mohiuddin was the first in the family to use this title. Due to his religious disposition he chose to become disciple of Faqir Amanat Shah Qadri, a famous saint and holy person. Following his spiritual guide, Faqir Sayyed Ghulam Mohiuddin started to use Faqir with his name.

The second version, reifies the use of the title by the family prior to entry into Ranjit Singh's court. It, however, credits the continuation of the title to royal conferment. Once Maharaja Ranjit Singh was greatly pleased with Faqir Sayyed Azizud Din and showed a desire to bestow a title that would continue to be used by him and his family through generations. He further asked him to suggest a title. Faqir Sayyed Azizud Din replied that he would like to have a title that would not sound vain if the family becomes poor in future and will have "an added grace if they should remain rich or become richer still" (Din, 1965: 40). The Maharaja then suggested Faqir, a title already being used by his father. Faqir Sayyed Azizud Din told him "there could be no better title than that for me and my family". Thus, Maharaja conferred the title upon him and also gifted

"two valuable shawls of orange brown (*gerwa*), the colour distinctive of ascetics" (ibid).

While the title was already in use, it gained recognition when formally conferred on Faqir Sayyed Azizud Din. Since then, all the members of Faqir family use it with great pride. They feel honored because it is reminiscent of their glorious past and is reflective of the Sufi disposition of their ancestors.

Accessing the Museum

Faqir Khana Museum is located in the centre of the 'Old Lahore'. It may directly be accessed through, Bhatti Gate; a converging point for many thoroughfares, hence, a congested and busy area. Bhatti Gate is one of the twelve entry gates to the famous old walled city[1] of Lahore. The gate owes its importance to the shrine of Data Ganj Bukhsh[2]. The gate is one of the oldest gate and the place inside was popularly known as Lahore ka Chelsea, owing to its eventful literary and cultural life. It was also home to men of letters before partition of the Indian Subcontinent in 1947. Bazar Andaroon-i-Bhatti Gate starts right from the gate, passing through the Bazar-i-Hakiman ends up at Moti Tibba Chowk (see Fig. 1). The bazar is a narrow lane covering a distance of one to one and a quarter of a mile. It is a busy bazar, which remains occupied with pedestrians, rickshaws, carts and occasionally a car, throughout the day. It remains open till midnight and is famous for street food, snacks and edibles. Next is Nayian Di Gali (barbers' lane) and then Mohalla Jalotian which is the great poet-philosopher Allama Mohammad Iqbal's residence. Passing through Mohalla Jalotian, Choh Mohalla, Noor Mohalla, Koocha Moti Tibba one reaches Bazar-i-Hakeeman which ends at Chowk Moti Tibba. On the way one pleasures the sight of Pir Bhola Shah's shrine and the famous Unchi (high) mosque of the area. The visitor may be amazed by the cultural richness and heritage found within this narrow lane. Faqir Khana Museumis situated in the Bazar-i-Hakeeman. In close vicinity is Astana-i-

[1] The walled city of Lahore, the old city, or Androonshehar (the inner city) is the most historic part of the city. Located in the north-west of the Lahore, the area had been fortified during the Mughal period. There are 13 gates allowing entrance to the city. Bhatti gate is one of them. It is inside Bhatti gate that Faqir Khana museum is located.

[2] It is shrine of the famous Sufi saint, Abul Hassan Ali Hajvery, popularly known as Data GanjBaksh.

Alia, where the Faqir family's ancestors are buried. At the other end of Bhatti Gate is Taxali Gate, the museum may alternatively be reached from there.

Fig 1: Layout of Bhatti Gate

Faqir Khana Museum: Reproducing History and Identity

The history of the museum and the artifacts therein help construct the history of the Faqir family; transmitting past knowledge in specific ways. We want to focus on the following aspects in this section:

Acquirement of objects and their connotative value, Religio-political outlook of Ranjit Singh, the religio-political outlook of the Faqir

brothers, the justness, progressiveness and indignity of the Ranjit Singh and the relationship of Sikh emperor with his Muslim courtiers.

Acquirement of objects and their connotative value: Among artifacts in the museum are those that are presented as gifts to the Faqir brothers not only by Maharaja Ranjit Singh but interestingly enough also by his rival and competitors, the British High officials. These articles become a source of providing an overall political scenario of the period (Ram, 1932: 1). The time when Ranjit Singh ruled Lahore, (1799-1839), was the period when the British colonizers also strived to extend their political control over as much of the sub-continent as they could. On the other hand Maharaja Ranjit Singh was determined to include the whole of Punjab into his dominion. Thus, it was in the benefit of both, Maharaja Ranjit Singh and the English to live in mutual co-operation so as to avoid war against each other and focus on their respective aims and goals. For the purpose both sides, the British and the Maharaja, while utilizing, Faqir Sayyed Azizud Din's expertise and skills in diplomatic matters could not help being impressed by him and often gifted him valuable objects. (Ansari 1962: 1044). The gold watch presented and title "The Protector of the Friendship of Both states" conferred to Faqir Sayyed Azizud Din by Lord Ellenborough who was infuriated due to bad conduct shown to him by SardarLahna Singh of Majeethia, is a case in point (Ali 1911: 489,490). The presentation of gifts and title by the high officials of British government was, in fact a token of appreciation of the Faqir brothers' outlook towards diplomatic and foreign issues. The Faqir brothers were never in the favour of war with the British, rather they believed in having a peaceful relationship with East India Company and to live in reciprocal and mutual co-operation for common good. Thus, according to Waheedud Din, "it is due to his [Faqir Sayyed Azizud Din's] wise counsel that the Maharaja maintained friendly relations with the British government; and the fact that the relations were on a footing of equality and mutual respect was largely an outcome of his ardent loyalty to Ranjit Singh, his inborn tact and his skill in negotiation." (Din 1965:40)

The very fact that gifts and titles were awarded to Faqir brothers by not only Maharaja but also his rivals in power leads to an insightful understanding of gift exchange as an important political trait in those day. During that period those in power often obliged the subjects with valuable gifts, *jagirs* and letters of appreciation as an acknowledgment of any

extraordinary service they render for the benefit of their emperor or in appreciation of their wisdom, astuteness or other such individual characteristics.

The concept of gift and gift exchange is also integral to the study of Anthropology. According to Mauss, gift exchange is based on three principles of giving, receiving and reciprocating. Gifts, it is believed "create relationship not only between individuals but between groups, relationships which take the form of total PRESTATIONS" (Smith, 1986:131, 132). The process of gift giving strengthens co-operation and reduces competitiveness, and antagonism. Key to this concept of gift exchange is the concept of "elementary morality of RECIPROCITY" (Smith, 1986: 131). In this particular case, the reciprocal element of "gift exchange" has strengthened co-operation between the emperor and his subjects, the emperor and his rivals in power, and the emperor's subjects and his rivals. The cultural feature of "gift exchange" dominated the political system as well as led to the growth of the reciprocal relationship between the two opponent political powers.

The religio-political outlook of Ranjit Singh: According to the family, another major challenge met by the political authority then was the religious diversity of citizens. Various items of the family collection, such as the manuscript of the Sikh religious book "Grunth" and the familial narrative about rosary presented to Faqir Sayyed Nurud Din by Maharaja Ranjit Singh are reflective of Maharaja Ranjit Singh and Faqir brothers' outlook towards religion, both handled religious matters diplomatically. Knowing that there lived believers of all the three main religions; Hinduism, Islam and Sikhism within Lahore; and believing in freedom to practice religion, Maharaja Ranjit Singh as per Faqir family, laid the foundation of a secular and liberal government. He formulated such policies that adherents of different religions could enjoy the liberty of performing their religious prayers, observing their religious rituals and celebrating their religious ceremonies. His policy was based on Guru Gobind's tenet

"He is in the temple as He is in the mosque.
He is in the Hindu worship as He is in the Muslim prayer.
Men are one, though they appear different (Din 1965: 24)."

Faqir Sayyed Waheedud Din, a descendant from the family who wrote a book titled: *The Real Ranjit Singh*[3], informs that: "in keeping with Ranjit Singh's liberal views, he and the royal family used to take part alike in Hindu, Muslim and Sikh religious festivals" (Din 1965: 23). This participation is seen as an effort to promote interfaith harmony and peaceful co-existence.

The family elaborates the period of Ranjit Singh's reign as one where the principles of secularism and liberalism were ensured and secured through an indiscriminate judiciary meeting the standards of that time. It is believed judicial allowance of customary law helped citizens resolve their caste and religious issues as per their values. Whether Sikh, Hindu or Muslim all could seek court service and receive a ruling as per their respective customary law. The Muslims could access special courts run in accordance with the Shariat Law.

But this does not imply that religious ethnicity never raised any critical issue during Ranjit Singh's rule rather that he resolved these religion related issues and tensions in a way so as to maintain the "peace" of his empire. The family perceives Ranjit Singh's reign as that of complete religious harmony.

The religio-political outlook of the Faqir brothers: The Faqir brothers in their capacity as advisors without themselves deviating from their religious decrees always suggested such resolutions to religious matters that helped to avoid conflict. Moreover, in view of the fact that Faqir Sayyed Azizud Din was a Muslim and had an inclination toward Sufi tradition, held no prejudice against any other religion (Ali 1911: 492). Sufi depicts special tolerance towards other religions, since, it is believed that the precepts of Sufi mysticism (tusawwaf), is similar to Hindu Vedas and decrees of Sikhism given by Guru Nanak (Ali 1911: 492). In addition to introducing tolerance, historically speaking Sufis had close relationship with the rulers, who not only conferred titles upon them but also assigned them certain duties significant for smooth and peaceful governance (Rizvi 1983: 191, 192).

[3] This book documents Ranjit Singh's rule and era in the light of artifacts present in the museum and associated narratives. The writer claims in the preface of the book that it is a "plain and simple pen-potrait of Maharaja Ranjit Singh" as his"ancestors knew him in real life" and as "the Fakir Family's Ranjit Singh" simultaneously disclaiming it as a "standard biography or historical research (Din 1965)

The familial narrative about Ranjit's coming to power is also interesting in the sense that it presents an alternative narrative existing in the oral tradition of the family. Faqir Sayyed Saifud Din, the chief curator, thus informs that prior to Ranjit Singh, Punjab was being ruled by 12 Sikh *misl* (confederacies). Lahore was occupied by the Bhangi[4] misl. It was a time of loot and plunder, a period where the citizens were distressed and heavily burdened by unnecessary taxation, including marriage tax, children tax, entrance and exit tax at the walled city's gates etc. There was no freedom of religion. On the other hand the local population was also irked by the Afghan invaders who were no better than the Sikhs. Infuriated and exasperated people of Lahore wrote a letter to Ranjit Singh, an indigenous emerging leader for help. Thus, Ranjit Singh in 1799 conquered Lahore and freed it from the atrocities of Bhangi *misl* and Afghan rulers. It was felt that a strong representation of Muslims in the court was required. For the purpose the Faqir brothers, respected by the people, suited the best. This narrative is also important from religio-political outlook. It depicts the criteria for a ruler as per Faqir family which is further elaborated in the following.

Justness, progressiveness and indiginity: A number of documents and correspondence letters found in the Museum are proof of Maharaja Ranjit Singh's being a fair emperor. The Faqir family believes that it was a "golden day" in the history of Lahore when "after years of anarchy", "the first Punjabi ruler" conquered the city. According to Faqir Sayyed Waheedud Din, with the coming of an indigenous ruler there developed a hope that "[I]t would knit together the various religious and racial communities of the Punjab into the nation headed for the first time in history by an independent Punjabi ruler" (Din 1965: 67). The justness and fairness of the ruler was reciprocated with utter loyalty and fidelity demanded of a subject, especially by the Faqir courtiers, believes the family. The two important letters of correspondence belonging to the familial collection are taken as depiction of his justness and evenhandedness. The following are extracts from a *farman* decreed upon Faqir Sayyed Nurud Din:

[4] *Bhangi* refers to a person who consumes and is addicted to the use of hemp. Since the Sikhs belonging to this misl were addicted to hemp consumption hence the nomenclature *Bhangi*.

"It is hereby decreed by His Highness with the utmost emphasis that no person in the city should practice high handedness and oppression on the people. Indeed, even if His Highness should issue an inappropriate order against any resident in Lahore, it should be clearly brought to the notice of His Highness so that it may be amended (Din, 1965: 31)."

Similarly, another extract from a *farmaan* decreed upon Faqir Sayyed Nurud Din and Sardar Amir Singh:

"By the grace of Sri Sat Guruji, the exalted command is issued to you that, deeming yourselves to be responsible for the security of Lahore, you should take care of the duties pertaining thereto Sri Sat Guruji forbid, if His Highness, His beloved son Kharak Singh Ji, Kanwar Sher Singh Ji, the Raja Kalan Bahadur, Raja Sachit Singh Ji, and Jamadar Ji should commit any inappropriate act, you bring it to the notice of His Highness. Secondly, you should send your trusted representatives to the sardars with instructions to refrain from committing inappropriate acts. If the sardars act according to your instructions, well and good; otherwise you should send word to them that you will bring the matter to the notice of His Highness (Din 1965: 32)."

These *farmans* are seen as evidences of Ranjit Singh's evenhandedness and progressiveness for whom well-being of the subjects was a primary consideration:

"The orders are not models of royal draftsmanship by any standard – ancient or modern, western or eastern. But they are unique in one respect: they throw overboard the time-honoured legal fiction upon which the fact of kingship is based – that the king can do no wrong. It was characteristic of Ranjit Singh to acknowledge that, as a man and a king, he was fallible and to provide against any possible adverse effects of his fallibility upon the rights and well being of his peoples (Din 1965: 33)."

In a similar vein, an important document is a thirty feet long scroll (appendix XI) having record of all the property belonging to Muslims, which have been confiscated before Maharaja Ranjit Singh's rule, but were returned during his reign. This scroll is a proof of Mahraja Ranjit Singh's administrative and ruling qualities that secured his subjects' rights. Ranjit Singh's perceived sincerity for Punjab and its people was met with equal commitment and loyalty by the Faqir brothers. Once when Dost Mohammad Khan moved to Peshawar with an aim to fight it back from Ranjit Singh, the latter sent Faqir Sayyed Azizud Din along with his army

for negotiations. Dost Mohammad Khan received Faqir Sayyed Azizud Din and his convoy by saying:
"Ah You Kafirs! I have taken you in" (Din 1965: 41).

This initiated a religio-political debate. One of the courtiers of Amir Dost Mohammad Khan expressed his shock and disappointment that the young Faqir despite being religious and pious person is taking side of a non-Muslim. To this the Faqir unrolled the insulting ultimatum by Amir Dost to Ranjit Singh, which clearly showed that he was fighting for territory, and not for religion and as Muslim it was his duty to remain true to his soil and defend his country against any aggression (ibid).

The third important factor which is emphasized of Ranjit Singh's period through the museum is his efforts for a progressive and developed Punjab. According to one of the key informants, in order to evaluate an era three aspects; state of infra structure, currency and arts and crafts, should be taken into account. With reference to the development of infra structure it is brought to light by the family that Ranjit Singh did his best for the uplift of Lahore. One of the instances quoted by the family to substantiate the argument is Ranjit Singh's sanctioning of two thousand rupees for the repair of the ditch surrounding the walled city and the gates of the walled city.

A large handwritten manuscript of the Holy Quran, which, it is believed is written by a Khushnawees (a fine pen man) of Sialkot who devoted his life and labour in preparing the script is also lying in the Museum. According the sources, he aimed to sell it to Nawab of Tonk, a pious and righteous person, with the hope of receiving a worthy reward. As he was passing Lahore carrying this manuscript on a cart, Ranjit Singh caught sight of him. Ranjit Singh rewarded him with the amount asked as well as a *jagir* for producing an outstanding piece of art. Later, he gifted it to Faqir Sayyed Azizud Din. The key informant added to this by informing that during the Sikh era, 120 schools of paintings were established. Artists were patronized, scholarships were given to them, taxes levied on Sikh mahrajas so as to collect money for scholarships. According to the curator of the museum "his [Ranjit Singh's] reign did not have downfall; it was glorious".

The family believes that Ranjit Singh was a visionary leader who despite being illiterate himself wanted "his people" to receive education. He envisioned a literate Punjab where majority could at least write an

application in Persian. For the purpose an elementary book was designed and disseminated. It was expected that with the help of this book people would learn Persian in 3 months. According to the key informant, within a period of few years more than 78% of the population was able to read and write in Persian. These and several other narrations by the family establish Ranjit Singh as an admirer and patron of arts and crafts and a progressive leader.

The close relationship of Sikh emperor with his Muslim courtiers: The miniature paintings in the museum are used as reflective of close relationship between Mahraja Ranjit Singh and the Faiqr brothers. For example, the painting of Mahraja Sher Singh, son of Maharaja Ranjit Singh, on a horse named "Dooloo" has an interesting story which is told as a depiction of the closeness of the two. It is told that, once prince Sher Singh took one of his father's favourite horse, "Dooloo", for riding without the latter's permission. After the ride, instead of returning the horse to the Royal Stable, the prince sent it to his own stable. The anxious darogha reported the case to Maharaja who got so furious that he ordered the exile of the prince and forfeiture of his possessions. The young prince requested Faqir Sayyed Nurud Din who was also his tutor to intercede. Faqir Sayyed Nurud Din, having scolded the prince for his wrong doing, went to Mahraja to mediate between father and son. When Maharja furiously complained about his son's impudence, Faqir Sayyed Nurud Din replied, "Maharaj you have punished him far too lightly. He took away the horse as if it was his father's property". The wise and witty reply pleased the emperor so deeply that he cancelled his order (Din 1965: 44). Such was the nature of their relationship, thus, Faqir Sayyed Waheedud Din states "Nurud Din wielded a good deal of personal influence with him.

Maharaja had so much confidence in his subject that he never took any medicine and any food without asking them (Munawwar 1973: 30). Faqir Sayyed Nurud Din was responsible for supervising food for Maharaja. All the meals supervised by him and his personal seal; Ranjit Singh never ate meal not having Nurud Din's seal. Similarly Faqir Sayyed Azizud Din had a very close and intimate relationship with the emperor. He was a devoted servant and a sincere friend (Ali 1911: 486). During his last days Mahraja suffered from paralysis. He could not speak thus communicated through signs. The only two people who could understand his sign language were Raja Dhian Singh and Faqir Sayyed Azizud Din.

Maharaja had so much confidence in latter that he asked for the latter's advice regarding his succession. Azizud Din advised that Prince Kharak Singh should be his successor and Raja Dhian Singh is made his Chief Minsiter, Maharaja agreed and passed the order.

Conclusion

The Legacy Continues

We have tried to show in this article the relationship between history and family identity as well as the way people construct both. This should not be misunderstood in the sense that history and identity (personal/family/ethnic) were not real. This is actually to emphasize that there are many different ways of looking at them and that there are many different histories and realities depending upon the writer, narrator, etc. In other words identity and history are 'his/her stories' differently named as 'partial truths'.

The Faqir family has used Faqir Khana Museum to construct a history thereby their own identity. This history, for instance their relations with Maharaja Ranjit Singh, is based on a lot of facts shown through a number of artifacts and documents, so it is 'true and real'. But these have been used to construct a particular history which may, for instance, be different from the layman main Muslim discourse about the rule of Ranjit Singh in the Punjab. The mainstream historical discourse is primarily based on the religious aspect of identity; thereby linking layperson more closely to Muslim Mughal emperors as against the Sikh ruler, Ranjit Singh. Consequently, either holding the Sikh reign in abeyance or interpreting it in a negative manner, that is, as a period of loot and plunder. History has been "unjust" and "unfair" to the great Sikh emperor, claims the chief curator. Faqir Khana museum, the artifacts therein and the associated narratives are then constructing and presenting an alternative historical narrative, one that they believe is true and rich in content, better than the official records. These are based on first hand experiences of their ancestors with the ruler, the knowledge of which is being transmitted to each generation through oral narratives and archival sources. The museum enables a "lived experience" of history.

The museum and the objects therein, starting from their own history lead the visitor to look into Lahore's history, the nature of Sikh rule over Punjab, and the rule of Maharaja Ranjit Singh in particular Not only

this, they also help to convey the perception of Faqir family regarding Maharaja Ranjit Singh and throw light on their relationship with him. It also answers the intriguing question of religion and faith not effecting the relationship between the Faqir brothers and the emperor. Last but not the least, these articles portray the family as patrons of art and antiquities. The family believes that through museum they are continuing the legacy of their "great" ancestors, that is, "contributing to their land".

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-8-

Nature of Muslim Rule in India
A Study of Marxist Perspective in Pakistan

Muhammad Naveed Akhtar

Abstract

Muslim Rule in India is the most controversial historiographical subject area. There are various approaches according to which historians view and discuss this age of Indian history such as Orientalist viewpoint, Muslim nationalism, Indian nationalism, and Hindu nationalism, Marxist conception and many parochial perspectives. This paper hence aims at assessing the Marxist historiography in Pakistan that deals with Medieval India, a period of Muslim rule (711-1856). It examines how Pakistani Marxist historians approached the subject matter and how far they diverge from pertinently core stance offered by Marxism. Further, it also sheds some light, occasionally, on the nature of disagreements and differences as to historical issues, lying between Pakistani Marxist historians and Muslim Nationalist historians. Yet major focus remains on Marxist historical discourse and discernable differences this circuit of Pakistani Marxist historians have gone into. At the end of the article, a relevant critique on the discourse offered by Pakistani Marxist historians—Sibte Hassan, Mubarak Ali and Qazi Javed, whose literature is actually being discussed—is presented.

Introduction

Marxist historians in Pakistan put substantial emphasis on the relationship between religion and politics. Under Marxist conception, they have viewed the amalgamation of the religion and politics, so to say the theocracy, a barrier against expression of free will of the people and manifestation of their aesthetic and artistic potential. At ideological level, Marxist historians in Pakistan have emerged as a school of thought that challenges the dominant and prevailed ideological notion, i.e. 'Two Nations Theory'. The theory explains the rationale of Pakistan's creation in separation of Indian Muslims from Hindu community in all aspects of religious beliefs and practices, cultural norms and traits, as well as social values and political ideologies. As Two Nations Theory is the ideology of

Pakistan and defines nationalism religiously, the stereotypical recognition of the Marxist historical literature in Pakistan, therefore, is that it is a propagandist literature fraught with anarchist and centrifugal tendencies. For that matter, some of the segmental discourses in that literature might have given it outlook as propagandist approach with hidden objectives of demonstrating anti-state views, but generalizing it as whole would be inappropriate and off beam. Marxists offer ideological disagreements asserting that the phenomenon of ideology is not static and incorrigible but dynamic and progressive—thus the ideology of the nation should be capable enough to address the challenges confronted to the state. They feel that the ideology, that once was relevant raison d'être to attain Pakistan at certain formative phase to attain a separate state for Indian Muslims, should now be revisited keeping in view the emerging challenges and constraints in the offing. Another dimension of criticism erected by Marxists on 'Two Nations Theory' is the argument that this theory, considering social and political milieu of Pakistan, possesses enormous potential to create precarious situations against liberal factions, minorities and women, as it provides justification to theocracy in the state.

The origin of Muslim nationalist historiography in India can be traced back in the period of India's colonization by British. It was the time when Indian Muslims had lost their political might and grip on economic systems prerequisite to hold it for their survival with dignity. On the other hand, the British had established their political dominance over Indian subcontinent by introducing new political, educational, judicial, and military institutions which aimed at reforming and educating Indians on modern scientific lines. Meanwhile, the orientalists had started writing Indian histories which, Muslims felt, were biased and the period of Muslim rule in India had given unfair treatment. Muslim historians, therefore, reacted by writing with revisionist perspective of orientalism. This had been an apologetic approach defending the policies of Muslim rulers which had invited the criticism of Western historians. These Muslim historians include both western educated and semi-scholars.

Here, the space to discuss Nationalist historiography at length is, of course, not enough.[1] However, the brief description of intensively expressed positions in Muslim nationalist historiography is as.

1. Muslim nationalism, or Muslim separatism in India, is not based upon material grounds such as the geography, race, ethnicity, or economics; but the Muslims are nation for abstract and spiritual grounds *inter alia:* the Muslim brotherhood, fraternity, equality and common faith.
2. Muslims of India have shared history with rest of Muslim world, and they therefore take pride in demonstrating strong solidarity with them.
3. Muslim Nationalists assume, advocate and propagate that the Muslims had a glorious past and their predicaments are because of straying away from the humanistic guiding principles set forth by Islam.
4. Propagated by Orientalists, the notion that the Muslim rule in India was a darkest age of Indian history is wrong. They argue that Islam and Muslim kings rather contributed a lot in social, political, educational, artistic and administrative fields and bestowed India the unprecedented vivification.

During colonial era, Indian Marxist historiography had also been concerned with providing revisionism of orientalists' historical undertakings but on quite different lines from those of Muslim nationalists. The perspective of Marxist historians was rather closer to Indian nationalist approach; they emphasized on providing the clarifications of the aspects which, they realized, had been dealt with narrow-mindedly, having inadequate knowledge of history of India. The original intent in Marxist historiography was to level criticism on orientalists historiography pointing out that it had served the British imperialist interests and exacerbated communal differences among Indian

[1] To know more about the perspective of Muslim nationalist and its demonstration in historiography, consult the books like Abdul Haleem Sharar's *Tareekh Sindh* (1907); Syed Sulieman Nadavi's *Arab-o Hind Kay Taalukaat* (1929); Maulana Maududi's *Masla-e Qaumiyat* (1939) and *Dahkan Ki Siyasi Tareekh* (1944);); S. M. Jaffar's *Some Cultural Aspect of Muslim Rule in India* (1939); and *Education in Muslim India* (1936); *The Administration of the Sultanate of Delhi* (1942); *Muslim Empire from Babar to Aurangzeb* (1936); I. H. Qureshi's *Ulema in Politics* (1974); and *The Muslim Community of the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent* 610-1947 (1977); Zafar Imam's *The Musalmaans of the Subcontinent* (1980); S. M. Ikram's *A History of Muslim Civilization in India and Pakistan* (1966); Waheed-uz-Zaman and M. Saleem Akhtar's edited work Islam in South Asia (1993); Saeedud Din Ahmad Dar' *Ideology of Pakistan* (1998).

masses. Further, it added an approach to view history from below and challenged the communalist perspective in historiography. Here, the space is not enough to discuss in details the contributions of Indian Marxist historians, yet most renowned of them can be mentioned as: Muhammad Habib (b. 1895- d. 1971), D. D. Kosambi (b. 1907-b. 1966), Ram Sharan Sharma (b. 1919- d. 2011), K. M Ashraf (b.1903-d. 192), Irfan Habib (b. 1931), Romila Thapar (b. 1931), and K. N. Panikkar (b. 1936), and Harbans Mukhia (b. 1939).

After partition of India, Marxist historians who preferred to make India their abode remained consistent to respond to orientalism and to the histories written with religious zeal. Nonetheless, Marxist historians in Pakistan took a shift from revisionism of orientalism to that of Muslim Nationalist historiography.

Marxist Conception of History

Apart from its political dimension, Marxism is an academic tradition; its influence on the disciplines of social sciences is remarkable (Boucher 2014, 2-3). Marxism is a set of well-connected philosophical ideas presented by a German philosopher Karl Marx (1818-1883), and supplemented by his companion Friedrick Engels (1820-1895). Being inspired by socio-political and economic conditions of Europe in 19th century and by the philosophers like G.W.F. Hegel, Charles Fourier and Ludwig Feuerbach,[2] he developed 'an economic and political program' (McLellan 2012). The essential ideas upon which Marxism is comprised of are, *inter alia,* historical materialism, class struggle, labour theory of value and social alienation. The idea through which he analyzed and philosophized the evolution of human history by unrevealing 'materialistic aspects of human nature and social conditions' is known as historical materialism (Warington 2000, 215-6; Zahoor 2013: 27). Historical materialism or dialectical materialism is a derivative and antithetical notion of Hegelian dialecticism[3] and implies that the evolution in human

[2] To find how Marx's ideas got influenced by these philosophers see: N. Levine's *Marx's Discourse with Hegel* (2011); J. B. Foster's *Marx's Ecology: Materialism and Nature* (2000), Geoff Boucher's *Understanding Marx* (2014) and David T. McLellan's article "Marxism" published in Britannica Encyclopedia Online.

[3] Marnie Hughes-Warrington's *Fifty Key Thinkers on History* (2000) mentions that 'At Berlin he turned from law to philosophy and was heavily influenced by Hegel and his

history is bound to happen as result of material and economic forces.[4] Those are modes of production which cause change in social relations: human esthetics, values and thoughts. In Preface of *the Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (1859) Marx stated:

'The general conclusion at which I arrived and which, once reached, became the guiding principle of my studies can be summarized as follows. In the social production of their existence, men enter into definite, necessary relations, which are independent of their will, namely, relations of production corresponding to a determinate stage of development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation on which there arises a legal and political superstructure and to which there correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life-process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but on the contrary it is their social being that determines their consciousness.'[5]

His framework interpreting history may concisely be described as class struggle, as *Capital Manifesto* written by Marx and Friedrick Engels states, "The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggle" (Marx and Engels 1848; Abel 2002: 463). It speaks volumes of human societies which, after bringing dependency and division of labour, has been divided into two classes such as slaves and slave-owners, peasants and landlords, labour and capitalists. Finding this binary structure of social relations in societies, he termed them as proletarians (working class) and bourgeoisie (capitalist class); and this relationship, he further defined, is that of oppressed and oppressor (Marx and Engels 1848; Abel 2002: 463).

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interpreters Burno Bauer and Ludwig Feurbach". Marx himself acknowledged that "Hegel's writings were the root of his philosophy" (Warington 2000, 215-16). Marx's works however are not mere the paraphrasing of Hegel's, those are fundamentally different since Marx viewed the base, i.e. dialect in matter, is responsible for change in superstructure, i.e. the ideal construction (Warrington 2000, 217; Rigby 2002. 981).

[4] It was Feuerbach, prior to Marx, who delivered the idea against Hegelian dialecticism contending that those were not ideas but material conditions that altered or determined the course of historical progress. He thus contended that 'the basic reality is not *Geist* but material' (Luther 2009, 261).

[5] See at http://www.marx2mao.com/M&E/PI.html (dated July 18, 2016)

In Marx's writings one of consistent theme is human alienation, an idea taken from Hegel and Feuerbach. The works by means of their labour produce exchangeable goods for markets which are necessity for existence, but the capitalists securing surplus value deprive and alienate them from their own labour. This economic alienation of the worker becomes causes social and self-alienation.[6] Marx believed that universal emancipation from class struggle is destined to happen at a certain stage of excessive industrialist development which would result proletarian revolution and establishment of communist society.[7]

Owing to the interpretations of and criticism on Marx and Engels' thoughts by various Marxist philosophers, the various Marxisms have been emerged that are collectively known as neo-Marxism. [8] By amending, or by incorporating various other literary traditions, the neo-Marxists have developed distinct historiographical frameworks of analysis, such as Frankfurt school, Annales School and the Subaltern studies. Further, the materialistic conception of history furthered historical knowledge, and that of other social sciences as well, by advancing the approaches like social history, economic history, history of material culture, and also promoted inter-disciplinary approach in historical research. Despite being less or more critical of classical Marxism, they also share similarities of ideas at certain philosophic and ideological points and the use of common jargon, terminology, phraseology and lexicon and they all, somehow, are said to be Marxists (Zahoor 2013: 26).

[6] To get detailed apprehension of Marx's theory of the surplus value of labour and idea of alienated being, see Bertell Ollman's *Alienation: Marx's Conception of Man in Capitalist Society* (1996) published by Cambridge University Press.

[7] The readings regarded to help understand Marx's idea of existences classes and nature of their struggle critically can be mentioned as Robert C. Tucker's *The Marx-Engels Reader* (1978), S. H. Rigby, "Marxist Historiography" in *In* Michael Bentley, *Companion to Historiography* (2002);

[8] To know more about genesis of neo-Marxism and critical debates on it, see: Lambert M. Surhone's and et al's edited work *Neo-Marxism* (Betascript Publishing, 2010), Lucas Abraham Van Wyk's *The Influence of Neo-Marxism on Economic Development* (1990), and Robert A. Gorman's *Neo-Marxism: the Meanings of Modern Radicalism* (Green Wood Press, 1982).

Marxist Historiographical Variants/ Strands in Pakistan

Though there are various Marxist historians in Pakistan, the three of whom—i.e. Sibte Hassan, Mubarak Ali and Qazi Javed—are much prominent, since they are the only historians who have produced considerable literature on medieval history of India. Despite the fact that these historians are regarded as Marxist historians and Indian history is their common area of interest, they are distinct representing different schools within Marxism. To reinforce what they propound, these historian are distinct in approaching historical process, in deconstructing the pre-existing historical believes and myths, and in providing new interpretations to the facts and in connecting different historical episodes. Sibte Hassan, notwithstanding some differences and limitation, generally provide history the explanations applying Marxist framework of analysis.[9] Mubarak Ali can rightly be regarded as a peoples' historian viewing history from below.[10] The perspective according to which Qazi Javed mostly views, explains and judges the historical developments is humanistic, pluralistic and existential.

There is no denying that shared value among these historians is to advocate secular liberal values and to condemn orthodoxy and theocracy, yet they significantly differ from each other even on ontological, epistemological and methodological grounds. For this very reason they have sometimes shown deviations or transcendence from a few convincing tenets of Marxism. For instance, Qazi Javed believes that those are not merely the material forces which effect historical progress but the powerful ideas do have same potential. He also asserts that historian must make an appropriate use of imaginations while interpreting facts and

[9] Marx and Engels disapprove religions as those for working class, they think, is opium which disorients man from a real cause of social injustice, and hinders reactive forces that can dismantle a social structure of oppression (Engels 1966: 131). Engels writes "All religion, however, is nothing but the fantastic reflection in men's minds of those external forces which control their daily life, a reflection in which the terrestrial forces assume the form of supernatural forces" (Engels 1966: 8). Nonetheless, Sibte Hassan's *The Battle of Ideas in Pakistan* comes with different position from that of Marx and Engels asserting that this is the wrong notion that secularism negates of religion but it provides religious freedom to all on equal grounds.

[10]Mubarak Ali in his historical enterprises view history with lens of a common people but he can hardly be regarded as subaltern historian since he neither applies subaltern framework and nor discusses the role of common people in historical process.

reconstructing history. The objectivity in history, the concept said to be fundamental and auspicious requisition for narrating history, is perceived by Qazi Javed as something which makes the knowledge of history boring and charmless. He personifies objective history as 'boring ugly old lady'. These are a few instances of those ideas which are quite enough to show that the historians branded to be Marxist use freedom in raising differences not only with the fundamentals of Marxism but also with the details which come out as interpretation of the historical facts according to such conceptions.

Three historians Sibte Hassan, Mubarak Ali and Qazi Javed are perhaps the only Marxist historians in Pakistan who has produced discernable literature on the history of medieval India. Graduate for Aligarh University, Sibte Hassan opted the profession of journalism and was a staunch adherent of communism being a part of Communist Party of Pakistan. In 1950s, he was detained by Pakistan's government for his clandestine political activities, he was one of those revolutionaries who were detained as conspirators of Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case. He wrote various books, monographs and articles in newspapers, some of which published with pseudonym. Discussing Indian history, the books which earned him scholastic fame include *Mosa Say Marx Tak; Marx Aur Mashriq; The Battle of Ideas in Pakistan; Naveed-e Fikar; Roshan Khayali; Pakistan Mein Tahzeeb Ka Irtiqah.*

The books *Mosa Say Marx Tak* and *Marx Aur Mashriq* provide commentaries on Marxism and history of philosophy with Marxist interpretation.

Mubarak Ali is professionally trained historian and his doctorate writing dissertation on *Mughal Court* is from Ruhr University Bochum Germany and he has been associated with profession of teaching history in Sindh University Jamshoro. He left that university because there he felt himself uneasy owning to the trouble creating attitude of the university authorities. He tried to be a part of teaching faculty of history department in Punjab University Lahore, but refused for his literary approach. He joined some research institutions like Goatee Institute Lahore, Aurat Foundation (NGO) and Mishal Publishers but left because he thought those restrict intellectual freedom. Writing books too is his longstanding career and he authored so for about eighty books in both English and Urdu languages. He has extensively written on philosophy of history,

historiography of India and the history of medieval India and socio-political issues of Pakistan. His books which are on medieval India include: *Akhari Ahde Mughlia Ka Hindustan* (1992); *Ulema Aur Siyasat* (1993) *Almiya-e Tareekh* (1994); *Sindh Kamoshi Ki Awaz* (1994); *Mughal Court* (1997); *The Shadow of History* (1998); *History on Trial* (1999)*; Tareekh Shanasi* (2002); *Tareekh Ki Talash* (2003); *Essays on History, Politics and Culture: A page from History* (2005); Essays *on the History of Sindh* (2005); *Tareekh Aur Siyasat* (2005); *Ulema, Sufis and Intellectuals* (2005); *Bartanvi Hindustan* (2009); *Baresagheer Mein Muslaman Mu'ashray Ka Almiya* (2012); and *Tareekh Ki Baaten* (2012).[11] By 2010, Mubarak Ali is a regular contributor to Pakistan's renowned newspaper *Dawn.*

The philosopher-historian, Qazi Javed is a director of publishing institution, a think-tank, *Adara-e Sakafat-e Islamiya.* He is a prolific writer and he wrote on varied subjects such as: Indian history, mysticism, philosophy of history, children's upbringing, social and psychological issues. His books which address Indian history are *Hindi-Muslim Tahzeeb, Bare Sagheer Mein Muslim Fikar Ka Irtiqah, Tareekh-o Tahzeeb, Punjab Kay Sufi Danishwar, Punjab Di Sufiyana Rawayat,* and *Ifkar-e Shah Waliullah.*

This has been discussed earlier that Marxist historiography in Pakistan has been emerged in reaction to Muslim or Pakistani nationalist historiography. The key themes that Pakistani Marxist historians have therefore emphasized are secularism, liberalism, progressivism and humanism. Nonetheless, the way they propagate these ideas and make them touchstone to judge historical actions and events varies in tone, tendency and temperament. This variation suggests how the historical

[11] Mubarak Ali's most books have been published by Fiction House Publisher which since 2012 has adopted new recognition as *Tareekh* Publishers. The books being published from Fiction House do not mention the years when the books has been published for the first time. The prefaces and introductions of the most of the books mentions the years but those too cannot be confidently regarded the dates of the first editions since it has been found that many books has been published before the date the prefaces mention. Here the years of publications mentioned with alongside book titles, for the convenience of the reader, are those which the prefaces of the books have acquired. Nonetheless, the years of publicans in the bibliography of this paper are according to publication dates of the books, from which the references for current discourse have been mentioned.

writings get effected by the writer's social surroundings and circumstances, vision and ideals, tendency to act upon will and constraints of professional career. As to secularism, Sibte Hassan's approach is apologetic,[12] Mubarak Ali's hardcore,[13] and Qazi Javed's reconciliatory.

An Overview of Pakistani Marxist Historiographical Dispositions on Nature of Muslim Rule in India

There is a remarkable and wider range of themes, pertaining to Muslim rule in India, that Pakistani Marxist historians have less or more discussed, those include *intera alia:* secularism vs orthodoxy; state and society relationship; the rise and fall of dynastic rule; the role of *ulema* and Sufis between state and society; spread of Islam in India; cultural imperialism and cultural exchange; material culture of royal court; the relationship between aristocratic class and common people; the social structure of India; social stagnation of the country; status of women in the medieval Indian society; the progress in the fields of art and literature; and feudalism in India.

Muslim rule in India is viewed by Sibte Hassan as secular; the Sultans of Delhi Sultanate and Mughal kings were conscious of the fact that the Muslims living in India with Hindu majority people could not afford antagonism with them. The Arabs, after the conquest of Sind, realized this constraint and acknowledged the Hindus as *Zimi* (the protected people) just considered it enough to impose *Jiziya* (poll-tax) on them. The Sultans and Mughal kings adopted same policy of tolerance which reached to its culmination during the reign of Mughal emperors Akbar and Shahjahan (Hassan 1975*,* 197-9, 201, 211, 321). The class of

[12] With an apologetic tone the main idea having been discussed in Sibte Hassan's historical account *The Battle of Ideas in Pakistan* is that secularism does not mean a negation of religion rather it provides religious freedom to all people on equal grounds. To Hassan, the possibility for such grounds can only be witnessed when separation of religion from politics becomes incontrovertible (Hassan 1986: 7-9).

[13] To be acquainted with Mubarak Ali's intense secularist stance and expressions and his justification for, see his books: *Ashoot Logon Ka Adab* (1990); *Baresagheer Mein Musliman Mu'ashray Ka Almiya* (1990); *Historians Dispute* (1992); *Tareekh Shanasi* (1993); *Ulema Aur Siyasat* (1993); *Almiya-e-Tareekh* (1994); *Essays on History, Politics and Culture: A Page from History* (2004); *Tareekh Ki Talash* (2003), *Interviews and Comments* (2004), *Tareekh Aur Aaj Ki Duniya* (2005).

Muslim clergy (the *ulema*) associated to the court has received denouncement of the historian for their orthodox views and for influencing the rulers to take harsh actions against non-Muslims (Hassan 1975: 197-205; Hassan 1986: 138-42). Hassan admires Sufis for promoting a culture of peace, tolerance, cultural exchange, and spread of Islam in India and for their outstanding contribution to art and literature in India (Hassan 1975: 186). His *Pakistan Mein Tahzeeb Ka Irtiqah* evaluates cultural exchanges taken place between Muslims and Hindus; the dresses, the music, mysticism, the cultural traditions, the language and knowledge (Hassan 1975: 166, 169, 175-9, 180-6).

His accounts *Pakistan Mein Tahzeeb Ka Irtiqah, Mosa Say Marx Tak* and *Marx Aur Mashriq* have discussed social structure (caste system) and economic system (feudalism); finding relationship between both Hassan asserts that the earlier evolved due to and depends upon the later, and both accompanied with self-sufficiency of labor and vast fertile land resulted in social stagnation of India—no change in modes of productions. Moreover, same factors later on caused the political decline of Muslims in India (Hassan 1975, 276, 281-4). Providing the examination of the decline of Mughal rule, the last chapter of *Pakistan Mein Tahzeeb Ka Irtiqah* have two sections: the first looks into said internal reasons and second discusses the causes signifying international historical scenario. It propounds that this was not Battle of Plassey (1757 CE) that generally considered to play a decisive role in the decline of Mughal Empire in India, but the fall of Constantinople at the hands of Sultan Muhammad Fateh in 1453 CE that seized economic opportunities for Europeans in that international market and they endeavored to find those in the rest of world including India (Hassan 1975: 376-9).

Mubarak Ali's position regarding Muslim rulers being secular and the fanatically orthodox and conservative role of the ulema indulging in politics and administrative affairs of the state is not different from that of Sibte Hassan. Nonetheless, contrary to Sibte Hassan' standpoint about Sufi's secular and liberal conduct between state and society, Ali does not acknowledge the Sufis as secular since they represented a religious communities' interest and preached the faith they belonged to. He appreciates them for consoling common people but denounces them for not providing alternative against tyrant state and social structure. Apropos of state-society relationship Mubarak Ali has viewed the pertaining

developments in line with cultural imperialism which too is antithesis of Sibte Hassan's consideration of cultural exchange. To explain his conception of cultural imperialism, his enterprises *Tareekh Ki Talash, Ulema, Sufis and Intellectuals, Ulema Aur Siyasat* and *Almiya-e Tareekh* make at length discourse, but with little empirical evidences, on forcible religious conversions, marginalization of non-Muslim, cultural and religious superiority complex of Muslim ruling classes, and their detachment from well-being of the locals (Ali 2012: 45-50; 2012c: 66-71, 109; 2012d: 23-4). Being sympathetic to the people of subcontinent, he recalls the invaders Muhammad ibn Qasim, Shahbudin Ghori and Mahmud Gaznavi as usurpers, oppressors and plunderers, though he has appreciated them for their administrative skills and policies. A discernable literature he has produced on downtrodden people i.e. lower castes and women which includes *Ashoot Logon Ka Adab* (1990) and *Tareekh Aur Aurat* (1993). His books on historiography demands the historians write history acknowledging the role of common people in historical process, and so he himself has endeavored but remained under certain limitations. His books *Mughal Court* and *Hindustan Ki Kahani* are appreciable contributions regarding the details of material culture of the royal courts having symbolic significance—including the crown, the throne, the court, the flags, the gardens, the robes, and the seals etc. These accounts also provide at length details on oppressive treatment of common people by the aristocrats.

Recounting the reasons of the decline of Muslim rule his books include *Akhari Ahde Mughlia Ka Hindustan* (1992), *Tareekh Aur Siyasat* (1993), *Almiya-i-Tareekh* (1994), *The Shadow of History* (1998), *History on Trial* (1999), *Tareekh Ki Talash* (2003), *Essays on History, Politics and Culture: A Page from History* (2004), *Bartanvi Hindustan* (2009) and *Tareekh Ki Baten* (2012). These accounts go into eclectic range of reasons that brought about the gradual decline of Mughals, which could be summed up as: arbitrary rule of monarchs; wars of succession; conspiracies of disloyal courtiers and aristocrats; poorly organized and inappropriately paid military; indifference of rulers to social and economic well-being of people; lavish lifestyle of monarchs and aristocrats; irreconcilability of center with centrifugal princely states and annoyed communities—i.e. Marathas, Jatts and Sikhs; Mughals' vulnerability against and economic dependency upon British East Indian Company; and

incompetent class of intellectuals to respond the political challenges and social chaos (Ali 1998: 64-66, 87-8; 1999: 157-644; 2005: 72-132; 2009: 51-9; 2012a, 145-162; 2012b: 137-145, 237-240; 2012f: 150-64; 2004: 49-54; 2012e: 13, 28, 92-3, 112-8).

Coming to the historical literature produced by Qazi Javed on medieval India, this can be noticed that his investigational interest is mainly in intellectual and cultural side of Indian society wherein two communities representing two distinctly magnificent civilizations, i.e. Muslim and Hindu, interact and evolve a unique syncretic culture. The manifestation of that culture he found in the forms of *Bhakti* movement, *Chishtiya* mystic philosophy, Sikhism, and *Din-i-Ilahi*; and the reaction of orthodox factions among Indian Muslims against these developments becomes subsequent part of his studies. The discourse on political developments therefore have attained supplementary concern of the author; nonetheless, that for having author's distinct interpretational approach is impressive. The perspective that distinguishes him from Sibte Hassan and Mubarak Ali is that of micro-history. He gauges the orthodox and liberal temperaments of Muslim monarchs treating them individually (Javed 2010, 10-21), rather than offering generalized judgements that Sibte Hassan and Mubarak Ali seem to do. The historian however asserts that the rulers who diverted from the policy of religious tolerance had to face severe repercussion of their orthodox policies.

Qazi Javed's *Baresagheer Mein Muslim Fikar Ka Irtiqah* (1977)*, Hindi-Muslim Tahzeeb* (1979)*, Punjab Ka Sufi Danishwar* (2009)*, Punjab Di Sufiyana Rawayat* dialectically traces the progress in mystic thoughts of Muslim, which he contends were liberal and humanistic. Javed is an admirer of these ideas reflected by *Chishtiya* Sufis and exponents of *Bhakti* movement who often remained under stern criticism of orthodox *ulema* in the court migrating from Middle East and Central Asia after the military attacks of Mongols. Javed thought Sufis did not make any intentional efforts to convert non-Muslim; their adoptive, liberal and progressive ideas as well as conduct however impressed locals and developed harmony between Hindus and Muslim and eliminated social alienation of the people (Javed 1977: 18, 21-2, 26, 32, 43, 47, 196). Being threatened by that Islam in India was losing puritanical essence, the orthodox elements making alliance with the rulers tried to contain the situation. This victory of orthodoxy on philosophical grounds, he thinks,

could materialized by Sheikh Ahmad Sirhind's philosophical construction of *Wahdat-ul-Shahud*, an antithesis of *Wahad-ul-Wajood*, Politically, this was a war of succession between Aurangzeb and Dara Shikoh, the representative of orthodoxy and mystic tolerance, was final decisive war that resulted in the favor of the earlier and demise of the later.

Javed's enterprises *Ifkar-e Shah Waliullah* and *Hindu-Muslim Tahzeeb* discusses the causes of the political decline of Muslims in India and reflects upon the movements that attempted to contain it. Accordingly, Javed examines the renaissance movement of Shah Waliullah and admires his philosophy calling him Marx before Marx and the first Muslim thinker who had given importance to material realities for the degeneration of society. He nonetheless criticizes Shah Waliullah's pragmatic approach for declaring non-Muslims of India as the enemies of Indian Muslim community and provoking Indian nobles like Najibudullah and Afghan ruler Ahmad Shah Abdali to topple down Mughal rulers for the well-being of Indian Muslims (Javed 2009; 32, 75-80). He criticizes Shah Waliullah and the other movements inspired by his thoughts for their error of judgement: declaring Indian non-Muslims as their enemy rather than considering the Europeans so who afterwards appeared to end Muslim political might (Javed 1977, 209-10).

Critical Appreciation

The content matters in the literature offered by Marxist historians in Pakistan are hinged upon humanism, secularism, progressivism and social welfare, highlighting the problems and constraints that hampered development and consuetude of the values that they assume as aspiring and auspicious. One the other hand, the principal argumentation of Pakistani Nationalist historians' is based upon premises of Two Nations Theory, which explains the vulnerability of Indian Muslims against the Hindu community that comprises of numerical strength, glorifies the ideals of Muslims community, and asserts the solidarity and shared history of Indian Muslims with rest of Muslim world. They are mainly concerned with providing of justifications to the political stances and strategies of the Muslim rulers under their religious subjectivity and biasedness. Their narratives therefore are apologetic. Their attentions are to glorify the measures and policies Muslim rulers adopted, elaborating the effectiveness to broader mutual interests of Indians irrespective of religious

discriminations. The acts and policies of the rulers which non-Muslim historians as well as secular historians have called rulers' aggression are explained in the writings of Muslim Nationalist historians as the measures adopted under threat perceptions, an inevitable use of force for establishing peace.[14] Theoretically speaking, the differences of approach between both nationalist historians and Marxist historians in Pakistan are ontological and epistemological. Their adherence to the paradigm of idealism is the drive in the argumentation of Muslim Nationalist historians' discourse whereas the Marxists go for that of positivism.[15]

Muslim nationalist's favorable treatment of Muslim political, military and religious leadership or institutions is simply a manifestation of their idealist perception and worldview. It corresponds to the notion that how nationalist historians feel themselves faithful and loyal to their religious values dogmas and have sympathetic corner for those whom they perceive the national heroes having similar faith. The objectivity of such historians works within the subjectivity of that idealist paradigm. However, the positivist historians, who considers the reality exists materially, have secular mindset and their objectivity operates within their subjectivity of positivist framework. To them, all such actions that rulers or other historical figures had performed merely to satisfy their religious zeal are critical at all. However, it is interesting to see that the Pakistani historians, either nationalist or Marxist, have shown varied degree of their own religious inclination and accordingly the treatment of historical facts. Nationalist historians are though idealist but they have tried to prove their stances by using scientific jargon and reasoning. Whereas, the Marxist historians, despite going into materialist themes and secular reasoning,

[14] To see approaches and viewpoints of Muslim nationalist historians regarding the policies and the actions which are critical to Hindu nationalist historians, following undertaking of them may be consulted: S. M. Jaffar's *Some Cultural Aspects of Muslim Rule in India* (1950), I. H. Qureshi's *Ulema in Politics* (1972) and *The Muslim Community of the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent (610-1947)* (2003) and Suleiman Nadvi's *Arab-o-Hind Kay Ta'lokat* (this books is based on the lecture of renowned theologian Syed Suleiman Nadvi. Edited by Muhammad Shabir Qamar and published by Mushtaq Book Corner, the book is without publishing date). Similarly, S. M. Ikram's *A history of Muslim Civilization* (ed. 7th, 1997) and Waheed-uz-Zaman and M. Saleem Akhtar's edited book *Muslims in South Asia* (1993) can also be consulted.

[15] Here, the idealism and positivism are meant for philosophical approaches to acquisition of knowledge, both epistemologically and ontologically.

have also shown their religious affections somehow. So is however not a case with Mubarak Ali who rightly be regarded as a staunch secularist and seems not ready to offer the slightest compassion for religiosity.

The expressions suggesting the extent of inclination of Pakistani Marxist historians to religion on individual level is not same. Sibte Hassan though is quite positivist in his approach, since he considers that studying historical phenomenon by an approach of historical materialism leads us to concrete results. However, his assertion that secular is not meant for the negation of religion but the religious freedom to all on equal grounds takes him away from the fundamental atheist stance presented by Marx and Engels. His criticism is for religious orthodox elements and fanaticism, not for the humanistic approach demonstrated by Sufis as well as the *Ismailia* rulers of Multan whom he rather considers the upright forces against the oppression and aggression of their times. He venerates Sufis for presenting true image of Islam and criticizes the *Ulema* for its distortion (Hassan 1975: 200). Thus, he despite being positivist remains failed to jettison his religious subjectivity thoroughly and somehow tries to endorse idea that religion should be interpreted according to Marxist framework.

Mubarak Ali, nonetheless, is a core secular historian who observes, and condemns historians not to observe, historical phenomenon getting free of religious biasedness. He has shown his displeasure for the historians who have perceived and portrayed the Sufis as secular, arguing that the Sufis confessing and having staunch association to some faith cannot be regarded as secular, nor can they be expected to strive for enhancing inter-religious harmony (Ali 2002: 62-3).

The descriptions in the narratives of Qazi Javed are obscure, since prefaces of his undertakings are lacking to express his lucid stances, methodology to carry out his task, and the operational definitions of the terms that he frequently uses like orthodoxy. The blurred and daubed applications of the terms to the personalities and situations have made his description of the historical phenomenon equivocal. For instance, he describes that the Lodhi rulers were real fanatics and orthodox and adduces an event of the assassination of a Brahman monk, named as Budhan, during the reign of Sikandar Lodhi. The monk's fault was that he avowed that both Islam and Hinduism are religion comprising of truth. Muslim *Ulema* contended that by the time acknowledging the truth of Islam Budhan was a Muslim, and if he did not jettison his pervious

religion he should have given a capital punishment. Sultan Sikandar Lodhi acted in accordance to the demand of clergies of his court, for which he, according to Qazi Javed, was a religious fanatic and an orthodox ruler (Javed 1977: 34). Is a killing like this a part of religion? Is this an orthodoxy or something else? How far the ruler like Sikandar Lodhi was orthodox when he acts under the pressure of *Ulema*? Such are the questions needed to be clarified from the historian.

Each Pakistani Marxist Historian being discussed here has although interpreted secularism in his own way, the general consensus that can be found among them is that the state-affairs must be dealt with separating religion from politics. In contrastingly such, the pivotal point in the approach of nationalist historiographers is religion that they think provide satisfactory answers to all problems of human life. This therefore is a clash of worldview between both nationalist historians and Marxist historians, the worldviews that brook no ontological and epistemological oppositions. This clash of understanding however is theoretical, but reconcilable through much pragmatic approach pursuing harmony, peace and progress in the society. In other words, some new approaches having syncretic characteristics are needed, by rendering importance to broader mutual concerns of the masses of the land by developing respect and acceptance for opposite point of views. This sort of attempts can be discerned in the writings of Qazi Javed more than those of Sibte Hassan, but Mubarak Ali's writings provide more radical expression leaving no space for compromise with religious orthodoxy.

Marxist discourse in Pakistan is full of polemical issues. It is based upon the notion to awaken the human faculty of materialistic reasoning in a society where majority of the people are extremely religious and traditional. Mubarak Ali's justification for the institutions of prostitution or his appreciation for the freedom that the prostitutes enjoy as comparison with household ladies, or Sibte Hassan's anarchist stance that state is merely a tool of oppression, the harsh criticism of Qazi Javed and Sibte Hassan to religious icons such as Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi or Mubarak Ali's to Shah Wali Ullah, all that are the issues to which the people are sentimental. Such stances of them can surely bring about troubles to a historian and even put their lives at risk; the autobiographies of Marxist historians and writers certainly show consequent plight they have earned

in Pakistan.[16] Most of them nonetheless proved themselves brave enough to be consistent.

The mode of description in Marxist historical writings, though, is secular, the orthodox elements have been dealt with such a critical way that historians' own ideological biases and feelings of aberrance for clergy are ubiquitous. The vocabulary, phrases and statements to describe *Ulema*'s conduct, personalities, and the harsh treatment given to them by the rulers are greatly pejorative and derogatory expressions. The feelings of animosity historians have towards the class of clergy are however expressed artfully, using methodological instruments, under the realization of religiously extremist attitude of the society they write for. Insofar as, the derogatory phrases used in the primary sources they have selected to adduce, inside pair of quotation marks, as a safe way, describing the character and personalities of the perceived, by them, orthodox figures in medieval India (Hassan 1975: 198, 303-8, 325, 332; Javed 1977: 133, 140, 148).[17]

Among three historians being discussed here, Mubarak Ali is the only one who is professionally trained historian and has been teaching that subject at university level, whereas Sibte Hassan is educated in the discipline of journalism, and Qazi Javed in that of philosophy. Such backgrounds of them have given distinct colors to their writings, approaches to experience historical phenomenon and being reflected upon those. Hence, some of historiographical mistakes, at some places, such as the anachronism, for instance, can be observed in the writings of Sibte Hassan and Qazi Javed but not, or relatively least, in those of Mubarak Ali.[18]

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[16] Sibte Hassan's *Shehr-e-Nigaaran* (ed., 16th, 2008) and *Mughani-e-Aatish-e-Nafs* are autobiographic accounts that provide the details about the pain and sufferings that the author has borne for his ideological commitment. Mubarak Ali's autobiographies *Dar Dar Thokar Khaye* and *Meri Kahani* tells about what heavy costs he has paid for the scholarship which is assumed notorious in the circles where he has been working or wanted to work. Jamshaid Nayab the author of *Marx Aur Rousseau* became a victim of targeted killing for the ideas which were said to be atheists and against those which the general masses profess. These however are just few examples of those who got victimized for their radical ideas.

[17] For instance, Qazi Javed reports that Emperor Akbar got the *Ulema* creating troubles for him captured and sold them to Afghan ruler obtaining dinkies in return. The historian further supplements by making fun that "Afghan ruler had to concede for a deal of such big a loss" (Javed 1977: 84).

[18] Lamenting the political decline of Buddhism in India, Sibte Hassan narrates, "The

One of the criticism that can be raised against Marxist historiographical literature is that the historians have paid much focus on describing and commenting on historical issues one-sidedly—it is rare that they engage with the viewpoints and arguments of their opponents. If they do so, they have made a fun of them or showed their annoyance towards them.

This is very common to see in the writing of Mubarak Ali that he emphasized on the need to highlight the role of common people in the course of history. It can yet be noticed that he has written history with a viewpoint of common people but that is not the history of common people since his works are unable to probe historical role of them. The discernable hurdle in doing so is that the historians rare find primary data to fulfill that need, writing history with real subaltern concern and providing that satisfactory evidences from primary sources.

Despite such drawbacks, the most admirable thing about Marxist historiographical production in Pakistan is that the differences of opinions Marxist historians have offered and the different ways they approach history enhance an insight about the development of Muslims culture in India towards different angles to think. Further, the medium they adopted to produce most of their works is Urdu language, a language that is regarded as *lingua franca* in Pakistan. By doing so, they have therefore made remarkable contribution in enhancing the historical consciousness of common people. The reconciliation of the understanding of Marxist works of historical significance with conventional wisdom of the peoples of Pakistan indeed can produce some positive and progressive results, the results of dynamic approach. However, in modern times and in plural societies or in the societies being driven under the influence of opposite ideological orientation, any ideology which has been drawn upon by any reductionist approach[19] cannot be supposed to hold an appeal for the people belonging to a complexly compound society.

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decline of Buddhism was the darkest chapter in the history of Pakistan (Hassan 1975: 148). In the same vain, Qazi Javed venerating the political achievements of Raja Chach describes that he can rightly be said a first ruler of Pakistan (Javed 1979: 19).

[19] It would be more fallacious assumption that a reductionism, i.e. putting emphasis on single factor of high importance, would be remedy to the problems of a most complex society divided into all forms of vertical and horizontal divisions. Rather such society needs dynamic solutions to their problems.

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Silencing of Chishti Sufism in the National Narrative in Pakistan

Tanvir Anjum

Abstract

The Chishti Silsilah is one of the earliest sufi silsilahs introduced and popularized in India by Khwaja Mu'in al-Din Chishti of Ajmer (d. 627/1230). It is considered the most popular as well as most Indianized of all the sufi silsilahs of South Asia, as its sufi masters vernacularized the message of Islam and Sufism in local context. What made them particularly endearing was their conviction in 'love for all' and religious inclusiveness. However, the Muslim nationalist historical works in Pakistan selectively highlight the role of sufis (especially the Naqshbandis) in South Asia. The sufis are presented as 'missionaries' or proselytizers of Islam, and as reformists fostering separate Muslim identity and consciousness. There is historiographical silence on Chishti Sufism in these works, as none of the celebrated Chishti sufi masters find any mention in them, nor their contribution in developing a social ethos reflecting religious harmony and cultural assimilation of the elite Turco-Persian and the local popular Indian culture is acknowledged. The nationalist narrative tends to view the past through the lens of the present day values, norms and contemporary circumstances. In a bid to justify the Two-nation Theory based on Hindu-Muslim separatism, it cites select historical evidence, and presses data in the service of a nationalist agenda. Marred by reductionism, it projects a much distorted view of the past, completely ignoring the role and contribution of the Chishti sufis in South Asian social and cultural history. The present study investigates why there is historiographical silence on Chishti Sufism in Muslim nationalist historical narrative, and undertakes its critical analysis to explore its underlying assumptions and misrepresentations of the historical role of the sufis.

Nationalism as an ideology which emerged in eighteenth-century Europe in post-enlightenment era had far-reaching political implications, but as a discourse, it is closely linked to history and history-writing. In Europe, the concept of a national history developed when the Romanticist historians tried to write the history of their own nations (Baár 2010: 46-74). Systematic nationalist historiographical tradition, however, emerged in Germany during the nineteenth century. Nationalism as a political ideology became popular in South Asia during the twentieth century. However, in contrast to Europe where the bases of nationalism were territorial (along with the commonality of ethnicity, culture and language), in South Asia religion became the chief denominator for nationalism. So in addition to Indian nationalism, there emerged religiously defined variants of nationalism such as Hindu and Muslim nationalisms. It also led to communalization of history-writing in South Asia, giving birth to Hindu and Muslim communal histories. It was also a response to the dogmatic assertions of imperialist historiography largely produced in Orientalist framework during the colonial era. Elliot and Dowson's 8-vol *A History of India as Told by its Own Historians*, for instance, is said to have aroused "communal passions" (Mukhia 1983: 60), as not only Hindus and Muslims were imagined as two distinct and separate communities or nations, the two were also historically pitted against each other. What follows is a brief overview and critical analysis of the nationalist narrative in Pakistan:

1. The Nationalist Narrative in Pakistan: A Critical Overview

The nationalist narrative in Pakistan presents religion as the most important agent of change in the South Asian society and history. It projects two-nation theory on the basis of Hindu-Muslim differences, and provides a historical basis for it. Islam and Hinduism are presented as poles apart, further assuming a neat demarcation between the Hindu and Muslim communities in political, religious, social and cultural terms. It is argued that in pre-partition India, the Hindus and the Muslims lived as two completely separate and identifiable nations or communities, though they had lived as neighbours for centuries (Qureshi 1965: 3-5; Hameed 1967). The narrative argues for the presence of different nationalities in the Indian subcontinent which had made it "impossible for them to be fused into a single nation" (Pirzada 1970: xii-xiii), and all efforts to provide a

bridge between the Hindus and the Muslims had failed (Ikram 1965: 1; Qureshi 1977). The partition of India and the subsequent creation of Pakistan, presented as a natural outcome of the historical processes, is interpreted in the framework of Hindu-Muslim separatism. The narrative strictly follows a diachronic trend with an underlying assumption that the historical events taking place through the centuries inevitably lead to an assumed end, culminating in the creation of Pakistan. The interpretation is linear and teleological in nature (Hardy 1967: 309).

Attempts have been made to justify the ideology of Pakistan, based on Two Nation theory. The theory assumes Hindus and Muslims as two contrasting "nations" having entirely different religion, history, culture, language, social customs, and traditions. The nationalist narrative seeks to find continuities with the past. The Two-Nation Theory and the ideology of Pakistan are projected backwards into medieval South Asia, and the case of long-standing Hindu-Muslim rivalry has been highlighted. The Muslims and Hindus are imagined as two bounded religious communities having essentialized cores. There are frequent references to the Hindu mind/psyche/mentality, their machinations and intrigues, or Hindus as inferior beings (Aslam n.d.: 15-23). Islam and Hinduism are as mirror image of each other. This "othering" of the Hindus and Hinduism in South Asia (Kamran 2007: 93-122; Kamran 2005) has helped the nationalist historians define the own identity as Muslims.

Though the Pakistani national narrative primarily aims at fostering patriotism and love for the fellow Pakistanis (or Pakistani Muslims), it also promotes hatred against Hinduism as a faith and its adherents across the border in India. Being negatively fashioned, a reactive bigotry is the main pillar of Pakistani nationalism (Jalal 1995: 78, 80-81). That is why, Hinduism is presented as a false religion in contrast to Islam which is presented as a true religion having a divine origin. Hinduism is presented as a pagan religion with the idolatrous practices in contrast to the monotheism of Islam. With the help of selective historical data, the narrative glorifies the views of those South Asian scholars, who had expressed hostile views towards Hinduism, altogether ignoring the views of those Muslim scholars whose approach was characterized by conciliation and friendliness (Friedmann 1986: 79-91). If the views of latter scholars are referred to in the narrative, these are branded as heretical and/or heterodoxical.

In South Asia, the past has been used in a variety of ways to construct identity. For this purpose, varied genres and frames have been invoked through which the past has been viewed and also used to remake the present (Ali 1999; Guichard 2010). The national narrative imagines the communal identities in South Asia as rigid and fixed, with roots in ancient or medieval past, though communalism, as we know it in contemporary South Asia, is a modern phenomenon that emerged during the colonial times when nationalism took roots in the region (Pandey 1990). In pre-colonial times, the religious identities were not sharply defined. For the *ashraf* or the migrants, the ethnic identities such as Turkic or Persian identities were far more important than their religious identity (Talbot 2003: 83-117). The same is true for the Hindu identity, which was imagined and invented as a part of the colonial discourse (Thapar 1989: 209-31). Nonetheless, the nationalist narrative tries to prove that Indian Muslims were one single undifferentiated and monolithic nation. The historians projected their own religious identity as Muslim in their works. Thus, the tensions between the ideology of Muslim nationalism and the geographical limitations of the Pakistani nation-state are evident in their writings (Jalal 1995: 78). Highlighting the "unresolved tension between Islam and Indian nationalism" in their works, Hardy remarks that in most cases these historians chose to be Muslim first (Hardy 1967: 305).

In short, the nationalist historians of Pakistan have a strong communalist approach (Hardy 1967: 302). One must not forget that the term 'communal' has a specific meaning in Indian context. For Thapar, communalism in the Indian sense is

> a consciousness which draws on a supposed religious identity and uses this as the basis for an ideology. It then demands political allegiance to a religious community and supports a programme of political action designed to further the interests of that religious community. Such an ideology is of recent origin but uses history to justify the notion that the community (as defined in recent history) and therefore the communal identity have existed since the early past" (Thapar 1989: 209).

2. The Historical Role of the Sufis in South Asia, and the Nationalist Narrative

The nationalist narrative and textbook histories in Pakistan partly acknowledge the historical role of the sufis in South Asia. The portrayal of the sufis is selective and biased. Only a few sufi masters find a favorable mention in these works. The narrative fails to befittingly represent Sufism in its totality. By reviewing the representation (rather misrepresentation) of sufis in the nationalist narrative, one may discern the reasons for the silencing of the role played by the Chishti sufis. What follows is a brief discussion on it:

The nationalist narrative links the spread of Islam to the sufi activities, and portrays the sufis as 'missionaries' or proselytizers of Islam, who converted non-Muslims, particularly the Hindus, to Islam in large numbers. It offers some select instances from the lives of sufis propagating religious exclusivism (Ikram 1982: 231). The sufi-missionary equation first appeared in Arnold's *The Preaching of Islam*, published in 1913 (154-93), from where the Muslim nationalist historians uncritically borrowed it. Thus, the narrative gives the credit of conversion largely to the sufis, understood as 'missionaries' of Islam, comparable to the Catholic missions, which are purpose-specific groups with the mission or goal of conversion to Christianity. However, historically speaking, it would be erroneous to assume that all sufis were consciously and intentionally involved in the process of conversion. Many sufis, particularly the Chishtis, did not consider conversion to Islam as a pre-requisite for an individual's spiritual development. Moreover, conversion to Islam in South Asia, as shown by Eaton, was not always a conscious act; it was a glacial process, in which multiple agents played their role, and that mass conversion often lacked conviction (Eaton 1985: 106-23).

The nationalist histories present the sufis as reformers of Islam with puritanical goals, trying to purify Islam of all Hindu accretions, which is said to have eventually fostered separate Muslim identity and consciousness. Fearing complete assimilation of the Muslims in Hindu majority, the Muslims leaders including the sufi masters strove to preserve their separate identity, and thus saved them from merging in Hinduism. The foremost among them is the Naqshbandi sufi, Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi, invariably referred to as 'Mujaddid Alf Thani' (The Reviver of the Second Millennium). He is believed to have played a very crucial role

in preserving the separate Muslim identity (Aslam 1974: 75-80). His anti-Hindu stance is appreciated and magnified, whereas his sympathetic views regarding Hindus and Hinduism, which he developed later in his life (Mujeeb 1967: 244; Friedmann 1971: 74-75), are conveniently skipped. Other reformers and champions of separate Muslim identity include Shah Abdul Aziz (the son of Shah Wali-Allah), Syed Ahmad Barelvi, who initiated Jihad Movement along with Shah Ismail Shaheed, and others such as Dadu Mian, Syed Nisar Ali (Titu Mir) and Haji Shariat-Allah, who initiated 'Faraizi' movement in Bengal (Qureshi 1977: 218-39; Bari 1957: 542-55; Ahmad n.d.: 3). Shah Abdul Aziz's ruling that the Muslims in South Asia should avoid using copper utensils which were generally used by the Hindus (Aslam n.d.: 22), is presented as a conscious attempt to preserve the separate Muslim identity in cultural terms.

The nationalist narrative also considers the Mughal Emperor, Aurengzeb Alamgir as a reformer and champion of Islam, who was influenced by the views of Sirhindi and his successors, and thus lauds his efforts in this regard. Qureshi interprets the war of succession between Dara Shikoh (executed 1659) and Alamgir, the sons of Mughal Emperor Shahjahan (r. 1628-58), as a conflict between the forces of heterodoxy and orthodoxy respectively. In his opinion, victory of the orthodox and puritanical Alamgir proved to be the "political culmination of the Mujaddidi movement" (Qureshi 1972: 98), since he tried to purge Islam in India of "un-Islamic accretions…" (Ahmad n.d.: 2; Aslam n.d.: 17). The efforts of Shah Wali-Allah, who invited Ahmad Shah Abdali to crush Maratha power in the Third Battle of Panipat, 1761, are appreciated, while Syed Ahmad Barelvi and Shah Ismail Shaheed who fought against the Sikhs, are presented as the holy warrior sufis. In addition, the role of the *sajjadah-nashin*s (custodians of sufi shrines) and *pirs* who supported the demand for Pakistan such as the Pir Muhammad Abdus Sattar Khan Niazi (b. 1915-2001) of Manki Sharif and Pir Abdul Latif of Zakori Sharif (1916-78) is also approvingly acknowledged.

Bhakti Movement originating in the sixth century AD does not find a favourable mention in the nationalist narrative, and misinterpreted as an attempt to merge Islam and Hinduism (Ikram 1952: 529-31). Writing about the effects of Bhakti Movement, Qureshi writes that "if Islam and Hinduism were the same, then the Muslims had no reason to be proud of their faith; if this pride was gone, the Muslims had no other loyalty to keep

them from absorption into Hinduism…" (Qureshi 1977: 136-37). To Qureshi, Bhakti movement was "more dangerous" as it was subtle, and under its garb, Hinduism could absorb Islam and Muslims in South Asia (Qureshi 1957: 22). The nationalist narrative fails to understand and appreciate the core message, teachings and impacts of Bhakti Movement in creating peace and inter-faith harmony in South Asia.

While acknowledging the contribution of a handful of sufis, the nationalist narrative holds the sufis responsible for corrupting the Islamic beliefs in South Asia. Qureshi, for instance, associates heresy with Sufism in historical perspective, and argues that the sufis had borrowed un-Islamic heretical ideas such as belief in metempsychosis, incarnation and pure immanence from the Hindus, and thus corrupted the Islamic beliefs. Eminent sufis like Hallaj are condemned for expressing "opinions which were patently heretical" (Qureshi 1977: 145). He further adds that there was "sub-conscious acceptance of some notions that were not Islamic in origin", and "Sufism could give cover to many ideas which were unacceptable to the orthodox…" (Qureshi 1977: 146, 147). In particular, Prince Dara Shikoh, who was an accomplished Qadiri sufi theosophist and author, is presented as a heretic, and strongly condemned for his heterodox views. He is almost portrayed as a villain—an infidel or unbeliever, who preached heretical views through his writings, most notably *Majma' al-Bahrayn* [The Confluence of Two Oceans]. However, S. M. Ikram is among those few nationalist historians who argue that Dara was not an unbeliever or infidel (1958: 397-410). Dara is primarily villianized as his views are interpreted as a challenge to the separate Muslim identity. As a matter of fact, the said work was merely an attempt to harmonize the Hindu-Muslim relationship by highlighting the similarities between the esoteric traditions of Islam (Sufism) and Hinduism (Vedantism).

The narrative also links decline of the political power of the Mughals to the degeneration of Sufism, as Sufism is believed to have become an "escapist philosophy of life" during the eighteenth-century (Husain 1957: 571). Ikram, while focusing on the social, religious and cultural history of the Muslim community, (unlike other nationalist historians who have merely focused on the political and military aspects), holds the non-conformist Sufism (sufis who apparently do not conform to the social norms or the norms of *shariah*) responsible for the decay of the Muslims (Ikram 1958). Regarding the influence of sufis among South

Asian Muslims, a historian comments: "Popular Islam which was a compromise between the pristine simplicity of Islam and the superstition ridden belief in charms and magic, while *pirs* imported innumerable rituals and beliefs into Islam..." (Rashid 1993: 102). The narrative views the vernacularization and indigenization of the message of Islam and Sufism, most notably associated with the Chishti sufis in India, as vulgarization of Islam. For instance, Aziz Ahmad views Shaykh Musa Sada Suhag's transvestite behaviour, which was a practical manifestation of the idea of God's bride, through his puritanical lens as 'vulgarization' of sufi practices in Indian social context (1964: 161).

The renowned sufi philosophies of *Wahdat al-shahud* (unity of manifestations; also referred to as Monism) and *Wahdat al-Wujud* or *Tawhid-i Wujudi* (unity of Being/Existence), and their dialectical relation is often highlighted in the nationalist narrative. But it is highly critical of the philosophy of *Wujud* (Qureshi 1977: 144-46), which postulates that God and His creation are one, and thus there is no fundamental difference between a believer and unbeliever at ontological level. The *Wujudi* philosophy is believed to "undermine the fundamentals of Islam and the integrity of the Muslim society … calculated to obliterate all distinction between belief and unbelief. [The] misguided mystics, taking inspiration from non-Islamic sources, held up to ridicule the Islamic tenets and beliefs…" (Ahmad n.d.: 1-2). The philosophy of *Wahdat al-Wujud* supports the claim of the ultimate unity of all religions (*wahdat-i adyan*), which in the words of Qureshi, was "the main weapon in the armoury of Hinduism against Islam" (1957: 23). Since this philosophy is seen as a contradiction of Hindu-Muslim separatism preached by the narrative, it is presented as a marginalized discourse in medieval South Asia, despite the fact that a vast majority of sufis advocated it.

The nationalist narrative selectively highlight the role of some select Naqshbandis sufis. More accommodative Naqshbandi sufis such as Fazl Rahman Ganjmoradabadi (d. 1895) do not find any mention in these works (Ganjmuradabadi 1990), while those who are generally known for their puritanical zeal, insistence on strict observance of *shariah*, and alienation from the Hindus are in focus. In particular, Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi's efforts to popularize *Wahdat al-shahud* are lauded, as he is said to have exposed the falsity of *Wujudi* philosophy and its dangerous implications for the Muslim society, and thus "saved Islam from

contamination and distortion" (Ahmad n.d.: 1-2). *Shahudi* philosophy distinguishes between the Creator and the creation, and hence the believer and unbeliever, and is therefore directly linked to the latter-day Muslim separatism (Ikram 1958: 259-79). It is against this backdrop that one may discern the historigraphical silence of Chishti Sufism in the nationalist narrative.

3. Understanding the Silencing of Chishti Sufism in the Nationalist Narrative of Pakistan

Silence is understood as an absence or a gap; it is a loss of voice as well as loss of power, and generally seen as negative. Silence can be intentional or unintentional, and it can be imposed by varied agencies. Sometimes silence is institutionalized and deeply embedded in varied social and political structures, as well as historiographical traditions, or schools of historians. In case of Pakistani nationalist historiography, there are multiple blanks in it, and certain episodes of history seem shrouded in silence. This master narrative provides shared frameworks for nationalist historians. There seem to be a commonly accepted attitude of silence among them towards a host of issues and themes, Sufism and the role of sufis, particularly of the Chishtis, being one of them. The nationalist historians share a 'culture of silence,' which might also be termed as a 'conspiracy of silence,' as they seem to have had an unspoken consensus or an unstated agreement to remain silent on issues or evidence contrary to the two-nation theory or the ideology of Pakistan. The threat of political oppression and dire consequences for their personal and professional life have seriously compromised their neutrality and impartiality. Such attempts at nationalizing the past amid institutionalized silence are characterized by deployment of selective memory, and hence, selective amnesia.

The Chishti *Silsilah* (or spiritual order) is one of the earliest sufi *silsilah*s, founded in about 318/930 in Chisht, a small town near Herat in present day western Afghanistan, by Abu Ishaq Shami, "the Syrian," (d. 328/940), but introduced and popularized in India by Khwaja Mu'in al-Din Chishti of Ajmer (d. 627/1230). It is considered the most popular as well as most Indianized and "most humane and peaceful" (Jaffer 2008: 109) of all the sufi *silsilah*s that flourished in South Asia, as its masters enjoyed popular appeal, and tried to vernacularize the message of Islam

and Sufism in local context. Vernacularization of Islam is the process through which the message and teachings of Islam adjusted and adapted in local regional environments, particularly in the non-Arab regions. In these non-Arab lands where Islam spread, it promised enough flexibility and accommodation to be adjusted in varied socio-cultural backgrounds. Consequently, the universal principles of Islam were vernacularized in specific time and space, and contextualized or localized forms and expressions of Muslim piety emerged in these regions. Owing to the geographical and cultural variations, diverse manifestations of Islam can be seen in these regional settings. Many practices associated with Islam reflect the indigenous social and cultural traditions. For many *shariah*-minded sufis, vernacularization appeared to be "diluting Islam with paganism" but despite such criticism, the Chishti sufis were willing to take that risk (Green 2012: 111).

In South Asia, what particularly made the Chishti sufis endearing was their conviction in 'love for all' and religious inclusiveness, rooted in their belief in transcendent unity of all religions. In this regard, historically speaking, the Chishti sufis in South Asia may be viewed as the faithful custodians of the teachings of the renowned thirteenth-century sufi philosopher, Ibn al-'Arabi, particularly his thesis of the transcendent unity of religions (Umar 2008: ii). According to it, despite multiplicity of outward forms and ritualistic expressions, there exists unity of the inner meaning or essence of all religions, since all world religions share a common divine origin (Schuon 2011). That is why, the Chishti sufis have been acclaimed as the champions of Hindu-Muslim unity in South Asia, along with the Qadiri and Shattari sufis. There is a general consensus among the scholars of Sufism that the Chishti sufis were not involved in conversion of the non-Muslims to Islam either by proselytization or by persuasion (Ernst 2002; Ernst 2004: 187-206; and Islam 2002). Many of them did not believe in religious conversion *per se*; they believed that salvation is not the prerogative of the Muslims alone, and thus others could also attain it, and hence, saw no need to convert.

The Chishti sufis advocated and popularized the philosophy of *wahdat al-wujud*, not merely with an instrumentalist view of achieving Hindu-Muslim unity, it was an integral part of their worldview. Their writings were often informed by the Hindu texts and religious literature as well as local customs and traditions. Nonetheless, in the nationalist

narrative, one never finds the recognition of Chishti services for inter-faith harmony such as the interpretative translation of *Bhagvad Gita* in Persian (titled *Mirat al-haqaiq*) by a seventeenth-century Chishti sufi, Abd al-Rahman (d. 1683) (Vassie 1992). Its target readership was Persian-speaking Turco-Persian Muslim elite, and was aimed at creating better understanding of Hinduism among them.

Similarly, the Chishti contribution in developing a social ethos reflecting religious harmony and cultural assimilation of the migrant Turco-Persian/elite and the local popular Indian culture is not acknowledged. Similarly, the contribution of Chishti affiliates like Amir Khusrau (d. 1325), a harbinger of Hindu-Muslim unity, in the realm of culture (such as the development of classical music theory by synthesizing the Indian and Persian musical traditions, and the invention of musical melodies and instruments) and literature (including sufi and folk poetry) (Kumar 2006) is completely ignored. Scholars like Khusrau played a great role in cultural assimilation of the migrant Turco-Persian and the local Indian cultures, but it is never acknowledged.

Many sufis of South Asia, particularly those belonging to the Chishti tradition, are credited with vernacularization of the message of Islam and Sufism. The sufis preferred to converse in local dialects than Persian (the court language) or Arabic (the language of formal religious instruction). Many of them including Baba Farid (d. 1271) also prescribed *dhikr* (recollection of God) to the native people in local languages (Jehanabadi 1308 AH: 25). Shah Fakhr al-Din of Delhi (d. 1784) argued that the *khutba* (sermon) before the Friday congregational prayers should be read in Hindawi language (Dehlavi 1315 AH: 23). Many of them composed poetry in vernacular languages to disseminate the teachings of Sufism through popular songs (Smith 2008). Despite the tremendous contribution of the Chishti sufis in South Asia at social, cultural, religio-spiritual, intellectual, and philosophical levels, it is unfortunate that the nationalist narrative is almost silent on the historical role of Chishti Sufism in South Asia, and the Chishti sufis are dismissed in a few pages (Ikram 1958: 66-75). The Chishti sufis appear to speak from the margins in the nationalist narrative. Their suppressed voices have been unrecorded by historians. The dominant or master narrative cannot absorb the role and contribution of Chishti sufis in South Asian society and culture. Historical evidence pertaining it does not fit the master narrative. For this reason, one

does not come across a single reference to any of the celebrated Chishti masters in the nationalist historical works. These works are silent about the conformist Chishti sufis such as Khwaja Moin al-Din Chishti of Ajmer, Qutb al-Din Bakhtiyar Kaki (d. 1236), Baba Farid, Nizam al-Din Awliya (d. 1325), Nasir al-Din Chiragh-i Delhi (d. 1356), Bandanawaz Gesudiraz (d. 1422), Muhibb-Allah of Allahabad (d. 1648), Kalim-Allah of Delhi (d. 1729), Fakhr al-Din of Delhi (d. 1784), Nur Muhammad Maharvi (d. 1793), Muhammad Sulaiman of Taunsa (d. 1850), what to talk of the libertine or non-conformist ones such as Ala al-Din Sabir of Kalyar (d. 1291), or Shaykh Musa 'Sada Suhag' of Ahmadabad, Gujarat (d. 1449).

In particular, the pluralistic and accommodative teachings of Chishti Sufism are not adequately highlighted in the nationalist narrative including the textbook histories, and instead a very different and sketchy picture of their historical role is presented. There is a need to encourage revisionist perspectives on the role of the sufis, particularly the Chishti sufis, in South Asia. The plethora of Chishti sufi literature offers a non-statist discourse, can be explored for articulating the diverse voices in South Asian history. Unfortunately, the nationalist narrative has made the readers to believe in the absence of these diverse voices. Many people assume the anti-statist discourse such as the one offered by the Chishti sufi sources to be marginalized, but the alternative sources of history like the sufi literature reveals it to be part of a mainstream discourse. The present study is an attempt to explain the silence on Chishti Sufism in the nationalist narrative, while highlighting the richness and complexity of the diverse voices associated with Chishti Sufism in South Asian history.

Master narratives can sometimes be layered, and there can be narratives within narratives. Among the nationalist historians writing invariably on political and military history, S M Ikram and Aziz Ahmad seem to be exceptions, as they wrote on themes in social and cultural history. Historically, Sufism has had a tremendous influence in the development of South Asian society and culture. Nonetheless, Ikram and Ahmad judged the trends in social and cultural history through the culturally dominant narrative, privileging conformist Sufism and discrediting all expressions of non-conformist Sufism.

The knowledge-power nexus as revealed by Michel Foucault suggests that knowledge production, including the production of historical narratives, cannot be separated from power. Foucault, who challenged the conventional historical thinking, and viewed the past from a new perspective, maintained that the mechanisms of power and its exercise have never been much studied by historians, who have largely focused on studying those who held power, and so there are anecdotal histories of kings and generals (Foucault 1980: 51). It has been asserted that the "production of historical narratives involves the uneven contribution of competing groups and individuals who have unequal access to the means of such production…The ultimate mark of power may be its invisibility; the ultimate challenge, the exposition of its roots" (Trouillot 1995: xix) The present study is also an attempt to unmask the politics behind the silencing of Chishti Sufism in the nationalist narrative of Pakistan.

Contemporary Context: Challenges and Impediments

Sufism is generally considered the 'soft side of Islam', a variant of Islam that is liberal, non-dogmatic, non-violent and accommodative. This universalist sufi worldview which transcends religious exclusivism, and advocates for religious inclusiveness has tremendous social implications. This view imparts an increased openness for recognizing multiplicity of views and accommodation of differences. This view urges for a non-communal approach towards people professing other faiths. It preaches conciliatory attitude towards other religious philosophies and systems, and propagates reverence for all sacred scriptures. It also encourages universal respect for the priests and spiritualists belonging to other religious traditions. The Chishti sufi worldview regarding the so-called 'religious others' can serve as a basis for promoting global peace and harmony.

Owing to the misrepresentation of Hinduism in the nationalist narrative, a majority of the Pakistanis believe that Hinduism is a false religion with no divine origin or book or prophet. It is loathsome and despiseable to them, and it has often resulted in the maltreatment of Hindu minorities living in the country. Interestingly, an average Pakistani does not despise Christianity and Judaism (treated as Abrahamic faiths as mentioned in the Quran), the way he despises Hinduism, for it is perceived at large as the religion of their arch enemy. Moreover, keeping in view the increasing religious radicalism and extremism in contemporary Pakistani

society, often referred to as 'Talibanization,' which has led to increasing maltreatment of the religious and sectarian minorities, and the growing ideological rejection of Sufism in the wake of proliferation of Saudi-funded Deobandi-Wahabi *madaris* (religious seminaries) in the country, it seems all the more challenging as well as promising to study and undertake research on the message and the historical contribution of Sufism, particularly of Chishti Sufism, in South Asia.

Critics often suggest that Pakistanis have become hostage to the past the nationalist narrative has constructed for them. The textbook history taught at schools and colleges in Pakistan is seen responsible, among other factors, for the rising religious radicalism in society. In the words of a critic: "In the absence of any other point of view, these textbooks are making the young generation narrow minded and prejudiced and…intoxicated by the fundamentalism…they seek violence to solve their disputes" (Ali 1998: 109).

Last but not the least, the question of retrieval is integral to the issue of silence. As Fivush reminds: "what is voiced becomes privileged in memory and what is silenced becomes more and more difficult to recall" (2010: 91) as well as difficult to believe in. Keeping in view the contemporary context, it seems more and more challenging to salvage the history of Chishti Sufism since its retrieval is not simple. An average Pakistani student of history or a reader may find it very troublesome to accept certain historical facts associated with Chishti Sufism. Nonetheless, it holds a promise for a better future for them since the past may offer an inspiration to the people.

Concluding Remarks

The production of nationalist historical narrative in Pakistan, which invents the past in many ways, is inextricably linked to power. The political and military leadership in the country has promoted the nationalist narrative as it serves its interests. Apart from fostering patriotism and national integration, the political and military leadership in the country believes that history has a definite role to play; and it can well-serve the contemporary political needs. The nationalist historical narrative tends to view the past through the lens of the present day values, norms and contemporary circumstances. In a bid to justify the ideology of Pakistan and Two-nation Theory based on Hindu-Muslim separatism,

these works cite select historical evidence, and press data in the service of a nationalist agenda. Marred by reductionism, they project a much distorted view of the past, completely ignoring the role and contribution of the Chishti sufis in South Asian social and cultural history.

There seems to be *politics* behind the deliberate silencing of Chishti Sufism in nationalist historical narrative. In Pakistan, the use of history as a tool has been promoted in order to achieve political ends such as legitimizing the military and political regimes by means such as Islamizing the teaching of history, among others, or justifying huge defense budget by encouraging anti-India and anti-Hindu rhetoric in nationalist narrative. Islam has been presented as the most important determinant of historical change throughout the South Asian history, the anti-India and anti-Hindu rhetoric is made to appear as historically rooted in the experiences of the South Asians. This institutionalized silence on Chishti Sufism needs to be broken by highlighting the richness and complexity of the diverse voices associated with Chishti Sufism in South Asian history. In Pakistan, the plurality of historical narratives need to be acknowledged and celebrated, not merely in academia but also at popular and state levels, and all narratives be allowed to coexist together.

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* This article is based on a paper presented at an International Conference titled "Trending Pakistan: New Approaches to the Study of History" held on April 28-29, 2016 at Arizona State University (ASU), USA, jointly organized by ASU & the American Institute for Pakistan Studies (AIPS). The author expresses her gratitude for the AIPS for awarding a travel grant for attending it, as well as the participants for their valuable feedback.

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-10-

Religion and Society – Redefining the Role of Sufi Shrines in Politics: A Study in NA-165, Pakpattan District, Pakistan

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Abstract

Sufi shrines are followed largely by rural population of Pakistani Punjab. Most of the Punjabi population consists of rural settings. Owing to large rural followings, the Sufi descendants possess strong social, cultural, religious and political positions in a Punjabi society. The purpose of the study was to investigate the role of Sufi shrines in politics to see how the current Sufi descendants translate shrine based religious power into political one. The study describes a nexus with in religion, society and politics by critically examining that how structural (socio-political and religious) factors make current Sufi descendants politically dominant. The study also discusses the consequences of multifaceted- socio-political and religious supremacy of current Sufi descendants in contemporary socio-political landscape of Punjab, Pakistan. Qualitative research methods such as semi-structured and unstructured interviews, key informants and participant observation were used for data collection. To analyse data, thematic approach with framework analysis was used.

Background

The evolution of Sufism in Islamic mythology contains multifaceted metamorphoses (Chittick 2000; Khanam 2006). Chittick (2000) and Khanam (2006) discuss the Sufi institutions and state that in the early days of Sufism, there were many Sufi masters with their *murids* but without any institutionalised movement. However, in 11th and 12th centuries this movement began to be established in proper orders or chains (Chittick 2000; Khanam 2006; Hassanali 2009). There were four major Sufi orders (*silsilas*)[1]. The first Qadri order (*silsila e Qadria*) was established by Shaykh Abdul Qadir Jilani (1071-1166 AD). The second order was

[1] An order or chain of a particular institution of Sufism.

Suhrawardi, founded by Abu' l Najib Suhrawardi (1098-1168 AD). The third was Naqshbandi order founded by Khwaja Baha' ud din Naqshbandi (1318-1389 AD) and the fourth major order was Chishti (*silsila e Chishtia*) founded by Khwaja Muinuddin Chishti (d. 1236) in Ajmer (Aziz 2001; Chittick 2000; Khanam 2006).

However, there is a growing interest in Sufism in Pakistan (Ewing 1983; Hassan 1987; Buehler 1997; Khanam 2006; Rehman and Lund-Thomsen 2014). Most of the studies advocate Sufism as a cause of love, peace, humanity, interfaith harmony, asceticism, cultural harmony, social support, economic redistribution and fulfillment of spiritual devotion and religious desires in Pakistani communities (Idris and Ahmed 2011; Kurin 1983; Rehman and Lund-Thomsen 2014). On the contrary, some other studies show that Sufism in Pakistan is a cause to identity crisis, sectarianism, terrorism and politico-religious clashes (Hassan 1987; Rehman 2006; Rozehnal 2006; Epping 2013). Epping (2013) demonstrates that in modern nation-state of Pakistan, with the emergence of different religious movements like Barelvi Movement in the 19th century, Tablighi Jamat, Sunni Itehad Council and Thanvi Movement, Sufism stands at cross roads splitting into two major Islamic forms a) popular Islam b) reformist form of Islam ushering to latter assumption.

However, many scholars have discussed the role of Sufi shrines in politics in South Asian landscape (Mayer 1967; Aziz 2001; Ali 2005). These studies focused on various aspects – direct and indirect involvement of Sufi saints and their descendants in politics, their influential status in the eye of rulers and ruler's patronage and revenues, by the value of their large local followings. And in exchange, these descendants used to give political support to the rulers in medieval period (Ewing 1983; Aziz 2001 and Ali 2005). Moreover, Ali (2005) while describing the political status of descendants (*sajjada nashins*)[2] in the British period, argues that the British recognised the local authority of *sajjada nashins* and entitled them with high class privileges, large land tracts and patronage to implement their bureaucratic policies. In this regard, the *sajjada nashins*, with their inherited religious authority, gained large scale of land which transformed them into the feudal lords in rural areas of Indo-Pakistan (Ali 2005). After the partition of India, in Pakistan, these *sajjada nashins* of popular shrines

[2]*Sajjada nashin* refers to a guardian or representative of a Sufi shrine.

in Punjab, Taunsa Sharif, Multan, Pakpattan and Jhang, have also attracted the attention of Pakistan's leaders. Some leaders have tried to control and, somehow, to replace the traditional authority of shrines by using shrines as the platform of social welfare but these efforts proved useless. It was because, these leaders began to use Sufi shrines for their political support (Ewing 1983; Aziz 2001; Ali 2005).

Thus, over the time, state patronage had let the *sajjada nashins* establish a strong political authority, through their inherited religious power and feudalism in rural areas, especially, in the Punjab and Sindh. These Sufi descendants of eminent Sufis have also been participating in electoral politics since the pre-partition to until recently in Pakistan (Aziz 2001). In this regard, these *descendants* have been an obstacle, especially, to local socio-political development in Pakistan as argued by Lieven (2011) that the *sajjada nashins* of Punjab's shrines do not genuinely advance local democracy to maintain their influence and control over local masses.

In the Punjab, Sufi shrines seem to have gained socio-cultural and religious importance. The Punjabi society, especially rural one, has extreme patronage for Sufi shrines and the Sufi descendants. There are many factors which cause the rural population to follow the *sajjada nashins* and *pirs*. These include low literacy rates, religious identity, feudalism and political economy (bulk of revenue of shrine collecting from rural people and spending back upon them for political cause) (Aziz 2001; Lieven 2011; Malik and Mirza 2015).

However, existing literature regarding shrines' role in local politics in Pakistan assumes religion as a major source of political status of Sufi shrines and Sufi descendants. The present study investigates religious factor and beyond religion it also investigates socio-political structure – social, cultural and political factors which help Sufi descendants to maintain their strong political position. The study also investigates, critically, the consequences of political stewardship of Sufi descendants in current socio-political landscape.

Review of Literature

The present study is about the question of political dynamics of above-mentioned shrines of saints at very local level. It is because; the *sajjada nashins* of Sufi shrines exert huge political power in a Pakistani society,

especially in rural areas (Aziz 2001 and Ali 2005). They derive this power from their large followings. According to the Sufi rituals, the followers (*murids*) are supposed to obey their spiritual masters (*murshids*) and this allegiance gives high and powerful status to the *murshid* (Werbner 1995). Thus the *murshid*, according to Sufi traditions, becomes traditional leader having huge power. As Taylor (2012) cited Max Weber's concept of leadership that

"Traditional authority typically depends on holding a traditionally sanctioned office, such as monarchy".

This traditionally sanctioned office has strong and deep roots in socio political structure of Subcontinent. According to Anjum (2014), the involvement of Sufi saints in politics bears various dynamics throughout the history of Subcontinent. Contrary to the assumption that the Sufi saints had been stayed aloof from rulers and political entities, it is historically evident that the Sufi saints used to gain political authority through their spiritual kingdom. Though, these founders of Sufi orders were not involved in organised or explicit politics but it was a belief, widely held in medieval period that without saint's blessing, the rulers were unable to rule (Ali 2005). In the pre Mughal Sultanate of India, the Sufi saints claimed that the king was endowed with political power because of their blessings and the people admitted this claim (Aziz 2001). It was a belief, widely held, that Iltutmish (died 1236) was blessed by Khawaja Muinuddin Chishti, Ghiasuddin Balban (died 1287) was blessed by Shaikh Fariduddin Ganj-i-Shakkar, and Muhammad Tughlaq (died 1351) was blessed by Shaikh Nizamuddin Auliya (Aziz 2001).

This widely held belief among the masses gave absolute authority to the Sufi saints that they started claiming that nothing in this world could happen without the permission of a *pir*, and religious practices were needless without following a *murshid* or *pir* (Ali 2005). Thus Sufi saints had got full-fledged authority in the worldly and religious lives of the masses. According to Aziz (2001), once Nizamuddin Auliya told his disciples: if there are two persons, one performs all his religious duties but has no *pir* and the other performs his religious duties and has a *pir* as well, the later one is better than the former.

However, owing to this blind belief of masses in Sufi saints, the rulers used to get support from these saints to maintain their throne strong (Ali 2005). The saints also took full advantage of their religious authority

in the minds of local people and gained wide patronage from the rulers (Ali 2005). This *pir*-ruler tie was beneficial to both the saints and the rulers. This was indirect politics between Sufi saints and the rulers. The saints used to give huge support to the rulers via their large local followings as Ali (2005) demonstrates that in the Sultanate period, the Sufi saints used to advise their followers to obey the rulers. Some scholars are of the view that this kind of role of Sufi saints was helpful to maintain peace and stability of the state (Anjum 2014). Anjum (2014) further says that in the Sultanate period, the Sufi saints used to play an important role as mediators. They used to protect state from anarchism and people from the rulers' oppression (Anjum 2014).

Anyhow, the role of mediation or the role of power broking gave a sustained authority to Sufi saints and their descendants over local people and the rulers as well. The saints used to give, implicit, political support to the rulers to maintain their rule and the rulers, in exchange, used to give revenue, land and other socio-economic benefits to the saints to maintain their spiritual kingdom (Aziz 2001; Ali 2005 and Hassnali 2009). However, the early Sufi saints, Khawaja Muinuddin Chishti, Shaikh Fariduddin Ganj-i-Shakkar and Shaikh Nizamuddin Auliya were not involved in explicit or direct politics. There are not clear historical evidences about whether their mediatory role was purely for the well-being of masses, peace and stability or for their personal benefits. In this case, two groups of scholars emerged in the arena of scholarly debate regarding the role of early Sufi saints. One group of scholars is of the view that the early Sufi saints stayed aloof from politics and worldly power, they played their role of mediation purely for the well-being of the masses (Chittick 2000; Khanam 2006). The other group of scholars is of the view that these early saints used to gain socio-economic benefits from the rulers to upkeep their *khanqahs*[3] (Aziz 2001; Ali 2005 and Hassnali 2009).

When it comes to the descendants of these early Sufi saints, there are clear evidences about their involvement in direct politics as Aziz (2001), Ali (2005) and Eaton (1984) give evidences of the direct involvement of Sufi descendants in politics. The descendants of Suhrawardi order used to enjoy governorship and administrative control in Multan (Aziz 2001) and the descendants of Chishti order used to enjoy

[3] A Sufi hospice – a meeting place of *murshid* and *murids*

this control in Pakpattan, Depalpur and Faisalabad or Lylpor (Eaton 1984).

Afterwards, in Mughal dynasties, these descendants became well established and powerful (Ali 2005). Aziz (2001) describes their status in a way;

> The Mughal state, in spite of its efficient provincial administration, prompts revenue collection, a disciplined mansabdari[4] system and the concentration of all real authority in a person of the Emperor – in spite of all these advantages of 'modern' political mechanism – added to the status of the pir by extending to him its support, recognition and patronage.

Gilmartin (1988) further says that in pre British days, the administration of justice was in the hands of local chieftains and in most of the areas, the descendants of Sufis had been established as local chieftain due to their inherited spiritual status and large tracts of land.

In this result, the relationship of power between the saints and rulers made the saints and their descendants (*sajjada nashins*) not only the local celebrities but also the imperial entities in the region. This connection with state also gave an official recognition to their religious authority and it made them political figures as well (Gilmartin 1988).

The state, for the legitimacy, stability and peace, often turned to the *pirs*. The Sultans of Dehli, the Mughals and the British could not have ruled without the administrative support of *pirs*. The process of gaining *pirs*' loyalty through land and privileges continued and multiplied in the British period (Gilmartin 1988).

The British recognised the religious and political influence of Sufi descendants among the local people (Ali 2005). After they annexed Punjab in 1849, they decided to use this religious and political influence of Sufi descendants for governance (Gilmartin 1988 and Ali 2005). They manipulated these descendants in their administrative mechanism by giving them more patronage as control over local people, large tracts of land and privileges (Gilmartin 1988 and Ali 2005). These descendants were also given the portfolios of *ziladar*,[5] magistrate and membership of district boards in some districts, Pakpattan, Jhang, Muzaffargarh and Multan, of Punjab (Gilmartin 1988 and Aziz 2001).

[4] Administrative system of Mughals, introduced by Akbar.
[5] District administrators.

Besides this, the *pirs* were also given many other privileges at local and provincial level (Gilmartin 1988 and Aziz 2001). At local level, they were endowed with the municipal committee of their towns, boards of their districts and local administrative committees as well. And at provincial or higher level, they were nominated for the provincial council, imperial Legislative Council or Indian Legislative Assembly and the Council of the state (Gilmartin 1988 and Aziz 2001). They were honoured in many ways having titles of Nawab, Khan Bahadur and so on (Gilmartin 1988 and Aziz 2001).

Aziz (2001) describes that the British were too clever to privilege the *pirs* according to their local followings. If the *pir* had large local followings, he was given the membership of provincial *darbar*[6] and in case of small followings; he was restricted to the membership of lower *darbar*. The other family members of a leading *pir* (*sajjada nashin*) were also endowed with *ziladarships*, *lambardaris*[7] and some non-commissioned ranks in army and so on (Aziz 2001). Aziz (2001) further explained the political influence of *sajjada nashins* and their families saying that in some cases the *sajjada nashins* had many wives which resulted in large family and all the members of this large family were appointed to different administrative designations. Moreover, these family members also multiplied their political influence by marrying into other landed elite (Eaton 1984 and Aziz 2001).

However, the British gave the descendants of Sufi saints wide space to dominate in direct politics that in the provincial elections of 1920 and 1946, the *pirs* represented 19 percent of rural constituencies (Aziz 2001). Thus the *pirs* became prominent part of Unionist party and All India Muslim League as Gilmartin (1988) describes that the elections of 1937 and 1946 saw many *pir* families which took part in. And when the demand for Pakistan strengthened, these families started to join Pakistan Movement vehemently and played a crucial role in organising support for Pakistan (Gilmartin 1988).

Therefore, the *sajjada nashins* and *pirs* of above mentioned orders enjoyed great patronage, through their direct or indirect, participation in politics, from the Muslim rulers of Medieval Period to the British Raj and even after the partition of India (Mayer 1967; Hassan 1987; Gilmartin

[6] Court.
[7] Chairmanship of villages.

1988; Aziz 2001; Ali 2005 and Rehman 2006). The *sajjada nashins* and *pirs* seem to have legitimised their former and latter participation in politics through the widely held belief among the local masses, especially in rural areas, that they have inherited extraordinary spiritual and material power (Eaton 1984; Werbner 1995).

However, after the partition of India, in Pakistan, many government regimes recognised the local authority of *sajjada nashins* and *pirs*. They had also tried to manipulate such local oriented authority through the implementation of different policies as Ewing (1983) and Hassan (1987) demonstrate that the traditional cosmology of Sufi shrines where a popular belief that, without a *pir*, it was impossible to reach God, was congruent with traditional regimes. The recently implemented policies, for replacing the constructed ideology of shrines by the true doctrines of Sufism, by Auqaf Department (established by Ayub Khan in 1959) was congruent with modern regimes of Pakistan (Ewing, 1983 and Hassan 1987). The former president of Pakistan Mr. Ayub Khan established Auqaf Department to transform the traditional doctrine of Sufism into modern and secular form. He tried to use the shrines as vehicle for modernisation and to taper off the influence of *sajjada nashins* but to no avail (Ewing 1983 and Hassan 1987). The efforts of Ayub Khan were not full-hearted as Ewing (1983) writes that Mr. Khan himself was *murid* of the *pir* of Dewal Sharif. This was because; he could not take stringent measures to control the shrines. Aziz (2001) says that Ayub Khan saw the shrines and *pirs* as important sources to maintain his political regime despite the fact that he seemed to be secular. He utilises the local power of *sajjada nashins* and preferred his political interests to the national ones (Aziz 2001).

Things did not change in the regime of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (former PM of Pakistan) and the contribution of government to establish new cult of shrines was constant (Ewing 1983; Hassan 1987 and Rehman 2006). The Prime Minister himself used to visit shrines officially and his Cabinet Ministers, Chief Ministers and Governors used to preside over the ceremonies of major shrines of Pakpattan, Sachal Sarmast, Jhang and Tonsa Shsrif (Ewing 1983 and Malik and Mirza 2015). And at the lower level, the district officials also used to perform such functions at the local shrines (Ewing 1983; Malik and Mirza 2015). Though, both Khan and Bhutto possessed secular thoughts in politics but they could not escape

from their narrow personal ambitions and the deep rooted influence of *pirs* continued to grow (Aziz 2001).

> Their government chose to identify themselves with the doctrine of Sufism in order to create for themselves a link with the religious authority. The Sufis were the symbol with which these secularists chose to legitimate their positions as leaders of Muslim democracy (Aziz 2001).

Ewing (1983) demonstrates that both Ayub Khan and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto attempted to increase Sufi shrines and the origins of such shrines for the glorification of Pakistan and of Islam as well. On the other hand, they also tried to capture the political authority of shrines but failed because of their personal political interests (Ewing 1983). However, the *sajjada nashins* and *pirs* have always been successful in maintaining their spiritual and political position strong because of inherited religious and spiritual status.

Moreover, Zia ul Haq (former president of Pakistan) introduced new polity named Islamisation. He tried to control the authority of Sufi descendants in the same way but for different purposes. He provoked orthodox movements of Islam. He wanted to replace the traditional teachings of shrines by orthodox teachings of Islam but latter he also utilised the religious and political influence of *sajjada nashins* and *pirs* (Ewing 1983; Hassan 1987; Aziz 2001 and Rehman 2006).

However, from Ayub Khan to Nawaz Sharif, the spiritual and political authority of *sajjada nashins* and *pirs* has been continuing. All the political governments (military or democratic) utilised the pseudo spiritual authority of pseudo Sufis. Aziz (2001) and Malik and Mirza (2015) demonstrate that whether the ideology of a political party is left or right and whether there is a military rule or a democratic government, the *sajjada nashins* and *pirs* prove to be an omnipotent entity. Moreover, disregarding the Islamisation by Zia ul Haq (Aziz, 2001) or modernisation by Pervez Musharaf, the loyalty of *sajjada nashins* and *pirs* for any political regime is indispensable (Malik and Mirza 2015).

Moreover, throughout the history of Pakistan, from the outset, the shrines of Sufi saints, besides the politics, have also been playing multidimensional roles in Muslim societies as social support, spiritual solace and economic redistribution (Kurin 1983; Rehman and Lund-Thomsen 2014).

Many words have been used in anthropological and religious studies on the role of shrines in Pakistan analysing the various 'positions'. Here, 'positions' mean various dimensions and these dimensions vary from shrine to shrine. For example, some shrines in Pakistan, remain virtually aloof from political arenas at both local and national level. They are playing significant role in fulfilling spiritual, social and economic desires of people as Kurin (1983) in this regard believes that the shrine of Abdullah Shah Ghazi in Karachi is giving socio-economic support.

Similarly, Idris and Ahmed (2011) and Rehman and Lund-Thomsen (2014) also discuss the social and spiritual support of shrines in the forms of interfaith harmony, economic redistribution, food and the solution of worldly problems. Keeping in view such cases, the study of shrines' role in Pakistani societies raises different challenges (Rehman and Lund-Thomsen 2014), especially when in the debate of politics (Mayer 1967). To make latter more understandable, we would like to quote Gilmartin (1988) who investigated varying influence of shrines' size and control saying that all shrines are not equal, some have less and other more influence in political authority in Punjab like Taunsa, Pakpattan, Multan and Jhang.

It is well investigated that how the *sajjada nashins* and *pirs* muster up and organise their local power by their unquestioned and unchallenged inherited authority. Malik and Mirza (2015) state that the shrines of Punjab are mostly located beside the rivers and due to this location, historically; they are followed by riverine people who, almost totally ignorant and illiterate, even do not know the original concept of Sufism. The *pirs* receive huge support from such people in the political arenas.

More so, throughout the history of Subcontinent, the *sajjada nashins* of these shrines have received huge tracts of land, revenue and other material resources from the ruling authorities, until the participation of India, by value of their unquestioned local oriented authority (Eaton 1984; Wright and Theodore 1999; Aziz 2001 and Ali 2005). In addition, this patronage of ruling authorities had established the *sajjada nashins* and *pirs* as, unchallenged authoritarians and due to this circumstance; they are able to maintain their influence (Malik and Mirza 2015). Owing to the patronage from the ruling authorities or governments and the large tracts of land, the *pirs* have established as feudal lords. The links with government and officials and the land play important role in maintaining

their position strong at local level especially. In this case, the *sajjada nashins* and *pirs* gain political power from their *murids* and from their tenants as well. In todays' Pakistan, the Sufi descendants are stronger due to land and religious status (Aziz 2001).

Moreover, after partition, the failure of the governments' policies, Ayub Khan, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Zia ul Haq, to replace the superstitious ideologies of shrines by modern Sufi doctrines or by orthodox teachings of Islam, has also played a significant role in reinforcing the authority of shrines in rural areas, in Punjab (Wright and Theodore 1999; Epping 2013).

The political economy is also playing an important role in local politics of these local oriented shrines as Ali (2005) and Hassan and Kamal (2010) demonstrate that the annual visits of *sajjada nashins* and *pirs* to their *murids* and the *murids* to *sajjada nashins* and *pirs*, at annual *urs* (annual ceremony), make piles of revenue by which the *sajjada nashins* and *pirs* reinforce their political cause. One more important factor, in the riverine region, is religious identity that, most people of that region belong to Barelvi sect of Islam which dates back to the Barelvi Movement in the 19th century, founded by Ahmad Raza Khan of Bareli. Epping (2013) illustrates that the Barelvis support Sufi shrines with whim and vigor.

However, some scholars are of the view that a societal transformation has occurred which restricted the socio-political and religious authority and control of Sufi descendants over the society. Ali (2005), talks about this societal change as;

> Change in political and social structure (awareness) and new scientific and technological inventions are threatening the traditional status of sajjada nashins.

The shrines are losing their influence as Wright and Theodore (1999), Buehler (1997) and Hassan (1987) further demonstrate that a multifarious paradigm shift has occurred in current shrine system which has diminished the role of shrines politically, socially and culturally, and restricted their influence to a narrow space. This paradigm shift refers to decolonisation, technical innovations, media, education and orthodox movements of Islam.

However, it is interesting that despite the ever growing political awakening, education, reformist Islam (Deobandi and Wahabi), which

strongly condemns the popular Islam referring to the orthodox teachings of the *Sharia* (Epping 2013), electronic and printed media, and academic work, the *sajjada nashins* and *pirs* have been maintaining their political control in some areas of the Punjab. There are some political constituencies in Punjab where the population is still under the political influence of *sajjada nashins* and *pirs*. The *sajjada nashins* and *pirs* are still continued to have social, religious, cultural and political supremacy. This is because, besides the religion, there are some structural factors of Punjabi society which have symbiotic relation with current status quo of *pirs*. These multidimensional structural factors have historically deep rooted in the political landscape of Punjab. We intend to examine this symbiotic relation and interdependence between political entities of shrines and society. We are of the view that only religion is not a supportive factor behind the status of Sufi descendants.

Besides religious factors, there are some other socio-political elements which help the *sajjada nashin* and *pirs* to organise political power. These socio-political elements include feudalism which plays significant role in local politics of Pakistani Punjab (Hussain 2012 and Javid 2012). The politics of Pakistani Punjab is dominated by the landed elite from British era to until recently (Javed 2012). Javed (2012) further states that land based politics still persists in some local areas of Punjab. When it comes to the *sajjada nashins* and *pirs*, they themselves are landed elites along with spiritual or religious elites and they use this kind of status in political bargaining.

Another important key element of socio-political structure is *biradari*[8] which plays a significant role in voting behaviour of Punjab. Ali, Chuadhry and Ahmed (2014) while describing the influence of *biradari* in some areas of Punjab, argue that if someone opposes his *biradari* in decision making, the *biradari* in reaction exclude him from socio-economic interests. In this case, the *sajjada nashin* and *pirs* also avail of this social institution of *biradari* in political bargaining. They have links with the heads of *biradaris* and get political support. Therefore, *biradari* also causes political support for *sajjada nashin* and *pirs*.

[8] A Persian word *biradari* is used for a brother; brotherhood, fraternal relationship. In Indian subcontinent, the term is used for members of the same caste (Ali, Chuadhry and Ahmed, 2014).

One more element is power structure. Power structure refers to *deraydari*[9] system. Chaudhry and Chaudhry (2010) say that the power brokers (*deraydar*) or interest groups, who help the politicians in organising political support through giving benefits to local people in both rural and urban areas, play a significant role in political process. Ali, Chuadhry and Ahmed (2014) demonstrate the provision of land to tenants from landlords, court cases (*thana-kachehri*), mediation of *biradari* disputes and other socio-economic problems are included in the responsibilities of *deraydar*. By the value of socio-political power the *deraydar* has to solve such problems, he is a power broker for local electorate.

In this regard, this study investigates that what kinds of socio-political and religious factors cause to maintain political status of *sajjada nashins* and *pirs*? The study also critically digs out the impact of socio-political supremacy of Sufi descendants on the political development in a Punjabi society.

Methodology

This study was conducted by using qualitative approach with descriptive research design. Different sampling techniques – purposive sampling, cluster sampling, stratified sampling and simple random sampling were used to classify and sample the respondents. Data was collected by qualitative methods – semi structured and unstructured interviews. Key informants and participant observation were also used as data collection techniques. Thematic approach using framework analysis as tool was used to analyse data.

Locale

The study was conducted in Pakpattan, a district of Punjab. Pakpattan District is globally renowned to have Sufi shrines of *Chistia silsila* (Eaton 1984; Lieven 2011). The shrines in Pakpattan – Baba Farid Ganj-i-Shakar, Bassi Sharif, and Chan Pir possess local, regional and global cults. In political context, it has been reported that the *sajjada nashins* of these shrines have been historically involved, directly and indirectly, in local and regional politics (Eaton 1984; Lieven 2011). The traditional socio-

[9] This term refers to a person to whom local people meet and discuss their daily life problems. In Pakistani rural society, deraydar holds land based power and he mediates between local people (Chaudhry and Chaudhry, 2010).

political structure – *piri-muridi*, *biradari* system, *deraydari* and feudalism in Pakpattan District have made shrine-politics nexus persistent.

Currently, Pakpattan District consists of three constituencies of national assembly (NA-164, NA-165, and NA-166) and five constituencies of Punjab Assembly (PP-227, PP-228, PP-229, PP-230, and PP-231).[10] The constituency of NA-165 is population of the study. There are numbers of shrines in Pakpattan District which are playing different political roles. This study includes shrines which are located in NA-165. These are the shrine of Baba Farid Ganj-i-Shakar, Bassi Sharif, and Chan Pir, Baba Muhammad Shafi, Baba Haidar Kamal, Shah Karam and Abul Kalam Shah Musa. All the *sajjada nashins* of these shrines are involved, directly or indirectly, in local politics. In contemporary politics of NA-165, the shrine of Abul Kalam Shah Musa of Qaboola, a small city of NA-165, is overwhelmed as it has been enjoying MNA ship since 2008 consecutively.

Results and Discussion

The central place from where *sajjada nashin* gets power is the burial place of a saint. There is a long chain of graves or shrines in each *silsila* of spirituality. This chain of shrines keeps growing since the outset of the *silsila*. The current *sajjada nashin* gets power from all of the shrines of his respective *silsila*. This chain runs in an inherited line. This inherited spiritual chain ultimately reaches the shrine of the founder undergoing lots of sub-ordinary shrines. The grave of the founder, Abu Musa of Qaboola, is the main shrine and all other sub shrines of the successors, even of the current *sajjada nashin*, are overshadowed by the umbrella of the main saint (shrine). On the other hand, the buried saint in the main shrine is directly associated with the Prophet of Islam (S.A.W). The shrine is the last resting place of dead and current *sajjada nashin* and with the passage of time this burial place becomes sacred and associates with religious piety. The memory of a saint and his charisma transforms into *baraka*.[11] This sacred place of *baraka* is visited by large followings especially from rural areas.

[10]District office, Election Commission od Pakistan.

[11]An Arabic word for holiness, virtue as inherent in spiritual blessing, spiritual power; the power to pass blessings onto one's *murid* or follower and successor as well.

This sacred shrine is believed to intermediate between man and God. There are many ways to avail of this intercession or intermediation, the most popular way is to become *murid* of the representative (*sajjada nashin*) of the buried saint. The other common way is to get direct association with the buried saint by becoming *malang*.[12] In both ways, the *sajjada nashin* is venerated like a prince because he is a direct representative having blood relations with the sacred chain of inherited spirituality. The *sajjada nashin* is believed to be deserved a great allegiance and veneration whatever the worldly position he possesses. In this result, he enjoys the fruits of both the spiritual constituency and the spiritual led political constituency. The former only can be seen by his subjects (*murids*) and the latter only can be seen by a common man (non-*murid*). In fact, he is a worldly person having all kinds of worldly desires and business but his personality is interpreted as very spiritual by his *murids* due to the *baraka* of burial saint and inherited sacred chain. This personality building has been observed in rural areas at large scale. The spiritual constituency of shrine is a major factor for organising political power. Besides the spiritual constituency, there are some other socio-political contributing factors that are discussed in the following text.

Religious Ignorance and Illiteracy

Religious ignorance and illiteracy are important factors which play a significant role in *piri-muridi*.[13] The *murids* are not only uneducated but also unaware of their faith and religion. Religious ignorance and illiteracy prevail largely in rural Punjab (Ali 2005). The rural *murids* see the shrine as a centre of their religion because they believe that their forefathers were made Muslim by the buried saints (the forefathers of *sajjada nashin*) and it is their obligation to serve *sajjada nashin* generation by generation. We have met many *murids* who had served many years of their lives for the *sajjada nashin*. We met an old *murid* who had spent thirty years of his life at the *khanqah* of Qaboola shrine. He remarked;

[12] The one who does not care about his surrounding and claims a direct attachment with divine, there are umpteen kinds of *malang* in Sufi mythology.

[13] A spiritual factor in rural areas of Punjab where local people believe that they are supposed to be allegiant and to give whatever the *sajjada nashins* of the local shrines demand from them. This system can still be observed in rural areas of the Punjab (Aziz, 2001).

> I was 15 when Saen Dewan sahib (the father of sajjada nashin) brought me at the daira[14] and now I am 45. I am happy because Saen Dewan sahib had given me the certificate of jannat (heaven) saying that this daira is your Makka, this is your Madina and this is your jannat, you do not need to offer prayers, you do not need to fast, you do not need to go for hajj (pilgrimage to Makka). I believe that I would be forgiven in hereafter by dint of the baraka of pir sahib.

He was very excited while telling his story. He was completely satisfied with his life. There are many other cases in local people like that of an old *murid*. The *sajjada nashin* and his other counterparts with some exceptions, on the other hand, are not qualified that when in the general elections of 2013, the *sajjada nashin* disqualified due to his fake degree of graduation. And his counterpart, the current MNA, is under matric. We observed some family members of other *sajjada nashins* of the district who are enrolled in Aitchison College of Lahore or, due to their piles of money, in British institutions. But, ironically, they remain *pirs* despite their high or higher education from standard institutions. They ensconce themselves in the same inherited spiritual thrones like their other illiterate counterparts. They are well aware of the illiteracy and ignorance of their subjects but they think that they are born to rule over these people. A *pir* or *sajjada nashin* must be from *seyad*[15] family. His illiteracy does not matter. Owing to illiteracy and religious ignorance; the local disciples believe that the *sajjada nashin* would become a *kamil pir*[16] when he reaches the age of forty. A chief disciple told;

> Pir sahib is still young and therefore he is busier in worldly life, when he would reach forty he would become kamil pir. This is because the Prophet of Islam was not given prophethood unless he got forty years old. This is from God. Man becomes full mature at the age of forty. I am sure pir sahib would become dewan and kamil pir like his father after forty years of his age.

Lack of education and religious ignorance play important role in maintaining the permanent political and religious authority of *sajjada nashin*.

[14] Hospice – a compound where the *sajjada nashin* of Qaboola shrine meets his *murids*.
[15] Family which is considered to have blood relation with the Holy Prophet of Islam.
[16] A Sufi saint who undergoes all the rituals of Sufi path.

Poverty

Poverty is also a major factor which turns many people *murids* of *pirs* in local areas (Aziz 2001). In rural areas of Punjab especially of Pakpattan, people are poverty stricken. Poverty makes them bow before the *pirs*, landlords and political elite. His daily life socio-economic problems make the poor go to shrine where he finds solace. Many poor villagers, who cannot afford going to doctors, go to the *pir* for *taveez*[17](amulet).

The *pir's* wealth is burgeoning while the poor *murid* suffers from the vicious cycle of poverty. The poor *murid* anticipates much from his *pir* and *pir* also promises much to give his *murid* but delivers very little. He takes more than what he gives to his poor disciples. There are a few households that are financed by the *sajjada nashin* in exchange of great allegiance and services. Many poor girls belonging to the poor household *murids* are serving their duties in the house of *sajjada nashin* in exchange of socio-economic support by *sajjada nashin*. The poor *murids* are satisfied and happy with this because this includes *baraka*. We visited poor rural family members who got *sajjada nashin* as their *pir* in legacy and their women are serving *sajjada nashin* and his family for good. A father's words, who had left his daughter at home of *sajjada nashin*, were;

> This is highness and kindnesses of this gharana mubarik (sacred house of sajjada nashin) that it gave place to my daughter. I feel pride that one of my daughters is growing in the house of pir sahib. She is lucky that she sees pir sahib and amma ji hazoor (mother of sajjada nashin) all the time.

The *sajjada nashin* has been observed many times saying his *murids* to be patient because this is the will of God and they would be rewarded in hereafter. On the other hand, he himself is struggling for his business of oil and gas. One of his *khalifas* (chief disciples) told proudly that *pir* sahib had set a target to establish at least twenty petrol pumps and by the blessings of Allah, only six are left to be set up. The *pir* is growing his wealth day by day. When in the days of the grandfather of *sajjada nashin*, the Qaboola shrine was roofless and the *khanqah* was of muddy edifice. And nowadays, the compound of the shrine and the *khanqah* is adorned with marble. There was not even only one petrol pump of the grandfather (the then *sajjada nashin*) of *sajjada nashin*. But in these days, the current

[17] An amulet to get rid of daily life's problems.

sajjada nashin has many petrol pumps and arable land. Poverty plays a significant role in organising political power. The *sajjada nashin* and his family know this. During the interview of the brother in law of *sajjada nashin*, he told;

> Poverty is a major factor due to which we lose or win elections. In Local Government (LG) elections of 2005, we lost the seat of district Nazim[18]. This was because we did not need the votes from local (poor) people; we needed votes from the Nazims (chairmen) of local councils. In general elections, all the local people cast their votes but in case of 2005 LG Polls, these local poor people could not cast their vote that was why we lost the seat of chairmanship of the district. Poor people want us more than the rich ones because we ourselves prefer poor people over the rich ones.

Poverty is a major element in making poor people *murids* of *sajjada nashin* or *pirs*. Rich and wealthy people are not as inclined to follow *sajjada nashin* as the poor ones do.

Biradari Affiliation and Hereditary *Muridi*

Biradari role in local politics has been observed in many forms. The first form of *biradari* role is traditional affiliation with the saint. In rural areas many *biradaris* are affiliated traditionally with a particular Sufi saint. The new generations are told by their elders that their forefathers had been converted into Muslim by a particular saint. There are a number of *biradaris* in the rural areas of Pakpatan district which are affiliated with different saints. All the generations believe that their forefathers were converted to Islam by the saints of Pakpattan. This affiliation with the ancient saints makes *biradaris* allegiant to the current *sajjada nashins* of the respective shrines. Moreover, this affiliation creates hereditary *murids* of *pirs* and this hereditary *piri-muridi* has become a social and religious value for the rural *biradaris*. No one can be rebel against the *pir* of his *biradari* especially against the *pir* of his parents. In rural areas, people are dependent upon each other (Aziz 2001) in different ways like the child depends on his father, he cannot make his own decisions in life matters, grandparents depend on their grandsons, wife depends on his husband or vice versa (in some cases), the decisions are made collectively not individually regarding the voting behaviour.

[18] District chairman

The other form of *biradari* role in politics is a commitment among all the members via their *deraydar* (chief). The *biradari* chief plays his role in politics as a power broker. He demands for a share in the power of politicians in exchange for the votes of his *biradari* members. He is responsible to solve any kind of socio-economic problems of his *biradari* fellows. The other members, on the other hand, trust on him and in case the chief does not fulfill his responsibility, they go against their chief and join the other cluster of their *biradari*. There are a number of clusters with in a single *biradari*. One *biradari* has not a single platform. The members of one *biradari* are affiliated with different kinds of clusters suited to their socio-economic interests. The politician does not need to go the every person of the political constituency. He has to capture *biradari* chiefs of respective *biradaris*. The *biradari* members give their votes to the politicians on behalf of their chief.

Feudalism and *Pirs*

The *zamindars*[19] and the *pirs* have symbiotic relations from the outset. As we described in literature review section (Ali 2005 and Aziz 2001) that in pre Mughal Dehli Sultanate era, in Mughal era and in British Period, the *pirs* used to be given large tracts of land in exchange for the support of their followings. Since, some *pirs* are themselves landlords while others have established their own land tracts and businesses like the *pir* of Qaboola shrine. If the *pir* himself is not a *zamindar*, he has close links with *zamindars*. If the *pir* has not his tenants like other *zamindars* do, he utilises the tenants of other *zamindars*. Though, the feudalist system is decreasing in countryside and finished in urban areas (Javid 2012). This is because much land has been sold or distributed among the offspring of landlords. However, in recent days, the feudalism is restricted to rural areas especially to the backward ones. In these backward areas, the feudalists still have control and influence over local people and use them for their political causes.

Moreover, the *biradari* system and the *zamindari* system (feudalism) are overlapped. In some cases, the *biradari* chief is also landlord and this position of *biradari* chief has more power to control his *biradari* members because he is a landlord too. In other cases, the feudal

[19] Landlords.

lord controls his villagers on the basis of his land, he gives land to the local poor people for residency and forming in exchange for their political support. Owing to his large land; he has symbiotic links with politicians like MNAs and MPAs and with police officials for socio-political interests. And in case if the politicians are *pirs*, the relation becomes stronger because the *pirs* have a spiritual authority and it is honor for *zamindar* to organise political support. The spiritual tag of the *pir* makes also stronger the traditional authority of *zamindar* over his villagers. Thus the element of *zamindari* system is also an important factor in political bargaining and helps *sajjada nashin* to maintain his political position strong in rural areas.

Government and *Pirs*

The *pir*-government tie is ever continued since so long. In pre Mughal era, the *pir* was king maker (Ali 2005) and the king was dependent on the *pir* to continue and maintain his throne. The same case is in recent days that in National Assembly of Pakistan, the large contribution of *pirs* can be observed easily. In case of Pakpattan district, the *pirs* have large followings and government upon knowing these followings gives them special patronage. This special government patronage to the *pir* makes *murid* prideful that the government officials bow before his *pir*. We observed this thing when Chief Minister (CM) of Punjab came to Qaboola to see the *sajjada nashin* for condolence at the demise of his father. Mr. Shabaz Sharif first visited the Qaboola shrine and then went to the *khanqah* of *sajjada nashin*. The arrival of CM was being discussed for many days in every nook and corner of Qaboola region by the *murids*. The *pir* on the other hand, is very clever and arrogant that he knows his bulk of followers and political support; he shows this arrogance to the government that once he went to see the CM of Punjab while the CM could not meet him. This was disrespect of *sajjada nashin* and was against his spiritual status. In this result, the *sajjada nashin* never went again to meet the chief minister of Punjab despite the invitations from the CM, according to personal secretory (a chief disciple) of *sajjada nashin*;

> Once we went to see the Chief Minister but he did not give any response to us, we waited a lot for him but he did not come out from his home, he (the Chief Minister) is too arrogant to see his party members, pir sahib does not need to meet him, he (pir sahib) is a dewan. He should not go to the door of these worldly

> politicians, he is a holy man, the worldly politicians should come to the pir sahib because all what they are, is due to the blessings of saints. This was the responsibility of pir sahib to meet him first because pir sahib went there on the behalf of public, he fulfilled his duty.

Different stories from many chief disciples and friends of *sajjada nashin* are discussed in this regard. The *murids* support the arrogance of their *pir*, they are of the view that *pir* sahib is a holy man therefore he should not go to the CM. The CM should visit *pir sahib*.

However, the *murids* see this government patronage as a blessing of popular saints; they think that the government is supposed to respect *pir sahib*.

Exchange of Political and Spiritual Powers

The *pirs* exchange their spiritual power with each other. Pakpattan district has three constituencies of National Assembly and five constituencies of provincial assembly. All the *pirs* of the district have their *murids* in different constituencies. One *pir* has not his all *murids* in his respective political constituency. His spiritual constituency prevails in different political constituencies. In this case, they share their spiritual constituencies with each other. For example, the *pir* of NA-165 has not all his followers in the constituency. There are different followers of different *pirs* in NA-165. On the other hand, the *pir* of PP-231 has not all his followers in PP-231. In this case, both the *pirs* of NA-165 and the *pir* of PP-231, exchange votes of their respective followers.

Besides exchange of political power, exchange of spiritual power has also been observed during the fieldwork. If some people in Qaboola or in adjacent areas have their *pir* in any other district of Punjab, they are allowed to visit the *sajjada nashin* of Qaboola shrine. The *sajjada nashin* of Qaboola shrine is their temporary *pir* on the behalf of their real *pir*. This is because their real *pir* or the shrine is far away from their home town. According to a chief disciple of *pir* Muhammad Ali Sahu of Shaikh Fazal;

> We are murids of one pir, pir Muhammad Ali Sahu sahib of Shaikh Fazal, but we have two pirs. The one is pir Muhammad Ali who is our real pir and the other is the sajjada nashin of Qaboola shrine. Saen pir Salman, the sajjada nashin of Qaboola shrine, is our pir on behalf of our real pir, pir Muhammad Ali, our real pir has said us to visit pir sahib of Qaboola whenever we want to see our real pir.

Political Economy of *Pirs*

Political economy of shrines is a major factor which encourages *sajjada nashins* to pursue their political causes. There are umpteen numbers of traditional, spiritual and historical events which make *sajjada nashin* collect piles of money. Firstly, the *urs* has a historical importance in traditions of shrines. The *urs* is a death anniversary celebrated every year by *murids* and the *sajjada nashins*. Every shrine celebrates this anniversary in specific styles or traditions. In some cases, many irreligious activities are practised such as drug abusing, prostituting, gambling and so on. However, the *urs* is a key for *sajjada nashins* to a locker of huge money.

The *murids* gather every year from every nook and corner at the shrine; they give money to *sajjada nashins* as *nazrana*[20] and feel pride. We observed that the *murids* give *nazrana* disregarding their financial condition. We also observed that the *pir*, on the other hand, is closer to the rich and wealthy *murids* that in his *khanqah*, the poor *murids* sit on the ground near the throne of their *pir* while the rich ones sit onto the beds and chairs. The *pir* never says the poor *murids* to sit on ground but they themselves know their condition and status. Similarly, the rich *murids* also know their financial condition and status, both are *murids* of the same *pir* but the rich ones are more confident than the poor ones especially when they find themselves at the *khanqah*.

The other important event is *yarheen*.[21] The *yarheen*, a religious or Sufi ritual, plays an important role in the political economy of the shrines. This event is celebrated in the memory of Abul Qadir Gilani, the founder of *Qadria silsila*. This event is celebrated on every 11th of Islamic month. At the shrine of Qaboola, the event of *yari* is celebrated both monthly and annually. The *sajjada nashin* of Qaboola shrine has six *takias* (spiritual spaces). And he arranged this event at his every *takia*. *Takia* refers to a spiritual space (Werbner 1995) where the *sajjada nashin* has large followings. For example, the main *takia* of *sajjada nashin* is Qaboola shrine, similarly in every surrounding district; the *sajjada nashin* has one *takia* or *khanqah* or *musalla*. All the *murids* gather with sweets, milk and many other gifts, at their respective *takia* to celebrate this event.

[20] Gifts in the form of money, gold, property etc, a *murid* gives to his pir.

[21] Every 11th day of Islamic month.

One more important day in Sufi rituals is *nachanny jumarat*[22]. This spiritual event is also an important part of Sufi mythology. The *pirs* and *murids* believe that on that day all the famous saints gather at the main shrine. Men, women and children gather on this day at the shrine and the *khanqah* of *sajjada nashin*, give money and other gifts to the *sajjada nashin* in exchange for the fulfillment of their desires and needs. All these rituals make piles of money for *sajjada nashin*, the *sajjada nashin* does nothing except to raise his hands for prayer for his followers. And in exchange of this prayer, the followers give money to their *pir*.

Women and *Pirs*

Women are more inclined to be influenced by *pirs* than the men. They are more illiterate and superstitious, sensitive about their faith (Aziz 2001). They are more vulnerable to the socio-economic problems than the men. They are deeply involved in family matters as they are the fulcrum of their families (Aziz 2001).

Women play a central part in looking after their children, manage the household budgets, find matches for their sons and daughters, look after their husbands and in some cases, bring up their grandchildren. They are at the centre point of the entire family. They are an important conduit of customs and values to coming generations. Thus they have greater interest in family matters than the men. That is why the family problems make them restless more than men. They go to the *pir* to solve their problems like childlessness, unemployed sons, unmarried daughters, unfaithful husbands, economic prospects and the health issues (Aziz 2001). The women have established deep relations with the buried saints. We met an old woman who was *murid* of the father of *sajjada nashin* and she has been visiting Qaboola shrine afoot for forty years. She was of the opinion;

> I have been visiting my pir since I was 25. Once my legs became paralised and I could stop visiting pir sahib due to my illness. I was very sad, I made a mannat that if my legs would recover, I would visit pir sahib every month. Now by the blessings of pir sahib, I am too lucky that my legs still help me walk to the shrine and pir sahib. All we have is by the blessings of saen dewan dastageer sahib, he was my pir and I want to die at his feet, at the grave of pir.

[22] Every first Thursday of Islamic month.

Thus the women give strength to the *piri-muridi* system. In some cases, we have observed that women have ultimate say in decision making; no one from other family members can dare to prevent them from going to the shrines or to the *pirs*.

The Ulema and *Pirs*

Ulema (the religious scholars) have a great say in the religious views of the people of Pakistan, especially of rural areas (Aziz 2001; Ali 2005). The *ulema* from different sects of Islam have different perceptions and interpretations of Quran and Hadith regarding the shrines and *pirs*. The Barelvis, a sub-sect of Sunni sect have great patronage for shrines and *pirs*. The *ulema* from Deobandi and Wahabi schools of thought condemn to follow the shrines and *pirs* and interpret (the following of shrines) as *shirk* (polytheism). However, in rural areas of Pakpattan, the ideology of Sunni Barelvi sect prevails and is deep rooted in the lives of the natives. The *ulema* from Sunni Barelvi sects are playing an important part in legitimising *piri-muridi* by a number of references from the Holy Quran and Hadith. In rural areas, the religious flagship is either in the hands of *ulema* or *pir*. The former legitimises to follow the latter. This legitimacy starts from *taqlid*, a governing element in the Islamic theology. *Taqlid* (Rahim and Affandi 2004) refers to follow or imitate without raising any question. What the holy men used to do in the past, must be done in the present blindly and unthinkingly. There is an acrimonious debate among the *ulema* of different schools of thought, regarding *taqlid*. All the sects of Islam are agreed to follow (*taqlid*) the Islamic jurists. But the *taqlid* of a *pir* is only pursued by Sunni Barelvi sect. However, the Barelvi schools of thought support this element fundamentally. Though in urban areas, some modern *ulema* even from Barelvi school of thought reject to follow an illiterate or ignorant *pir*, but in rural areas, the *ulema* advise and inculcate the rural masses to respect and follow the *pirs*. They have lots of interpreted Hadiths and Quranic verses. We have conducted interviews from some *ulema* regarding the following of shrines and *pirs*, they presented many references from the Holy Quran and Hadith for the legitimacy of *piri muridi* as they narrated;

> These (the pirs) are wali Allah (friends of God) and we should not say anything against them because God has said in the Holy Quran; the one who has inimical feelings for the wali Allah (the friend of God), is the enemy of God. (Holy Quran).

> Once the Holy Prophet said; O people! I have left two things with you, the first is Holy Quran and the second is ahl-e-bait (the descendants of the Holy Prophet S.A.W), if you follow both you would never go astray. (Sahi Muslim Sharif).

One respondent from among the *ulema* was of the view;

> By denying ahl-e-bait, we would not be forgiven by God in the hereafter. These, the ahl-e-bait are respectable whatever they do in their daily lives; we should respect them because they have the holy blood of the Holy Prophet in their veins.

All these interpretations of Quran and Hadiths turn the rural masses to be prostrated in the feet of *pirs*. The amalgamation of religious and cultural history of the Subcontinent has been perpetuated, giving free space to the *pirs* and the *sajjada nashins* of the Sufi shrines. The rural masses, due to very little knowledge of Islam and ignorance and superstitious mentality, follow the *pirs* vehemently. They think it is *guna kabira* (mortal sin) to challenge the spiritual and religious status of the *sajjada nashin*. Thus, the *ulema* are playing key role in *piri-muridi* system by giving legitimacy to the pseudo spiritual and very political throne of *sajjada nashins*.

Prevalent of Spiritual Myths

The people of the rural Punjab are very superstitious regarding their cultural and historical superstitious belief (Farooq and Kayani 2012). Different stories and fables regarding buried saints circulate among the rural masses. These stories circulate in a special kind of unconscious mechanism. These stories are created by the *murids* of *pirs* and are handed down by generations to the generations. The *khalifa* (chief disciple) who spends most of time with his *pir*, creates many stories of *karamat* (miracles). Any abnormal activity of the *pir* becomes *karamat*. We were told different stories of the *karamat* by many chief disciples. All the stories we heard from the *murids* had no logic or any supernatural sign but these are *karamat* of *pirs*. These stories, after the death of *pir*, undergo generation by generation growing curiosity and influence the minds of local people. One of chief disciples, whose father had spent many years with the father (the then *sajjada nashin*) of *sajjada nashin*, told a story;

> My father had observed many events of karamat in his life that, according to my father, once Saen Dewan sahib went to a beautiful prostitute, he slept with her, this act of dewan sahib surprised and graveled my father that he was very disturbed that night, he saw through a minor hole of the door, to his surprise, both dewan

> sahib and the prostitute were disappeared. There was nothing in the room to hide behind except a precarious small bed. After a while he probed again into the hole what he saw that dewan sahib and the prostitute were talking to each other. After some time, he probed again thrice, both were disappeared again. After they left the brothel, my father could not dare to ask Saen Dewan sahib to tell the whole story. When they reached the khanqah, my father went to his room. He was too restless to be asleep. After a while Saen Dewan sahib called on my father and asked him to sleep. My father went to asleep and he saw Saen Dewan sahib in his dream while telling him the whole story of the brothel. Saen Dewan sahib told him that he did not go to the prostitute for sexual intercourse; he went there to solve a problem she was facing. When my father got up, went to Saen Dewan sahib for begging pardon. When he found himself near Dewan sahib, Dewan sahib smiled and asked him that he had forgiven him.

Likewise, many other stories circulate among the local people creating intense curiosity in the minds of superstitious people and turning them *murids* of *sajjada nashin*. The superstitious fables play a significant role in establishing everlasting supremacy of *pirs*.

Political Ideology

Political ideology also plays a significant role in voting behaviour of the people. Ideologically, in urban areas of Punjab especially of Pakpattan District, the Pakistan Muslim League N has large voters. It is historically evident that PML (N) could never be defeated in the urban areas of Pakpattan district. It has always swept up from all the polling stations of all cities in all constituencies of the district. However, from rural areas, the *sajjada nashin* win by the value of his spiritual bases and gets votes of his *murids* and the followers of shrine while in urban areas he gets the votes of PML (N). We met some urban people who voted for *sajjada nashin* on behalf of PML (N), despite the fact that they never met *sajjada nashin* even a single time. The *sajjada nashin* himself knows this fact that in 2006, he registered his own political party named by Human Party but he never contested elections from the platform of his own political party. Though in rural areas, he has large number of votes of his followers than in urban areas but he knows that to contest elections from any other political party means to face tough time in elections. As he recorded;

> There is a large difference between the political processes of rural and urban areas. There are the votes of ticket (political party) in urban areas while the votes of personality are in rural areas. In rural areas, people do not see political party, they

> see the personality and status of the candidates while in urban areas, people do not see personality or status of candidate, they see their political party.

Thus the votes of urban population are always for PML (N) whatever the bad circumstances are being created by the leadership of MNAs or MPAs. Moreover, in urban areas, PML (N) has hereditary followings exactly like the hereditary followings of *sajjada nashin* in rural areas. As according to one respondent from Qaboola City;

> I belong to a 'Muslim leagi' (staunch supporter of Muslim League) family. My forefathers were staunch supporters of Muslim League from the outset. Our whole family members are supporters of Muslim League. And in recent days, amongst from all political parties, only PML (N) can be claimed as Pakistan Muslim League. In fact, we cannot blame PML (N) for the bad condition of the city; we can blame the MNA and MPA for this. There is no fault of PML (N), look at Arifwala city which also has MNA of PML (N) and greater developed than our city, PML (N) wants development but our MNA (the sajjada nashin) does not.

Political Elite (*deraydar*)

The elite class (in Marxist perspective) plays important part in changing the attitude of local people regarding their preferences, likes and dislikes and voting behaviour, at local, regional and national levels (Ali, Chuadhry and Ahmed 2014). There is a class struggle between local people and the elite class of NA-165. They struggle for their personal interests. The elite class tries to solve the problems of local people; they meet them for capturing loyalties and votes to maintain their status in society. They act like *biradari* chief in rural areas, meet their voters and provide them protections from any kind of socio-economic dilemmas. On the other hand, the local people try to get close to the elite personalities to become prominent in the eye of dominant entities of the area. They show their loyalties to the elite class and participate warmly in election campaigns. The behaviour of the elite towards the *sajjada nashin* is exactly same as the behaviour of local people towards them. This class struggle creates a hierarchical social contract between the politician, the elite class and the local people. Moreover, the struggle between local elite and local people give a clean way to *sajjada nashin* to organise political power. Poverty plays important role in this struggle that many poor people are captured by the political elite of NA-165.

In this regard, despite a societal change in political and social structure (Ali 2005), a paradigm shift – decolonisation, technical innovations, media, education and orthodox movements of Islam (Hassan 1987; Buehler 1997; Theodore 1999), the *pirs* and *sajjada nashins* are continued to have socio-political, cultural and religious authority through the above explained structural factors. The consequences of the multifaceted authority of *pirs* and *sajjada nashins* are explained in the following text.

Exploitation of Sufism

Sufism carries social, cultural and religious significance in the Subcontinent. It has symbolic value of peace, interfaith harmony, social support and spiritual solace. But for the time being, the institution of Sufism has been losing its purity. Its original doctrine is being deteriorated transforming from 'give to take'. Earlier Sufi institutions used to give love, peace, cultural harmony, and socio-economic support to the local population. The current Sufi institution has started to take socio-economic and political support from the local population. Earlier (original) Sufi institution used to deny worldly desires, political power and material ingredients of luxuries. While the current pseudo Sufism tries its best to maintain its position strong in politics and elitism.

Persistence of Ignorance

The *pirs* or *sajjada nashins* (with some exceptions) have been playing major role in maintaining the ignorance and illiteracy of the local people. This is because, the ignorance of local people is key to maintain their position. The more illiterate people means the more patronage for *pirs*.

Two types of ignorance in Punjabi society have been observed especially in NA-165 namely religious ignorance and illiteracy. In urban areas and countryside, some educated (especially in Barelvi sect) *murids* of *pirs* are victimised by religious ignorance. They have education but very little knowledge about religion. They follow the *ulema* led interpretation of Quran and Hadith regarding the patronage and following of *pirs* or *sajjada nashins*. On the other hand, the rural *murids* are victimised by both types of ignorance. We are told by many *murids* that their *pirs* had given them the guarantee of heaven in hereafter. This is a belief widely held especially in rural *murids* that their *pir* or *murshid* will lead them to the heaven in hereafter. They (the *murids*) have nothing to do

with Islam. Their religion is *pir* and the *pirs* are true guardians of Islam. The *pirs* persist ignorance by doing so themselves. A *pir* has also a *pir* as his *murshid* further. Once, during fieldwork, we found ourselves at the *daira* of a *sajjada nashin* who was *murid* of another *sajjada nashin*. He told one of his *murids* a maxim;

The one who does not have a pir as his murshid, the shetan (devil) becomes his murshid.

We heard this maxim many times from many local *ulema*. This belief is widely held in local areas of Punjab, especially in rural ones, that without a *pir*, it is too hard to find any proper way to live. This kind of narrative gives *pir* a full-fledged authority over his *murids*. Thus, to follow a *pir* and believe in it has become an essential part of religion especially in rural areas of NA-165.

Dynastic Politics

The full-fledge authority of *pirs*, due to religious ignorance and illiteracy among local people, makes *pir* a monarch. They get pseudo spiritual kingdoms in legacy. Ironically, many well-educated *ahl-e-sadat* (descendants of *pirs*) control the same pseudo spiritual throne of their forefathers. They are of the view that they are born to control local people. They interpret this as if they are serving local people by maintaining the *piri-muridi* (duty) of their forefathers. They interpret their political throne into spiritual. One of the *sajjada nashins* proved this as;

> I think there is no problem if a pious man enters in politics. In my opinion, sayasat (politics) is the other name of khidmat (to serve people). These people (rural masses) have been attached with our buzurgs (forefathers) since long ago. And our buzurgs had been serving them. Therefore, it is an obligation of a pir to maintain his forefather's silsila (chain) of khidmat.

On the other hand, the disciples have also been observed having the same thinking. They see the status of their *pirs* through the religious and cultural lens. As one of chief disciples said;

> Pir sahib (the sajjada nashin) is appointed as a dewan by his father (saen dewan dastageer sahib). This is a system of God that every area within a specific boundary needs a dewan (representative of the shrine) to solve the problems of people. These are divine silsilas (chain or order) of popular saints and it is the duty of a dewan (sajjada nashin) to protect and maintain these holy silsilas.

Thus, the inherited Kingdom is based on intercession in Sufi mythology. Intercession is an important and a core part of shrines (Hassanali 2009). The *sajjada nashin* intercedes between his followers and God because he is a pious and holy man having holy blood of the *ahl-e-bait* (descendants of the Prophet S.A.W) and the follower is a sinner.

Intimidation and Loss of Will Power

In Pakistani society, the *pirs* are damaging the will power of local people (Aziz 2001). This is the worst thing the local people especially in rural areas are found with. In every matter of life, the *murids* go to their *pir* for his counsel. They devote their will to the will of their *pir*. They do not make decisions even for a trivial matter of life. They are like puppet and the *pir* or *sajjada nashins* have great say in their socio-economic and political decisions. However, somehow, the *sajjada nashins* have been observed to be playing positive role in doing this. As they play important role in solving some social problems of their *murids*, by mediating, such as disputes among *biradaris* and matrimonial problems. But the repercussions of the loss of will power of *murids* are worse than this little social support of *sajjada nashin* especially when it comes to the decision making about voting behaviour. The *murids* cannot dare to make decisions about their voting behaviour without the counsel or consent of their *pirs*. As one of the respondents answered to question about voting behaviour;

> We are under the flag of pir sahib; we have nothing to do with any political group or party. Our party is of pir sahib and our votes are the votes of pir sahib.

Extremism and Social Cohesion

Many cases of extremist activities, regarding the question of following the *pirs* or not, are uprising. The story starts from a debate between followers and non-followers of *pirs* or shrines. This debate leads to extreme violence even to the cases of murders. We saw some tragic incidents regarding this in NA-165. Different people from different Islamic sects, especially between Barelvi and Wahabi and Deobandi blame each other. The followers (Barelvis) blame non-followers (Deobandis and Wahabis) of being *munkar* (dissident). The non-followers blame followers of being *mushrik* (polytheist).

Besides religious extremism, many cases of social disputes among *biradaris* and family members emerge due to the divisive thoughts

regarding the following of shrines or *pirs*. In urban and periphery areas, these incidents are limited to the extent of acrimonious debate or hatred. But in rural and backward areas, this goes beyond from the bitter debate or hatred to a great violence.

Political Hegemony over Local Politicians

Large followings and structural support give *sajjada nashin* and *pirs* an ultimate authority in the arena of local politics. He is like a potentate and dictator. He and his family members have control over local politicians of NA-165. Owing to this hegemony, the system of local government is being eclipsed especially in urban areas of NA-165 because of ever growing population in urban centres. The worse effect of the hegemony of *sajjada nashin* over local politician is that the local political competition is stagnant. The local political competition refers to the competition among different candidates of local government like chairmen and vice chairmen. We observed this competition in the urban areas of other constituencies of the district. Where there is no traditional leadership like that of the *sajjada nashin*, the process of local government is better due to the active citizens. In these areas, the citizens put pressure upon the local politicians and the local politicians upon their legislative counterparts (MNAs and MPAs) for the development of their community.

In case of the NA-165, the process of local development is stagnant especially in urban areas. Once at the *daira* of *sajjada nashin*, during the local government elections in 2016, all the candidates of chairmanship and vice chairmanship from the city were convened by *sajjada nashin*. He (*sajjada nashin*) announced that his brother-in-law was the candidate of chairman and his cousin (another family member) was the vice chairman of the city. He categorically declared that he was not going to let anyone contest over the seats of chairmanship and vice chairmanship of Qaboola (a small city of NA-165). According to his brother-in-law, it was against their status quo that if someone contested the local government elections against them from their own city.

The local politicians dread the spirituality based authority of *sajjada nashin*. They do not dare to go against the *sajjada nashin* and his family albeit without few exceptions that some people from elite classes of the city dared to contest over the seats of both chairman and vice chairman in local government elections last held in 2016. Some days later, the *sajjada nashin* coordinated with these opposite candidates too.

During interviewing, some local politicians from rural areas told that they were satisfied with the MNA ship of *sajjada nashin*. Ironically, when the local politicians were asked the same question whether they were satisfied or not with the MNA ship of *sajjada nashin*, all of them answered 'no'. They were not satisfied with his MNA ship but most of them said that they supported and voted for *sajjada nashin* in general elections. They did so for their personal interests, personal relations with *sajjada nashin* and ideological affiliations, according to what they answered. In this result, the local people of NA-165 cannot enjoy a local representative suited to their choices because of the political hegemony of *sajjada nashin* and his family.

Terror and Resistance

The urban people are more vulnerable to the terror and resistance from the political hegemony of *sajjada nashin*. The citizens of Qaboola are scared of raising voice against the hegemony of *pirs*. Despite the political awareness among the urban population, they are vulnerable to the traditional and dynastic control of *pirs*. The *pirs* are resisting socio-political awareness of the citizens. Many incidents regarding this kind of resistance have been observed especially in urban areas of NA-165. During our fieldwork, a major incident occurred in Qaboola city when some citizens tried to raise their voice against leadership regarding precarious sewerage system of the city. They had to face terror and resistance from political leadership. An FIR was lodged against those citizens. Some of them were beaten severely by the pressure groups of leadership. However, terror from leadership is being prevailed to resist, control and enslave the urban population. Besides the terror and resistance, there are many other social, economic and political repercussions such as corruption, confiscation of public and private property and crimes.

Conclusion

Over the years, the descendants and *sajjada nashins* of Sufi shrines have been dominating in local and regional political landscape of Punjab. Besides the religious legitimacy which is the main source of political power, there are some other socio-political factors in Pakpattan District that help shrines to politically dominate. These factors include poverty, *biradari* system, feudalism, *deraydari* system, prevelant of spiritual

myths, political economy, political ideology and government patronage. These are the most significant factors to probe shrine-politics nexus. Interestingly, both *pirs* and their subjects (*murid*/ non-*murid*) actively manipulate such situational factors. In other words, besides religious salvation and spiritual solace, the *murids* and non-*murids* have some socio-economic and political interests. The *pirs*, on the other hand, take care of such interests to maintain their status. In NA-165 of Pakpattan, the *sajjada nashin* or *pir* takes care of his poor *murid* and supports him financially and socially while the poor *murid* does the same providing political support in exchange. Similarly, the *sajjada nashin* also takes care of socio-political status of *deraydar*, *biradari* chief and feudalist and fulfills their demands while in exchange, they do the same for *sajjada nashin*. Besides this, the rest of factors – prevelant of spiritual myths, political economy, political ideology and government patronage also complement the process through which the *sajjada nashin* gets political dominancy. In this sense, all these socio-political factors operate in the framework controlled by religious and spiritual legitimacy of *sajjada nashin*. In essence, the *sajjada nashin*, besides his religious status, manipulates the traditional socio-political structure same as the other politicians do. Though a societal transformation has occurred in urban and periphery areas, but in rural areas, of NA-165, the traditional socio-political structure is continued as the study highlights the current scenario. The political leadership, earned by above explained process, of *sajjada nashins* and *pirs*, causes different social, religious, cultural and political issues.

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